The Ethical Dimension of Personal Knowledge by Jenkins, David O.
Loyola University Chicago 
Loyola eCommons 
Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 
1981 
The Ethical Dimension of Personal Knowledge 
David O. Jenkins 
Loyola University Chicago 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss 
 Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jenkins, David O., "The Ethical Dimension of Personal Knowledge" (1981). Dissertations. 2044. 
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/2044 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more 
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. 
Copyright © 1981 David O. Jenkins 
THE ETHICAL DIMENSION OF PERSONAL KNOKLEDGE 
by 
David 0. Jenkins, Jr. 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
July 1981 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
To Dr. Richard Westley, who went far beyond 
the call of duty in helping me prepare this 
manuscript under difficult conditions while 
never failing to elicit my best efforts. 
ii 
VITA 
The author, David 0. Jenkins, Jr., is the son of 
David 0. Jenkins, Sr., and Alberta Jeannette Jenkins. He 
was born August 22, 1946, in Washington, D.C. 
His elementary education was obtained in the public 
schools of O'Fallon, Illinois and secondary education at the 
O'Fallon High School, O'Fallon, Illinois where he graduated 
in 1964. 
In September, 1968, he entered the Florida Presby-
terian College and in June, 1970, received the degree of 
Bachelor of Art with a major in philosophy. While attending 
Florida Presbyterian College he was nominated for the Dan-
forth and Woodrow Wilson Fellowship receiving a designation 
in the Woodrow Wilson Fellowship. He served on the Social 
Relations Committee, and in 1970 he received an award for 
best Senior Thesis. He was awarded a fell~wship for gradu-
ate school at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee. 
In 1972 he received. the Masters of Art in Philosophy 
from the University of Miami. In 1975 he received the Master 
of Divinity from Duke University. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................... ii 
VITA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................. iv 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1 
CHAPTER 2 
CHAPTER 3 
CHAPTER 4 
....................................... 1 
THE STRUCTURE OF TACIT KNOWING AS 
EMBODIED TRUTH ....................... . 22 
Introduction .......... , ........... . 22 
The Structure of Tacit Knowing In 
Valu~ Knowledge ... ..... ........... 25 
The Body's Role in Value Knowledge 40 
Truth & Reality in Value Knowledge 47 
Personal Knowledge of Values 64 
EXPLICITATION OF TACIT KNOWING 72 
THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF KNOWLEDGE ..... . 92 
Indwelling & Conviviality in Value 
Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 
Discovery in Value-Knowledge 
Breaking Out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 
Conclusion ......................... 
THE PARALLEL OF KNOWING & BEING IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF A NOTION OF FREE AND 
129 
RIGHT ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2 
The Origin of a Notion of Right 
Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 133 
iv 
CHAPTER 5 
CHAPTER 6 
CHAPTER 7 
CHAPTER 8 
CHAPTER 9 
CHAPTER 10 
CHAPTER 11 
Page 
The Parallel Between epistemology 
and Ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 
Knowing and Being in Emergent 
Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 
Freedom 153 
"RULES OF RIGHTNESS" AS LEVELS OF 
HUMAN ACTIVITY ........................ 162 
THE INADEQUACY OF SYMBOLS FOR 
UNDERSTANDING THE ETHICAL DIMENSION 
OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE ................. 187 
CONCLUSION AND TRANSITION 
AN OUTLINE OF WHAT WE MUST EXPECT TO 
FIND IN POLANYI'S SOCIAL THOUGHT, 
BASED UPON WHAT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED 
215 
THUS FAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 4 
THE SCIENTIFIC ENTERPRISE AS A MODEL 
FOR MORAL COMMUNITY .•..............• 
The Moral Autonomy of Science 
The Ethical Dynamic of Science 
Truth and Morality 
241 
243 
248 
263 
Moral Rules In a Social Context ..•..•. 268 
Communal Change of Moral Consciousness. 273 
The Communal Good ................... 279 
THE MORAL INVERSION OF THE FREE SOCIETY. 287 
Moral Inversion in Society 287 
Marxism as an Example of Moral Inversion 298 
The Logic of Liberalism 
THE FREE SOCIETY 
v 
305 
311 
INTRODUCTION 
Few philosophers have achieved as much in so many 
areas of human endeavor as has Michael Polanyi. My study of 
Polanyi's philosophical works introduced me to an outstand-
ing and penetrating thinker in the areas of epistemology and. 
the philosophy of science, which emphasizes a wide-sweeping 
view of the ontology of evolutionary change. But these works 
were themselves grounded in the insights he achieved as a 
thinker in the fields of chemistry, economics, and sociology. 
And I found that an understanding of these works was helpful 
in understanding his philosophical insights. 
My study of Polanyi was not a mere perusal of a point 
of view. I encountered his thought in an attempt to discover 
insights which mediate between the epistemological methodol-
ogies of existential phenomenology and analytic philosophy. 
A teacher had recommended reading Polanyi's Tacit Dimension 
and Personal Knowledge; and, upon reading them, I became con-
vinced that the notion of tacit knowledge held much promise 
for satisfying my search. 
But my motive for investigating Polanyi's notion of 
tacit knowledge was not strictly a desire to find a mediating 
epistemological methodology. I, like most students of philos-
ophy, wanted more deeply to find some philosophical position 
which did more than suggest some point of view or fact of 
1 
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knowledge, as valuable as such a discovery might be. Perhaps 
I am only dimly reflecting a more wide-sweeping interestiin 
the practical import of philosophical thought; but I under-
stood my oKn search to be an attempt to find some rational 
guide for ethical life. 
I have always believed that some actions and even 
beliefs and intents were somehow fundamentally right whereas 
others were wrong. And I am convinced that most rational 
and sane persons believe this. But I have found it difficult 
to compartmentalize ethical issues apart from what I actually 
think and do, as so many reflective people are capable of 
doing. My acts seem always to be fraught with the reflective 
self-criticism: is.this act right? Should it be done? Is 
there a better way? What is wrong with what I'm doing? And 
in so far as my thoughts themselves were considered to be 
forms of action, I asked whether in some sense it was ethi-
cally correct--and not merely factually correct--to adopt 
certain points of view. In short, I have considered the 
ethical search for "riahtness" and for "good" to have pre-o . 
eminence over the search for facts or for wide-sweeping points 
of vieK which form a context for the facts. 
I cannot justify this preference. I'm not sure it 
~ be justified. But I have not chosen to attempt such a 
justification; I have chosen only to be led by this prefer-
ence into the search for those answers that are most 
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meaningful to me. It forms what Karl Jaspers the Fragestellen, 
the context in which all answers appear--the ethical question 
is my fundamental question. 
This question (What is right and Good?) was the true 
inspiration of my investigation of Polanyi's thought. Existen-
tial thought seemed to be a dead-end: I found Gabriel Marcel 
and Jean-Paul Sartre at an impasse which could not be resolved 
merely be accepting blindly the presuppositions of The Mystery 
of Being or of Being and Nothingness. Nor did I find resolu-
tion in the works of Heidegger or other existential ~hinkers. 
I was searching for a rational ground of human interaction and 
decision; and I found the existential refrain of groundlessness 
to be inimical to this search. Only Marcel was helpful, since 
he asserts the reality of human relations; .but still I could 
find no rational grounds not to "refuse the invitation" which 
he extends to "being-with" others in fidelity and love. I 
thought Marcel was right; but I needed more rational grounds 
on which to justify his (and my own) convictions. 
Again, the analysts offered me nothing more than clari-
fications of the use of words such as "right" and "good". I 
wanted to know what I ought to do in particular, concrete 
situations; but from Wittgenstein and Ryle I seemed to learn 
only what I ought to~ about such situations. I cannot deny 
that such reflections are helpful and even necessary for ethi-
cal decision-making; but clarifying how one ought to speak of 
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"right" and "good" is simply not sufficient for establishing 
firm principles of right action in concrete. situations. ~1ore 
is needed; and I felt impelled to search for what was lacking 
1n an analytic approach. 
I cannot justify this prejudice I have developed 
against existentialism and analytic philosophy. I feel my 
critique is generally just in so far as it goes. But I do 
not wish to devote much space to a critique of these broad 
philosophical methodologies. I only wish to state the pre-
judicial grounds that formed my motive for pushing beyond 
existentialism and analytic philosophy to new insights, such 
as those of Polanyi. 
Thus, when I encountered Polanyi's detailed descrip-
tion of the nature and role of tacit knowing as the key to 
the epistemological dynamic of scientific knowledge I 
immediately raised to myself the question whether there might 
be a tacit knowledge of values and of the principles of right 
action. That is, I questioned whether tacit knowing were 
reducible to being the dynamic only of scientific knowing. 
I saw the potential of expanding such a notion into other 
areas of knowledge as well; for to say that an explicit, 
focal knowledge of facts always relies upon assumptions of 
knowledge to which we are committed and of which we are not 
necessarily a\\·are seems to outline a dynamic that could per-
tain not only to science in its strictest sense but also to 
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the kind of knowing we might claim for non-scientific fields 
such as art and history. 
A close reading of Personal Knowledge and the Tacit 
Dimension suggested such an interpretation. But Polanyi was 
far ahead of me. He too saw the ramifications of his notion 
of tacit knowledge and worked on an expansion of it into 
other domains of knowledge. He acknowledged in these works 
that knowledge in general develops according to the dynamic 
of tacit knowing. And in later articles and books such as 
Meaning he argued for the reality of domains of knowledge 
other than science which also are supported by the dynamic of 
tacit knowing. Thus, art, history, religion, and political 
science were all given full status as true domains of know-
ledge. 
But what about ethics? Polanyi's .epistemological 
insights as well as the ontology which he develops on the 
basis of it lead naturally to knowledge-claims in other 
domains. Thus, s~ould not one expect or hope that ethics 
would be a domain of knowledge in its own right? If there 
are domains of knowledge other than science--domains which 
are limited and justified in terms of the standards and 
norms pertaining to their own subject matter--then why not 
expect an appropriate domain for knowledge of the right and 
of the good? 
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I began to search the works of Polanyi for an answer 
to my question: is there a domain of knowledge appropriately 
called "ethics" which is constituted by some grasp of "right" 
and "good"? Polanyi himself does not specifically address 
the problem of the existence of such a domain. But that 
does not mean that such a domain cannot be piece~ together 
out of what Polanyi does say about values, ethics, morality, 
social dynamics, and the dynamic of tacit knowing. Polanyi 
is far from inimical to such a task. Indeed, he is very con-
cerned in his works in social and political theory to respond 
to the question of moral right and good. But he develops 
explicitly only the areas of epistemology (philosophy of 
science), art (in the various forms of literature, painting, 
sculpting, etc;), history, religion, and political science. 
I am convinced, however, from the large number--of statements 
responding to moral concerns that he did not omit an explicit 
development of ethical theory as the result of holding some 
theory which would preclude the possibility of ethical know-
ledge. 
In the first place, I not only found no evidence of 
such a theory in his major works but rather found many inti-
mations of the possibility of developing such theory. Second, 
his works are full of references to what appears to be a 
tacit moral thoery which Polanyi had integrated loosely into 
his texts but never made explicit mainly because his focus, 
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though often shifting, was trained on other important issues. 
And this theory is most evident in his social and political 
works, though its basic structure surfaces even in a close 
• study of his specifically ethical statements. 
Thinking myself to be only one of a large number of 
people who had raised the question of ethical knowledge in 
Polanyi's works, I thoroughly reviewed the secondary litera-
ture on Polanyi in order to benefit from those who had cleared 
this ground before me. But to my surprise my study turned up 
only two such articles: one by Frank_Knight written in 1949 
(Virtue and Knowledge) and a recent one by Harry Prosch deal-
ing directly with Polanyi ·~ethics. Knight's article was more 
suggestive than helpful. He did not actually try to develop 
a Polanyian ethical theory but pointed out that one might be 
able to construct such a thing. I was already that far along 
in my research, so I turned to Prosch's article in hopes of 
finding some concrete guidance. 
~- -- -- ~ 
Prosch's article was indeed stimulating; but it stimu-
lated me by arousing my disagreement. His article centered 
around the most recent work which Prosch edited and published 
for Polanyi: Meaning. And that book presents a theory of 
symbolism (in just a few chapters) which Prosch lifts out and 
makes the key and essential notion of a "polanyian" ethic. 
This bothered me because I was already convinced of the possi-
bility of a Polanyian ethic on the basis of all of Polanyi's 
8 
other works prior to the publishing of Meaning. So I could 
not believe that a Polanyian ethic would be impossible with-
out his notion of symbols--or, at least I did not want to 
believe this. For then I would have to.: be wrong in my in-
sight. 
I read Meaning and realized its value for a Polanyian 
ethical theory. But I was convinced that there was a great 
deal more to developing a Polanyian ethical theory than con-
cocting one out of a few of Polanyi's last lectures. The 
entire notion of tacit knowing and Polanyi's theory of 
ontological change were presupposeq in Meaning and were essen-
tial for an understanding of Polanyian symbols. Hence, the 
ethical domain, in so far as it involved tacit as well as 
symbolic knowledge, also involved the kinds of norms and 
standards developed by Polanyi for other domains of know-
ledge. And this meant that a close study of all of Polanyi's 
important works in the philosophy of science and his social 
and political writings might indeed uncover--by way of making 
explicit--the tacit Polanyian ethic. Indeed, I take this 
insight to be my prime contribution to Polanyi studies. 
I decided-to examine Polanyi's philosophy of science 
first, since this constitutes the emphasis of his philoso-
phical work and is also the prime source of his notion of 
tacit knowl~dge. I believed that an analysis of a well-
structured presentation could give me the basic structure of 
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a dynamic of tacit ethical knowledge. The first half of this 
work is dedicated to this task. My strategy was to develop 
from Polanyi's philosophy of science (his epistemology and 
ontology) the basic dynamic and structure of moral knowledge; 
and then this structure could be confirmed in a study of his 
social and political writings. The structure of moral 
knowledge as made explicit in Part I can then act to orga-
nize Polanyi's scattered references to moral realities and 
their relation to social change (Part II). Using the basic 
structure of moral knowledge as an organizing factor, I can 
develop a coherent picture of a concrete Polanyian ethic 
from his social and political writings. And these together 
should tell me what, in Polanyian terms, constitutes a right 
action or a proper pursuit of the good, at least in a general 
sense which can be applied to specific situations. Further, 
such a picture allows us to see the ideal societal structure 
produced by such an ethic; it allows us to see ~he sorts of 
decisions called for in a moral society. 
More specifically, the strategy of my argument is 
aimed at finding and confirming a tacit structure of personal 
knowledge in the ethical domain through a detailed analysis 
of the important ideas of Polanyi's philosophical develop-
ment. I have already explained the nature, function, and 
relation of the two major parts; but it is helpful to examine 
the movement of the argument in a more detailed overview. 
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In Chapter One I present what I take to be Polanyi's 
fundamental idea: the notion of tacit knowledge. Relying 
on Polanyi's own technique of making explicit what lies 
tacit in an idea, I do not employ what many may consider to 
be "logical" arguments or point to "facts" in order to draw 
out a concept of value-knowledge which I believe would cor-
respond more or less closely to Polanyi's own concept had he 
developed it 'more explicitly. Instead, I simply apply the 
principles of tacit knowing to a presupposition which I 
believe Polanyi shares with me (a view for which there is 
ample documentation): that we ordinarily have a fairly well 
formed sense of right and wrong and of good and some kind 
of hierarchical value structure. Given this presupposition, 
I do not believe it is difficult to establish a case for at 
least the possibility of a tacit knowledge of values. And 
that is what I attempt to do in the first chapter. 
In this chapter I also integrate Polanyi's concept 
of the role of the body in the knowing act into knowledge of 
values. One cannot leave Polanyi' s notion of "embodiment'' 
in knowledge untouched in a theory of values. I attempt to 
show how fundamental life-values are rooted in biological 
existence and how less "body-connected" values can be seen 
to be integrated with them in a profound way. In the con-
text of embodiment in knowledge I argue that, if knowledge 
is intuitive (rather than "rational" or "empirical") in 
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character, then value knowledge must also be intuitive. Thus, 
value-knowledge, like all tacit knowledge, is intuitive in 
the sense that it is an embodiment of the person within value 
experience. And this experience is the ground for reflection 
and insight into value and the nature of the Good. At this 
point, I tie Polanyi's unique notion of truth and reality 
into his notion of intuition and insight in order to pre.cise 
in what sense value-knowledge can be true. In short, I argue 
that there can be a personal knowledge of values. 
In Chapter Two I apply Polanyi's notion of how know-
ledge passes from the tacit dimension to explicit concepts to 
tacit value knowledge. That is, I extend the notion of per-
sonal, tacit knowing to the explicitation of tacit knowledge 
in the form of personal commitments to concepts. And I 
argue that value-knowledge may be brought to explicitness so 
that we have access to concepts of value and of the Good 
which may be said to be true or false. 
Chapter Three extends Polanyi's notion of conceptual 
knowledge to the social, interpersonal ground of all knowledge. 
Demonstrating that Polanyi's concept of embodiment (now called 
"indwelling") involves a notion of interpersonal relations 
(which he calls "conviviality") I attempt in this chapter to 
show how value concepts are not just individual insights but 
refer essentially to the communal bond that makes individual 
life possible. Thus, I attempt to show that a Polanyian ethic 
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1 s grounded in values which reflect our communal bond with 
others. We are right, in Polanyi's view, to believe that 
others are persons just as we are; and this belief is the 
basis for a "convival" ethic, an ethic which is essentially 
social in that it bequeaths to each generation in the form 
of "tradition" insights into value that must be learned from 
"connoisseurs". 
-I do not wish, however, to give the impression that 
ethical knowledge is simply the learning of a social code 
to which we are bound. I do not believe Polanyi would wish 
to see a "Polanyian" ethic identified with casuistry. Apply-
ing his concept of the dynamic of discovery to ethical know-
ledge, I argue that new insights into value and into the 
nature of the Good are possible. We can "break out" of 
older traditional modes, not by ignorantly rejecting them, 
but by utilizing them as connoisseurs of the tradition to go 
beyond them to new ethical realities. These realities, like 
all new insights, participate in (and reveal more profoundly) 
a "whole" which makes sense of more fragmented insights. I 
argue simply that, if all forms of tacit knowledge give 
access to discoveries, then value-knowledge must admit of 
them. 
The third chapter ends the discussion of Polanyi's 
epistemology and the way it can be extended to knowledge of 
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values. The argument thus far has consisted of a gradual 
extension of tacit knowing to personal and interpersonal 
dimensions of conceptuality, an extension which was applied 
immediately to our conviction that we know right from wrong. 
Chapters Four and Five deal with an extension of Polanyi's 
ontology into the ethical realm of knowledge. These chapters 
involve two important shifts of focus. First, I shift from 
talking about the knowledge of values to talking about 
knowledge of the ontological structure of man. That is, I 
shift from speaking about how we gain knowledge of values to 
speaking about how we exist as human beings. Second, I shift 
from speaking primarilY- about values to speaking about right 
action (mainly because the first shift commits me to speak-
ing about man as actor rather than as knower). Thus, these 
chapters involve an application of Polanyi's theory of man 
(and being in general) to an ethical notion of right action. 
An importantly relevant argument in forming this 
bridge from an action-oriented ontology to a concept of 
right action in the ethical realm is my argument that know-
ing itself is an action and can be described in ontological 
terms. Furthermore, the reverse is true: Polanyi's ontology 
can be viewed as having the same structure as.the dynamic of 
tacit knowing. In Chapter Four I argue for the parallel of 
Polanyi's epistemology and ontology in order to show that 
knowledge of a value is also at the same time a commitment 
14 
to act in certain ways. Indeed, knowing itself is an act 
to which ethical norms are applicable; thus, knowledge of 
the Good is a move toward the good, a move that must obey 
standards of right action just as knowledge must obey stan-
dards of truth. 
Having established this parallel of knowing and 
. 
being, and having applied this parallel to ethical modes of 
knowing and being, I proceed in Chapter Four to consider 
Polanyi's concept of emergent evolution and freedom. 
Polanyi's commitment to a kind of universal freedom (in the 
sense that no event is entirely explicable in terms of the 
events that "cause" it) is obviously relevant for an exten-
sion of his thought to the moral domain. Man'is free in the 
sense that he is morally responsible for his decisions, even 
if this freedom cannot be conceived in terms of a rational 
philosophy. Again the parallel of knowing and being is 
relevant here in that the irreducibility of "higher" reactions 
to the "lower" elements that make it possible is due both to 
the epistemological principle that we always know more than 
we can tell and to Polanyi's notion of a "boundary condition". 
This latter notion is relevant to his concept of emergence; 
and emergence is a more complex and wide-sweeping concept 
of "breaking out", which I discussed in previous chapters. 
Boundary conditions are taken up more specifically in Chapter 
Five. In Chapter Four, emergence and freedom are extended 
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into a concept of moral freedom exerting itself in more and 
more complex and highly developed ways in pursuit of the Good. 
Chapter Five considers the moral development of man 
more profoundly as a movement toward higher levels of being. 
That is, the ontological structure Polanyi defines as a 
hierarchy of being in which higher levels rely on lower levels 
(which in turn support and participate in higher levels) is 
extended to the moral domain. Man freely pursues the Good 
through a process of maturing toward the achievement 'Of wholly 
novel modes of human being, modes which represent new insights 
into value, right, and the Good. I apply Polanyi's notion 
of "rules of rightness" (which he applies to the structures 
of reliance and marginal controls in the functioning of 
organisms and machines) to the moral domain, contending that, 
just as there is a tendency toward the stabilization of 
reactions or repeated functions so that "rules" of normal or 
"right" behavior are established and cannot be broken without 
damage to the structure created by them, so moral action pro-
cedes by "rules of rightness". These rules describe systems 
of behavior which make communal life possible, though they 
are rules to which we freely submit and change as we break 
through to new levels. I conclude the chapter with a-dis-
cussion of Polanyi's concept of "ultra-biology", which is 
immediately relevant to ethics since is describes the ulti-
mate end toward which man is moving as he develops higher 
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levels of being. Polanyi points toward Chardin's concept 
of the neogenesis as the apex of human development. And I 
take this to be a moral as well as ontological category, 
as I am sure Teilhard de Chardin did. 
Chapter Five ends the major discussion of the 
relevance of Polanyi's epistemology and ontology to the 
ethical domain of personal knowledge. I consider that I have 
thus far made three contributions to Polanyi scholarship: 
first, I have drawn from a wide number of resources to pre-
sent an integrated description of Polanyi's epistemology 
and ontology; second, I have located the parallel between his 
epistemology and his ontology and have lffted out from them a 
basic philosophical structure which can be applied to other 
fields of thought; third, I have extended this basic structure 
to ethical experience and have shown that ethical theory is 
possible in terms of personal knowledge. 
A fourth and important contribution is made in 
Chapter Six. In this chapter I take Harry Prosch to task for 
too narrowly identifying the possibility of a Polanyian ethic 
with his very late concept of symbols. I agree with Prosch 
that symbols are important for understanding certain aspects 
of moral life, such as the role of moral heroes. But my 
previous arguments have already established that a personal 
andnotmerely a symbolic knowledge of values and of right 
action and the Good are possible; and, on the basis of this 
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contribution, I argue that a Polanyian ethic is primarily 
personal knowledge though it admits the role of symbolic 
knowledge. Thus, my fourth contribution consists in ensuring 
that the whole structure of personal knowledge is applied tc 
the ethical domain. For this also guarantees that even 
those who do not have the imagination to appreciate the value 
of moral heroes can still legitimately speak of the sense of 
value, right, and wrong which all persons experience. I 
take this position to be unique among those which other 
scholars, few though they be, have suggested in regard to a 
Polanyian ethic. 
Chapters Seven and Eight are transitional chapters. 
Chapter Seven is a closing summary of Part I, and Chapter 
Eight outlines what we might expect to find concerning scat-
tered references to moral ideas which we find in Polanyi's 
social and political writings if I am right about the way in 
which I am extending his epistemology and ontology into the 
ethical domain. I consider the second part of the disserta-
tion to be a confirmation of the contributions I have 
advanced, though it is a confirmation which "fleshes out" 
the essential structure of ethical theory I have proposed 
and thus extends an understanding of it into more concrete 
images. 
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Chapter Nine returns to Polanyi's notion of the 
nature of the scientific enterprise in order to lift out 
the social dynamic of the search for truth (rather than the 
epistemological dynamic, which was dealt with earlier). My 
purpose in doing this is to demonstrate that science, con-
sidered as a human activity, involves essentially a moral 
strategy for achieving its purposes. Thus, science, 
replete with its commitment to truth, is a moral activity 
and binds scientists together as a moral community. Com-
mitment to truth, freedom of exploration, mutual control 
and polycentric interests, free competition for publication, 
etc., are all social anti moral activities which make the 
achievement of truth possible. And, if truth is possible 
only under such conditions, then the development of moral 
truth itself can occur only under similar social structures. 
Hence, the republic of science is a model for the moral 
community. Its essential structure is the fundamental 
structure of all truth-finding, which is the root of all 
moral development (since without moral truth there can be 
no moral life). 
But Polanyi, I argue, gives us more than science as 
a depository of truth. I have argued that there are other 
domains of knowledge besides science, and in this chapter 
I amass evidence of Polanyi's intended extension of personal 
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knowledge to other domains such as art and history. So what 
is true of the moral organization of science must be true 
about other domains of knowledge including ethics. This 
means that the ethical life is necessary in order to gain 
ethical knowledge. Thus, we can pursue the Good only by 
reference to moral truth and the ethical organization (both 
individually and communally that that implies. Hence, we 
find confirmation that ethics is not only possible as a form 
of personal knowledge, but that it is essential as part of 
the search for truth that personal knowledge participates 
in. From this point, the "confirmation" slides into a 
description of how moral organization functions in society. 
And the description matches what we might have expected to 
be the case judging from the ethical theory I developed from 
Polanyi's epistemology and ontology. The chapter ends with 
a description of the communal movement toward the Good as 
a moral achievement. 
Chapter Ten deals with the various moral inversions 
of this movement toward the communal Good in an effort to 
throw further light on the nature of this movement by virtue 
of some well-developed contrasts. To this end, I discuss 
Polanyi's dissatisfactions with rampant scientific scepti-
cism (which leads to nihilism), Marxism, and the liberalism 
of democratic institutions. These dissatisfactions are 
related to the failure of these social structures to 
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properly pursue truth and to the way in which they differ 
from the dynamic of the republic of science. 
Finally, in Chapter Eleven, I analyze Polanyi's 
notion of the free society to find the elements of moral 
culture which were implied in the contributions of Part I, 
as well as the more concrete working out of our expectations 
in earlier portions of Part II. This description of the 
free society concludes the dissertation. 
In addition to the research and argument portions of 
the dissertation, I have also added sections entitled "cri-
tical comments". These comments are intended to explore· 
various important critical insights into certain notions 
which Polanyi advances. Their purpose is to clarify what 
Polanyi means rather than to be isolated critical statements 
with no relation to the body of the whole. Some of the 
criticisms were suggested by journal articles and some of 
them were developments of my own thought (a minor contribu-
tion to Polanyi studies). Since I have intended this work 
as a whole to be a development of only certain of Polanyi's 
works, I have not amassed references for the critical notes, 
though I do not wish to claim that some of their basic ideas 
are not to be found in critical journal articles. My intent 
to clarify rather than merely defend or refute Polanyi in 
these comments should enable me to escape from a charge of 
building "straw horses". My work is aimed at explicitating 
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what is tacit in Polanyi (right or wrong) and not at defend-
ing his ideas. 
CHAPTER I 
THE STRUCTURE OF TACIT KNOWING AS EMBODIED TRUTH 
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
In what follows I take the "epistemological argument" 
to mean a Polanyian account of how we come to know that the 
values we hold are right (or, conversely, how they are 
known to be wrong). That is, I shall display the fundamental 
criteria by which we know whether what we value is what we 
ought to value. 
I call this a "Polanyian account" because I believe 
it is similar to one which Michael Polanyi would have given 
if he had developed his philosophical work in the area of 
ethics. I cannot claim, of course, to speak for Polanyi. 
He was a man of deep and enterprising thought, and one cannot 
guess what rich and penetrating insights he would have 
brought to the field of ethical studies. 
Polanyi's epistemological work is highly developed, 
and what he says about knowledge has import for many domains 
of human thought. Though he was a scientist and though he 
raises epistemological questions in the context of scientific 
work, Polanyi's expressed intent was to develop criteria of 
knowledge that could be extended beyond the sciences into 
the domains of art, religion, history, and politics. That 
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he never dealt explicitly with ethical issues, apart from 
piece-meal remarks that may be gathered from his various texts, 
does not preclude a development of his work into the ethical 
domain as well. Indeed, one can only assume from Polanyi's 
own intent, that he would be happy to see such an effort. 
The development of Polanyi's expistemology into 
criteria by which we know standards of good, right, and value 
is in some instances a straightforward inference. The whole 
tenor of Polanyi's work makes it obvious that an epistemology 
of values is an appropriate development of his work into the 
ethical domain of human experience and knowledge. 1 We must, 
however, rely on Polanyi's own understanding of the process 
of knowing: we must draw out what remains tacit in his 
thought concerning ethics and bring it to explicit form. 
This process transcends simple inference (which is itself a 
means of explicitating tacit knowing) in that is displays 
I 
entire gestalten of thought which seem to lie hidden and yet 
accessible within Polanyi's work. 
Ethicists properly distinguish between value theory 
and normative ethics. The first field deals with the notion 
of value and questions of worth; the second deals· with 
~ichael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y., Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 52. 
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questions of what we ought to do or be. To some extent 
questions in the first field may be resolved independently 
of those in the second. In the analysis of Polanyi's epis-
temology, ·I shall deal with questions of value. I shall take 
up the grounds of normative theory in the analysis of his 
ontology. Generally, I shall show that what Polanyi says 
about how we come to know and to justify knowledge claims 
may, in Polanyi's own terms, be legitimately extended to a 
description of how we come to discover values and justify 
universal notions of worth. 
In this chapter I will analyze Polanyi's fundamental 
notion of tacit knowing and show that it is applicable to 
our presupposed knowledge of values, I will argue that we 
do in fact have a tacit knowledge of values. In this context, 
I will employ Polanyi's notion of "embodiment" to elucidate 
the manner in which value-knowledge, as tacit, is rooted in 
biological, bodily existence. This tacit "body-knowledge" 
will be identified with intuition, a notion which will be 
extended to the fundamental mode of personal knowledge as a 
whole. I will discuss Polanyi's concept of truth and reality 
in relation to intuition and will apply these epistemological 
concepts to what I take to be a legitimate expansion of them 
into an analysis of our knowledge of values. Thus, we begin. 
immediately with Polanyi' s fundamental idea and relate it' to 
our presupposed value-knowledge. 
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1. The Structure of Tacit Knowing in Value-Knowledge 
The question concerning how we come to know may be 
raised from within a variety of perspectives. Our perspective 
is governed by a particular epistemological question we are 
asking of Polanyi: How do we come to know values? 
We can begin to answer this question by analyzing 
what Polanyi calls the tacit dimension of knowing; thus, we 
can begin by asking how tacit knowing can involve knowledge of 
values. 
A few simple examples will suffice to introduce us to 
the notion of tacit knowing. How do we recognize a face in a 
crowd? Obviously no single face is so radically different 
from all others that it stands out because of these differences. 
Rather, when we look for someone in the crowd, we already have 
a sense of what we are looking for: a familiar face. But 
what is it about a face that makes its features familiar? No 
one feature can account for this familiarity, nor can the ex-
pression it bears do so--though we do talk at times as if this 
were the case, as when we say something like, "It must be John; 
I'd recognize that nose anywhere". But our knowledge that 
this is the person we are looking for cannot be justified by a 
close analysis of the person's features. We know we have 
found our friend but cannot specify in detail how we know this. 2 
?.Mi-chael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y., Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 4-5. 
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Again, we may examine the simple example of reading. 
When we read, we attend to the meaning of sentences and to 
the thought (argument, description, etc.) they communicate. 
We could not do this if we did not know the words that con-
stitute the sentence and the letters that constitute the 
words. Indeed, we would insist that we do know these even 
if we were unable to account immediately for just how we 
knew them when we weren't paying attention to them. Again, 
we are claiming to know something without being able to 
specify in detail how we know it. Nonetheless, we can point 
to our understanding of the meaning of a sentence as evi-
dence that we do know what we claim to know even though we 
cannot tell how we know it. 3 
These examples serve to clarify one feature of tacit 
knowledge: its nature as a kind of "silent" knowledge. The 
word "tacit" means "silent", and Polanyi employs it to 
describe a fundamental feature of knowing: every knowledge 
claim relies upon knowledge we have but are not aware of 
until we focus our attention on it. It remains "silent" 
until we address it and force it to speak concerning its role 
in knowledge. 
3Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y., Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 22. 
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What is the structure of this silent or "tacit" dimen-
sion of knowing? The clue to this structure lies in the word 
"rely". We rely upon knowledge of which we are unaware in 
order to be aware of something else. That upon which we rely 
Polanyi calls the "proximal" term; and that on which we focus 
while relying on the proximal term is called the "distal" 
term. The word "proximal" suggests nearness, and the word 
"distal" suggests distance. Thus, we rely on what is "close at 
hand" in order to become aware of what is relatively more dis-
tant. In the examples above, our familiarity with the features 
of the person we were looking for was the proximal term of our 
explicit, distal focus of recognition in a crowd. And our 
proximal knowledge of the letters of a word is essential to 
understanding the "distal" meaning of the sentence. The proxi-
mal terms, when focused upon, are seen as isolated particulars 
with no functional relation to the distal term, which.inte-
4 grates these pariiculars into a coherent pattern. But when 
relied upon in an act of tacit knowing, the proximal terms of 
knowledge form an essential functional relationship with the 
distal terms. 
We should note immediately that the fundamental struc-
ture of tacit knowing as a reliance upon unspecified knowledge 
to attend to specifiable meanings is itself an "ontological 
Essa s b Michael Polan i, edited 
The University of Chicago Press, 
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commitment". 5 Tacit knowing is not a critical stance which 
throws doubt upon knowledge claims. On the contrary, Polanyi 
asserts that this central theme of his epistemology is a 
description of an a-critical ontological commitment: a 
depth commitment to understand what we experience as being 
6 fundamentally real. 
Let us clarify a few terms which P6lanyi employs in 
regard to the dynamic of tacit knowing. Polanyi identifies 
the proximal term in the act of knowing with subsidiary 
knowledge and the distal term with focal knowledge. 7 
These identifications make semantic sense in that 
the distal term appears as such only when we focus our atten-
tion on it; and the proximal term is subsidiary ~o such a 
form: i.e., it "subsists" in a tacit way, silently support-
ing such a focus. Thus, our knowledge of letters in a word 
5Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y., Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 13. 
6 I must remind the reader, however, that at this 
point I am referring only to the structure of tacit knowing 
in its barest and most essential features. I am not saying 
that Polanyi argues that we are committed to a particular 
view of reality as a whole, but rather that the assumption 
that experience bears on reality is an essential component 
of any knowledge claim. This is an important claim and will 
have a profound affect upon what w~ can say about value-
knowledge. 
7 Knowing and Being: 
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: 
p. 128. 
Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited 
University of Chicago Press, 1969), 
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is subsidiary to the focal meaning of the word or to 
sentences comprised of words. 
The appearance of things within the functional 
relation of subsidiary and focal types of knowledge is called 
the "phenomenal" structure of tacit knowing. 8 The word 
"phenomenon" means "appearance"; and Polanyi is claiming 
that distal, or focal, knowledge is the explicit conscious 
appearance of what lay hidden in the tacit dimension of 
knowledge. For example, focusing one's attention on a paint-
ing in an effort to determine style may enable one to notice 
aspects of the painting which were not noticed before. One 
may notice, e.g. that broad, sweeping strokes and bright 
opaque colors give the painting its ephemeral quality. We 
were not unaware of these stylistic techniques before such 
an analysis; we were tacitly aware of them. And because 
we were tacitly already aware of them, we were able to raise 
the question of style and seek out the stylistic techniques. 
Thus, when we focused on them, they rose up out of the 
8Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y., Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 11. 
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still hidden depths of the painting and revealed themselves 
for what they were: they appeared. 
Concerning this aspect of tacit knowing, Polanyi 
says, "This is the dynamic of tacit knowing: the questing 
imagination vaguely anticipating experiences not yet grounded 
in subsidiary particulars evokes these subsidiaries and thus 
implements the experience the imagination has sought to 
achieve". 9 
The functional and phenomenal structure of tacit 
knowing are clearly intimately related. Our reliance upon 
tacit knowledge in order to focus upon explicit objects of 
knowledge is essentially the means whereby the tacit leaves 
its silent hiddeness and appears. So Polanyi says, 
" ... We are aware of the proximal term of an act of tacit 
knowing in the appearance of its distal term. We are 
aware10 of that from which we are attending to another thing 
9Knowin 
by Marjor1e 
pp . 19 9 - 2 0 0 . 
lOMichael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y., Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 11. 
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in the appearance of that thing". 11 
We should not be surprised, then, when Polanyi claims 
that the appearance of something is essentially the meaning of 
the particulars we rely upon in order to focus upon it. The 
joint meaning of particulars, as integrated into a comprehen-
sive whole through focal attention, is called the "physiognos-
tic'' meaning of the particulars known hitherto only tacitly. 12 
llwe must, however, avoid identifying tacit knowledge 
with the actual ap~earance. Such an identification would 
contradict the not1on of tacit knowledge since "tacit" by 
definition is that aspect of knowledge that does not appear. 
In what way, then, are we aware of what we know tacitly? 
This question presupposes that tac1t knowledge is either 
another kind of knowing which requires a different kind of 
awareness from that which we have of explicit phenomena; or else 
that it is the same kind of knowledge arbitrarily partitioned 
from explicit phenomena. Polanyi does not intend tacit know-
ledge to be understood either as a different kind of knowledge 
or as a different "intensity" of knowledge. We are aware of 
the tacit dimension of knowledge through our awareness that 
what we know explicitly is not the whole of what can be known 
but is known as such by a reliance on other elements of know-
ledge which do not appear. Tacit knowledge is what we rely on 
in bringing some particular aspect of knowledge to explicit 
focus. This "bringing to focus" is itself an explicitation 
of what was formally tacit. Our awareness of the tacit as 
tacit is, however, reduced to a general sense that what we 
see explicitly before us has undefined borders that point 
outward toward areas of life of which we are not aware but 
upon which we rely in order to be conscious of an explicit 
object at all. Tacit knowledge, then, is not identical with 
the ap~earance of an object, though we are aware of tacit 
knowle ge in the appearance of a thing. 
12Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited 
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 
pp. 12 8-9. 
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This term has within it the notion of appearance, since the 
physiognomy of a thing is its surface appearance. And this 
aspect of meaning is also identified with the ontological 
aspect of tacit knowing since Polanyi says that this aspect 
is constituted by a reliance upon the particulars of an 
d h . . . . 13 entity to atten to t e1r J01nt mean1ng. 
An example of physiognostic meaning is the mere visual 
appearance of any object. Its shape, texture, color, etc., 
is presented as a coherent mass, a "physiognomy" of unique 
features. But ideas also have a physiognostic meaning, an 
appearance of structure and pattern of dynamic flow, a con-
ceptual content which is kin to the appearance of objects. 
The concept of Good, eg., has a unique physiognomy composed 
of various experiences which we denote as "good": the shar-
ing of friendship and love, achievement in one's profession, 
etc. Thus, the shape and structure of any meaning, whethe~ 
perceptual or conceptual, is its phys.iognostic meaning. 
Intellectual knowledge of values can be seen to share 
the same structure common to all other forms of knowledge. 
Polanyi indeed applies the structure of tacit knowing to all 
levels of knowledge from perception and motor skills to the 
13Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y., Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 10, 13. 
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highest intellectual endeavors. 14 He says, "The shaping of 
our conceptions is impelled to move from obscurity to clarity 
and from incoherence to comprehension, by an intellectual dis-
comfort similar to that by which our eyes are impelled to make 
clear and coherent the things we see''. 15 I shall go into more 
detail about the various levels of tacit knowing shortly; but 
for now we can establish at least some fundamental ideas about 
value-knowledge if such knowledge is tacit. 
To begin, values are meaningful as explicitations of 
knowledge that is tacit. This statement makes sense when we 
note that for Polanyi all knowledge is either tacit or relies 
on what is tacit. Now, a value can indeed be interpreted 
merely as an emotive preference or as an attitude. But, even 
if we interp~et a value in this way, we do not escape the 
Polanyian dynamic of tacit knowing. For the assertion "values 
are only emotive preferences or attitudes" is itself a know-
ledge-claim about the nature of values (otherwise the "argu-
ment" for a preference theory could be seen merely as a 
statement of personal preference on the part of the speaker 
and would bear no persuasive force other than as an emotive 
appeal). And this knowledge-claim relies upon a tacit 
awareness Of emotive preferences. 
14Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 13. 
15Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), pp. 100-01. 
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Thus, we must raise the question whether the distinc-
tion between emotions (or preferences) and conceptual know-
ledge is so clear-cut. If emotions can be said to be a kind 
of awareness (and indeed the notion of emotions of which we 
are unaware in any sense is an odd one, denying even a 
Freudian theory of the unconscious which states that we are 
"aware" of them though not consciously), then we must ask 
whether this awareness is knowledge in any sense. Obviously, 
such awareness is not conceptual knowledge. But to deny 
altogether that it is knowledge leaves us unable to explain 
how we become aware conceptually of our emotional preferences. 
Perhaps our only recourse is not to "proof" of such knowledge 
but to an acknowledgment that, unclear as our notion of such 
knowledge might be, our emotions must be understood in such 
a ~ay as to include a knowing awareness of them. 
The notion of tacit knowledge as defined by Polanyi 
best fits the description of this kind of knowing. Every 
knowledge-claim about the nature of values in general or 
about the importance (or unimportance) of particular values 
relies upon the knowing-awareness of these values, even if 
we represent them as mere emotional preferences. I.e., we 
rely upon a tacit knowledge of preferences and ascriptions 
of worth in order to assert anything explicitly about values. 
Values are meaningful as explicitations of tacit knowledge. 
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Polanyi, of course, does not speak of values in this 
way, since he never accomplishes a description of value 
theory in the context of a theory of tacit knowing. But if 
we adopt his theory as he states it, then tacit knowing is 
well exemplified in the manner in which we hold and are 
aware of values. 
This does not mean that Polanyi is willing to explain 
how we come to know things by claiming that we already know 
what we are trying to explain. Taken to extremes, this is 
an absurd argument, since it would simply say that somehow 
we already know what we are trying to explain. But the notion 
of tacit knowledge is not so absurd. Tacit integrations are 
the joint meanings of the tacit particulars comprising them. 
Such meanings are tacitly more than any single tacit particu-
lar; as integrations, they are not just "sums" of tacitly 
known elements upon which we rely to focus on certain ideas. 
This "more" is a creative "more" in that the joint meaning of 
tacit particulars is not identifiable with any idea previously 
known tacitly and yet says in some sense what several tacit 
particulars say "together". Explicit values, then, are held 
as integrations of· joint particulars which we rely on in 
attending to the vague and unorganized notions of valuing in 
order to ascribe a standard of worth to something. Statements 
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concerning value-knowledge are rooted in tacit appreciations 
of value or else tacit appreciations which are initially 
integrated explicitly as values. 
Further, value knowledge is not mere subjective asser-
tion. A more comprehensive understanding of tacit knowledge 
will help us understand why values are not merely subjective. 
Tacit integrations themselves are not just subjective 
assertions proclaiming the meaning of more fundamental 
beliefs. We must remember that the tacit dimension of know-
ledge involves a commitment that our thoughts bear on reality. 
The visions evoked in an attentive focus on some particular 
problem are suggested by commitments that are already func-
tioning tacitly. In the case of value-knowledge, the problem 
concerning how to ascribe worth to acts, th~ughts, feeling, 
etc., evokes through attentive thought, visions of standards 
of worth. These visions are not just subjective assertions 
because they are creative integrations of the joint meanings 
of various experiences of worth: times when we have con-
sidered one idea superior to another, or a person's life as 
morally superior to another, or a way of life as better than 
some other way. We perceive certain things as better than 
others (eg., we value human life over that of an insect; or, 
we prefer our mothers over total strangers). We evaluate 
our situation and take preferred courses of action. All of 
these fundamentally human acts are acts of ascribing the 
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worth of one thing, act, or situation over another; and such 
worth-ascribing acts seem to be essential for human life. 
Without some kind of order of preference, some kind of capa-
city for evaluation, human actions essential for life (food 
gathering, social structure, etc.) would be impossible. Thus, 
we must conclude that we do have the capacity to evaluate and 
that this capacity is rooted in a drive to make evaluative 
sense out of life-experiences. 
Insight into value, then, is rooted in concrete experi-
ences, integrating their meanings into unified visions which 
cannot be separated in any way from the experiences they are 
rooted in. The word "subjective" means for Polanyi simply an 
assertion that is made outside of the tacit commitments one 
1 . . 16 lves ln. Such assertions are generally shown to be subjec-
tive (and mistaken) in that they have little power to bear out 
the reality we live in, a power possessed by valid integrations 
of tacit beliefs. 17 
Values, then, are integrations of the experienced mean-
ings lived through in concrete situations of ascribing worth. 
And such integrations are inextricably rooted in these 
16Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962)' p. 304. 
17 
Ibid., I>· 37. 
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experiences and are not "subjective" in the sense of being 
d . h . , . 18 unconnecte Wlt exper1ence or aro1trary. 
18To some exte11t we have already tried to clarify Polanyi's notion 
of tatit knowledge. Polanyi spent no little effort in clarifying this 
notion himself, though each effort leaves questions unanswered. Polanyi 
never seems to make explicit just what tacit knowing really is in itself. 
He defines tacit knowing essentially in relation to explicit knowledge, 
each time relying on a phenomenological description of the manner in 
which explicit knowledge relies on tacit knowing. Hence, we might observe 
that Polanyi relies fUJldamentally upon description and an appeal to intui-
tion in his attempt to establish a case for tacit knowing. His work Per-
sonal Knowledge is a massive attempt to demonstrate that the enterprise of 
science relies upon a "tacit" theory of tacit knowing; but his argument 
leads only to the persuasive assertion that the tacit dimension of know-
ledge must be acknowledged without detailing how we experience it in 
itself. 
Polanyi, of course, is in no position to describe tacit knowing 
. in itself. Tacit knowing is known only in relation to explicit knowledge, 
only as its support. In itself (if it could be separated from explicit 
knowledge) it must remain silent. It can tell us nothing about itself. 
Thus,. we cannot quite grasp this "awareness of awareness" in itself; we 
cannot fully explicitize the tacit dimension. And this "criticism" of the 
tacit dimension is precisely, according to Polanyi, part of the descrip-
tion of it. To argue that we are reduced to simply acknowledging that we 
know in a tacit manner is to assert precisely what Polanyi means by tacit 
knowing: that we always know more than we can tell, and this knowledge is 
not amenable to proof. ~~- -~ ·-·----· ···· ·· ·· · 
- ~·~~. -----··----· - -
We can rail against this assertion of "unknowable knowledge", cal-
ling it nonsense and mere assumption. Polanyi's argument is only as con-
vincing as the acknowledgment it foists upon us. But to be clear, this 
does not mean that Polanyi is ·wrong. Even if we maintain either a stan-
dard of empirical verification or rational demonstration as a criterion 
for the acceptability of a theory such as that of a dimension of "tacit" 
knowing, the unfounded assertion of such a theory does not thereby demon-
strate its falsehood. 
If we are willing to accept a theory of tacit knowledge, despite 
the difficulties that exist in distinguishing it from a Freudian uncons-
cious or a Jamesian "fringe consciousness", then a claim that value know-
ledge relies on tacit knowledge is a proper claim. But still unclear is 
_!he manner in which we "rely" on. tacit_ knowledge in order to focus our 
attention -eXplicitly. ·we may consider the relation bebveen tacit and ex-
P~icit to be one of several types: associative, causal, logical, induc-
tlvely inferential, or as a relation of meaning. Though Polanyi often 
spea~s of the last as th~ prop<=:r relat_ion between the tacit and tJle 
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Having described the notion of values as rooted in 
tacit knowledge of evaluation experiences, we may now turn 
to a deeper analysis of how these experiences arise as tacit 
forms of knowing. We turn now to Polanyi's concept of the 
body and its fundamental rule in perception and the unique 
kind of knowledge we call skills. 
eXplicit, he sometimes seems to include one or more of the other types I 
have named. And he never clarifies in detail how "reliance" can be a 
relation of "meaning" (in the sense that the eXplicit is the meaning of 
tacit knowledge) in so far ar ''meaning" is defined as the .relation between 
tacit and eXplicit! 
Whether we must consider these other possible relations between 
tacit and eXplicit as types of ''meaning" or meaning as a relation separate 
from these others is an open question. But clearly we rely on tacit par-
ticulars to focus on a meaning we would have no access to without them, 
regardless of how we define ''meaning". 
Polanyi claims that we come to a knowledge of things already com-
mitted to their reality. One might accuse him of proposing a naive realism, 
of believing that the world simply imposes its structure upon a passive 
and intelligent mind which has the mere function of recording and manipu-
lating the data as true comprehensions of reality. But this critique can 
be avoided by an understanding of what Polanyi means by "reality". Reality 
is not what realists take it to be: an objective structure passively 
acknowledged. Rather, "reality" is a personal corrnnitment to continue pur-
suing truth in tenns of what is presently believed. The word "reality" 
refers to a sense that we know something of what is there, though we can 
make to absolute statement concernmg reality. Our "ontological connnit-
ment" is not a subjective assertion or a claim of absolute, "objective" 
knowledge. It i~ a_claim that we are personally involved in the pro-
c~ss of the contmumg unfoldment of truth from perspectives which con-
ht~ue to be confinned in their truth as we follow the intimations of 1gher truth inherent within them. 
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z. The Body's Role in Value-Knowledge 
For Polanyi, the human body is the fundamental tool 
for gaining knowledge. He says '' ... all thought contains com-
ponents of which we are subsidiarily aware in the focal con-
tent of our thinking, and all thought dwells in its subsi-
d . · · f th t of our body" . 19 1ar1es, as 1 ey were par s This "exten-
sion" of meaning from the body outward is achieved by a kind 
of projection of sense to a point farther away from the body 
and back again to it. For example, imagine a man in a dark 
cave using a long stick to probe unseen territory. The end 
of the stick is pushed forward by the man's arm, sending 
various kinds of data (holes, rocks, soft spots, etc.) to 
his hand. And these in turn are assimilated or translated 
in terms of body knowledge: three steps in this direction 
will bring one to the edge of a cliff, two in another direc-
tion will encounter a wall. More generally, we interpret 
things in the world as "up", "down", spatially oriented, 
and as temporal in relation to the fundamental tool of all 
knowledge: the body. Polanyi calls the meanings revealed 
in such interpretive projections "telegnostic" meanings, 
which are essentially forms of knowledge gained by exten-
sion of the body in some medium. 20 Physiognostic and 
19Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), p. x. 
jorie 
edited by ~far-
1969), pp. 128-9. 
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telegnostic meanings are just two ways of observing the same 
phenomenon and, therefore, occur together. Both are tacit 
forms of knowledge which may be explicitated through selective 
attention. The former, however, refers to the structure of a 
perception or conception, and the latter refers to the origin 
of it. Thus, they can be readily distinguished from one 
another. 
The role of the body is fundamental in knowledge. 21 
It is at the same time in the world while it reveals the 
world. The body itself is known focally only as an object 
in the world. We "know" the body tacitly, of course; but we 
have no explicit knowledge of its own spatial, temporal, cor-
poral nature apart from an understanding of it in terms of 
the world which the body tacitly gives us. Polanyi sees this 
body-world movement as a mutual dialectic of co-determination, 
which means simply that one cannot be understood without the 
other since each reveals the other to the depth that each is 
understood. 22 This understanding of the role of the body in 
knowing obliterates the distinction between "internal" and 
"external" as determinative epistemological categories. Both 
21Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 29. 
22 Ibid., p. 12. 
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internal and external are mutually given and neither has the 
power to be the ultimate critical standard of the other. 
"Internal" data are not under the authority of "external" cri-
teria, nor are "external" data to be arranged by internal 
23 patterns. The world of knowledge, then, is a unified but 
"bi-polar" world in which revealed and revealer are mutually 
given in terms of tacit body-knowledge. 
Skills are good examples of forms of tacit knowledge 24 
that are still closely connected to the body. When one learns, 
eg., to ride a bicycle, one relies on tacit muscular coordi-
nations that are never ·know.n in detail explicitly. One might 
be able to do it, but he cannot tell anyone else exactly how 
he does it. The body is more deeply aware of this "how" 
than his conscious grasp is able to convey. And one is said 
to "know how" to ride a bicycle only as he masters it as a 
skil1. 25 
We should understand this knowledge, however, to be 
held by the person. At present we are considering the role 
of the body in knowledge, but this focus should not obscure 
the more comprehensive and unifying power of a personal hold 
23Kn . owm 
Grene, (Chicago: 
Grene, 
s b Michael Polan i, edited by Marjorie 
1cago Press, 19 9), p. 126. 
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on knowledge in which the body performs its role. In tacit 
knowing we must say that the person knows: though the exmaple 
of the bicycle rider makes it clear that the person relies 
upon the body's role in knowing more deeply than he can tell. 
Perceptions of all kinds (the five senses, kinaesthe-
tic senses, internal senses, etc.) are examples of tacit forms 
of knowledge that are also closely related to our bodily 
reality. Polanyi asserts that we have an innate craving to 
make out what lies before us, 26 to use our powers of perception 
to discover a coherent world. 27 - That we seek to discover a 
coherent world is very important. Perceptions are not simply 
passive receptions of objectively determined data. 28 We try 
to make sense out of what we perceive in the process of per-
ceiving it. Essentially involved in developing perceptual 
coherence (eg., ~nowing that square towers are not really 
round when one views them from a distance) are one's beliefs 29 
26Knowing and Being: 
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: 
p. 120. 
2 7 . . .. 
Ibid., pp. 138-9. 
28 Ibid., p. 79. 
Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited 
University of Chicago Press, 1969), 
. 
29Jov'!ichael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: The 
Unlversity of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 67. 
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which act as a kind of reality screen30 for perceptions. 
our senses must meet certain standards of coherence before 
they can be relied upon, and these standards themselves develop 
toward greater sophistication as our perceptions in turn in-
form us about the world. Perception, then, cannot be separa-
ted from interpretation31 and the standards that support it.32 
The essential mutual support of perception and inter-
pretation makes perception something of a bridge between the 
most body-oriented form of tacit knowledge (skills) and highly 
sophisticated mental forms (e.g., science). Polanyi says: 
We know that perception selects, shapes, and 
assimilates clues by a process not explicitly con-
trolled by the perceiver. Since the powers of scien-
tific discerning are of the same kind as those of 
perception, they too operate by selecting, shaping 
and assimilating clues without focally attending 
to them.33 
30we don't believe, e.g., that sticks bend when dipped 
in water, despite what we perceive. We learn in this case to 
perceive that sticks only a~pear to bend in such situations. 
Our world remains coherent 1n such a case, despite the contra-
diction of our senses. 
31Michael Polanyi, Notes on Prejudice (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago, Special Collections Library, unpublished 
manuscript 11/28/39) box 26, folder 1. 
32Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towardsa Post 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 
1962), pp. 96-7. 
33Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 11. 
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I quote Polanyi here because I want to indicate that, 
with perception, we have added an important facet to our 
understanding of tacit knowledge. Skills are developed by a 
kind of immediate feedback: we succeed or fail in what we are 
trying to do. But perception combines a drive toward success 
(or coherence) with a development of standards to ensure this. 34 
One can extend these elements of tacit knowing to value know-
ledge. One could argue that the capacity to experience 
insights into worth in respect to some things lies in a funda-
mental drive, a power to make evaluative sense of things which 
is grounded in the aim of the body toward a fundamental bio~ 
logical success. 
This drive is aimed at discovering values that are 
already there in a sense similar to the way one strives to 
perceive what is before one. The embodied evaluator tries to 
clarify preferences, or senses of worth, that are tacit and 
which are in part responsible for his successful survival. 
His tacit world of preferences emerges as he engages in con-
crete situations requiring evaluative effort. He "makes out" 
the level of preference of an act, situation, or thing, not 
as a passive reception of data but as an interpretive effort 
in which t~e preference is revealed as a value essentially 
related 'to human life. Values do not exist in some Platonic 
34Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical 
Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 99-100. 
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realm of purity; yet they are discovered in so far as they 
relate to fundamental human projectsr 35 
35
one might question whether Polanyi is unintentional-
ly vague concerning whether knowledge of the world or know-
ledge of the body is epistemologically primary. Thus, it 
appears that he attempts to justify his theory about the "pri-
mary" role of the body by reference to a position that seems--
mysteriously--to be neither in the world nor located in the 
bocly, a position from which both are viewed synoptically. 
But what is the justification for claiming such a synoptic 
view? 
We can clarify Polanyi's intent in this regard by 
noting that the criticism misses the mark in accusing him of 
vagueness and of importing an unjustified, unclear, and ill-
defined vantage point from which to view both body and world. 
Polanyi is not residing in a "vague" position but rather an 
ambiguous one. And I believe he does this intentionally and 
justifiably. 
Knowledge of the world is not, for Polanyi, reduci-
ble to a description of how sensory mechanisms join with 
reflective capacity to create an "intelligible world". We 
have already spoken of knowledge as inherently possessed of 
an "ontological commitment" with which the independent force 
of the world announces itself. Nor is the body reducible to 
those descriptive categories employed by scientists to clari-
fy the natural world, such that it would be only an object 
among others in a natural world viewed and known through some 
means other than the body. The body and the world mutually 
disclose one another, and neither is reducible to a function 
of the other. Polanyi appears to remain in a position of 
ambiguity, gaining his "synoptic" vantage point through re-
flection on the historical origin of both knowledge of the 
world and knowledge of the body: the alternating focus on 
each in terms of the other as preserved in memory and as pro-
jected in each bodily move. 
If our description of Polanyi's intent is correct, 
as I believe it is, the question of primacy is resolved. 
Neither the body nor the world perceived through its medium 
~onstitutes the primary element of knowledge. This ambigu-
lty is at the root of any epistemological claim, since all 
knowledge is rooted fundamentally in the world as mediated 
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3. Truth and Reality in Value-Knowledge 
For Polanyi, embodied tacit knowledge is intuitive. 
That is, it consists in a spontaneous integration of particu-
lars into a coherent object which relates directly or in-
directly to the world as perceived through the body. 36 · This 
intuitive aspect of tacit knowing is a part of all forms of 
knowing from perception to the highest discoveries. 37 Polanyi 
views the development of knowledge as a process of moving from 
through the body. And this is true no matter whether the 
more obviously body-oriented forms of knowledge such as 
perception and skill-performances are involved or higher 
intellectual feats of "embodiment" are involved. Hence, 
values, rooted in a fundamental drive toward biological 
success, are inherently body-mediated even though they are 
developed and expressed in higher intellectual achievements. 
The body, then, is a kind of "primordial" tool in 
the discovery of values (though not all values are directly 
related to a need or preference of the body). The survival 
and maintenance of bodily existence depends upon certain 
orders of preference (foods to eat, types of shelter, etc.). 
The world appears as a hodge-podge of routes to the satis-
faction of the person's needs, each value answering to a 
personal need (some answering to "transomatic" needs). The 
world is not an "independent" object in the sense of being 
radically different from a subject. Like all forms of know-
ledge, values, understood as primitive, biological ones or 
highly developed social ones, are tacitly known and mediate 
a subject-object dichotomy. And, because they do this, 
they appear in the "united" world as realities that cor-
respond to our embodied existence. 
36Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 60. 
37Knowin 
by Marjor1e 
p. 201. 
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one intuitive integration to another by the interplay of 
. d d . d d b f . . 38 imagination as supporte an gu1 e y ormer 1ntegrat1ons. 
Thus, whether considering the grounds of discoveries or the 
discoveries themselves, tacit knowledge is not the product of 
deduction or induction ~ ~ but is an intuitive grasp of the 
meaning of hitherto unrelated particulars of knowledge. All 
deduction and induction occur as relations between explicit, 
formalized terms, which are themselves dependent upon tacit 
forms of knowledge. 39 Even a contradiction, which puts a 
dead-end to deductive or inductive knowledge, can be resolved 
by an intuitive integration40 which resolves the tension 
between the two terms. 41 
As intuitive knowledge, tacit knowing is said to b~ 
"irreversible". 42 This means that, once one has performed a 
certain tacit integration, one cannot erase the knowledge 
38K . d B . now1ng an e1ng: 
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: 
p. 204. 
39rb·, 1Q.' pp. 170, 212. 
4°rbid., p. 168. 
Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited 
University of Chicago Press, 1969), 
41 The contradiction between the geocentric and helio-
ce~tric theories in astronomy, eg., was resolved by an insight 
W?1ch accounted both for the apparent truth of the geocentric 
tneory and for the phenomena which could be explained best by a 
heliocentric theory. 
. . 
42Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Cr1t1cal Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 
1962)' p. 106. ' 
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aained by it. One can add elements of knowledge to a concept 
t:> 
achieved by such an integration by deduction or inference, but 
the basic notion to which one adds (or perhaps subtracts) ideas 
is irreversible. From within the world is permanently trans-
formed, comprehended in deeper and richer ways. 
Tacit knowing, then, is an intuitive, heuristic move-
ment toward the meaning of particulars. The meaning, once 
achieved, becomes the ground for all future tacit integrations. 
Tacit knowing exists in an inextricable relationship with ex-
plicit knowledge, which expresses the focal meaning of what 
is tacitly known. 43 When made focally explicit, knowledge 
can b . . 1 44 e put to cr1t1ca tests. We can establish rules that 
are also explicit and which guide us in the way we employ 
explicit statements, such as in mathematics or in rules of 
evidence in a law court. Such critical employment may enable 
us to correct critically one statement in the light of another, 
and this corrective device may even serve to confirm or invali-
d k 1 d 1 . b d . . . 45 ate a now e ge c a1m ase on tac1t 1ntegrat1on. Thus, our 
43Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 11-12. 
44Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 14-15. 
45 Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited 
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1969)' p. 133. 
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claim on reality through tacit knowledge cannot be arbitrary. 
Though tacit knowledge is "a-critical"46 in that is cannot be 
judged as right or wrong by the critical standards or deduc-
tion and induction, it can be confirmed or invalidated by 
critical rules. 47 There is, then, rational access to tacit 
meaning since "tacit knowing" in another way of referring to 
the deepest context for meaning of any explicit statement. 
Thus, what we rely on in order to focus explicitly on some-
thing else is the tacit meaning of what we focus on. Tacit 
knowing and tacit meaning are fairly interchangeable terms, 
d . 1 . . . b h 48 an rat1ona cr1t1que may penetrate 1nto ot . 
Explicit, critical knowledge, then, is essential in 
confirming or invalidating tacit integrations. And such 
intuitions are not true merely by virtue of being intuitious. 
Their truth must be confirmed explicitly even though we are 
46Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 264. . 
47
rbid., pp. 285-291. 
48
copernicus, eg., might well have simply intuited as 
a spontaneous, tacit integration the theory that the earth re-
volves around the sun as the most adequate understanding of 
the meaning of the data he had before him. But the explicit 
statement of his theory still required a complete critique by 
logical rules, contrary data, etc. Such a critique served to 
confirm the theory. But it also served to invalidate the 
former geocentric theory. 
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convinced of the truth of what we intuit. 49 
Being convinced of the truth of our intuitions, then, 
is not an adequate criterion for their acceptance as true. 
such a criterion would be a mere subjective feeling of psycho-
logical certainty. Our intuitions can be false, and this 
falsehood must be admitted in the face of a failure of 
rational confirmation. 
Returning to our development of a Polanyian notion of 
values, we can establish that Polanyi is both a cognitivist 
and an intuitionist in value theory. Worth-ascribing acts 
aim at fulfilling a knowledge that one thing or act is better 
than another: they project a value and not just an emotional 
preference. Values involve knowledge that x is better than y. 
And this knowledge is of a tacit, intuitive kind in that it is 
a spontaneous integration of particulars into a meaningful 
pattern. But this pattern must, in turn, pass muster before 
a rational critique which applies explicit criteria (eg., of 
universality and appropriateness) to it. The result, if the 
challenge of the critique is met, is a rational affirmation 
of a value, the knowledge of which is rooted in a tacit 
integration of hitherto unmeaningful particulars of human 
experience. 
49Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 9. 
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One might be faced, eg., with several alternative 
preferences, each of which seems to cancel out the other 
(eg., attend to one's work, go to a movie, etc.). Though 
one cannot do all of these at once, a higher knowledge, 
which remained tacit until focused upon under the tension 
of this decision, can possible unite them. Out of the effort 
of trying to see clearly how to achieve some kind of unity 
from this mass of contradictory preferences, there emerges 
a plan of action, an ascription of the worth of one act over 
another based· .upon a knowledge of "betterness", that places 
all proposed acts~in perspective. One might, eg., determine 
that certain goals can'be delayed and still be meaningful 
while others are more immediate. Thus, the temporal dimen-
sion of values becomes important. Some values may be 
delayed in their realization, while others must be immediate-
ly pursued. Functioning with this new insight, one might 
order his preferences beginning with the most immediate one 
and ending with the one that can be delayed the longest. A 
new insight, then, unifies this activity of worth-ascription: 
an insight into value. 
Of course, we are here already presupposing a sense 
of "betterness" to which we are applying our temporal pre-
ferences. The sense of "betterness" is deeply and tacitly 
rooted in our sense of what tends to promote the projects of 
our lives; and these projects include the fundamental attempts 
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at pure, biotic achievement (food, shelter, etc.) as well as 
the highest acts of self-sacrifice for the benefit of others 
with whom we share life. Thus, an insight into value (or 
the "betterness" of one over alternative options of action) 
is an insight into what promotes our most highly developed 
sense of good, considered as the achievement of our projects. 
Our projects come given at birth in the cry for life, but 
even this fundamental project may be abandoned as we develop 
higher insights into value which lead us beyond the biologi-
cal need for survival. Thus, though values are rooted in 
biological experience, this experience can be reformulated 
and developed into radically different senses of worth than 
those primordially given at birth. The sense of betterness 
may be~ priori in this sense; but it is not~ priori in the 
sense that man has a comprehension of value which is fixed 
and only needs to be applied to particular instances. Values 
must be discovered as routes to new levels of human existence. 
We can distinguish worth-ascription from value in 
clear terms. I speak of insights into value because I con-
sider Polanyi a cognitivist in that he implies that values 
are grasped intellectually. When we grasp a value, we grasp 
that one thing, act, or state of affairs is better than 
another and may argue for the validity of our position on the 
basis of any number of reasons. The ascription of the worth 
of something is based upon such insights. But sometimes we 
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feel that something is better than another thing without know-
ing the reason why or even knowing the value we are aiming at. 
We merely act in accordance with a preference that remains 
blind. This is worth-ascription in its purest sense. And as 
such, worth-ascription is grounded in a tacit knowledge of 
the value it is based on. We may analyze preferences to dis-
cern the values they are based on and offer these as the 
ground of our preference. But usually ascriptions of worth 
and insight into value go hand in hand, so that is is not 
necessary to distinguish clearly between them. 
One's tacit integration of an order of preference, 
of course, may be discovered not to be the "right" one. The 
consequences of one's order of preference may indicate that 
one's ascription of worth is, eg., self-defeating in that it 
dissolves the possiblity of achieving later goals. Going to 
a movie now, eg., may mean that one does not complete one's 
work on time. A critical analysis of one's order of prefer-
ence may reveal this and correct it--or else confirm that one's 
original tacit integration has placed one's preferences in a 
proper order. Our ascriptions of worth, then, are not arbi-
trary. They are grounded in tacit integrations that yield 
insight into a right order, a value that can act as a stan-
dard for ordering our lives and achieving ultimately an 
insight into the Good. In this. sense, a self-defeating act 
reveals the falsehood of one's value and, thus, reveals a 
55 
negative criterion for right choice. 
Our original tacit integration is a-critical. But 
this insight ·may be corrected, modified, confirmed, or invali-
dated by explicit developments of it. One important feature 
of this corrective or validating procedure is that it reveals 
tacit knowing as a kind of "foreknowledge" 50 We make explicit 
what we already know tacitly, and we shape the form of our 
explicit knowledge through the guidance of the clues offered 
us in our tacit knowing: we "feel" our way toward new in-
. ht 51 Slg S. 
As we move into the area of man's- higher functions 
of concept-formation, this.foreknowledge becomes more impor-
tant. For here we discover that the search for understanding, 
to achieve intellectual integrations that make deep and pene-
trating sense of the world, is itself an inherent desire in 
man.
52 And it is a desire which aims at its own satisfaction. 
We achieve this satisfaction by "sensing" our way to the re-
solution of intellectual paradoxes, often guided by con-
ceptions we never previously thought had any bearing upon the 
N.y.: 
50Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 23. 
. . 
51Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post 
Cr1t1cal Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
196 2) ' p. 12 8. 
S 2 Ibid . , p . 12 7 . 
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the reality in question. In this sense, such concepts are 
heuristic in nature, forming an interpretive guide to new 
insights which integrate wide ranges of previously unrelated 
53 
concepts. Thus, intellectual desire, thrusting forth as 
an energy of probing, reflecting, researching, integrating 
imagination, 54 is a passion that finds its resolution only 
in an understanding to which one is fully committed as bear-
ing on reality. 55 Indeed, Polanyi claims that a feeling of 
satisfaction, of resolution, is one of the marks of truth. 56 
This does not mean, however, that such a feeling of 
resolution or satisfaction~is the criterion of truth. 
Polanyi's concept of truth does not permit any single, simple 
criterion which can distinguish truth from falsehood in 
definite, clarion tones. Our beliefs, whether true or false, . 
involve commitments to act as though they bore directly on 
reality: belief involves a passionate commitment to the 
reality revealed to us in believing. That is, believing is 
reality-orientated, as I have already pointed out in my dis-
cussion of the ontological aspect of tacit knowing . 
. 
5\iichael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post Criti-
cal Phi)osophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 143. 
. 
54Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: The 
Un1versity of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 57. 
. 
5~ichael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post Critical 
Ph1losophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 106. 
5\richael Polanyi, The · Study of Man (Chicago: 
of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 26. The University \ 
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Polanyi's definitions of reality and of truth bear a 
striking similarity. Reality attracts our attention by 
clues which create the tension that only a passionate intel-
lectual research can satisfy. And it has this power of attrac-
tion because it is independent of the knower and can manifest 
itself in unexpected ways.S7 Similarly, an idea is true when 
it is capable of revealing its own truth by continuing con-
firmations in yet unknown and unthinkable consequences. 58 We 
have an "intimation" of reality in a true idea, 59 an intima-
tion which confirms itself in new and unexpected ways as we 
follow its limitless implications,60 an intimation which leads 
us to patterns of ideas that are truly aspects of reality. 61 
by M. Grene, 
pp. 119-12 0. 
Michael Polan i, edited 
of C icago Press, 1969) 
58Nichael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post 
Critical Philosoph¥ (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 
1962), pp. vii-vii1; Michael Polanyi. 
59Michael Polanyi, Scientific Thought and Social 
Reality, ed. by Fred Schwarz (N.Y.: International Universities 
Press, Inc., 1974), p. 126. 
60Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962),p. 252. 
61Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 10. 
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Polanyi's notion of truth should enable us to see 
that, though no truth comes to us without our passionate com-
mitment to it as truth, truth itself is not reducible to a 
mere passion. One must still ask whether our passions -
our commitments, are right. 62 
The rightness of a passion or commitment canoot, how-
ever, be determined by traditional epistemological tests. 
Polanyi finds fault, e.g., with the correspondence theory of 
truth.63 The necessity of conceiving assertions as belief 
commitments alone makes a correspondence theory of truth un-
acceptable, together with all of the criteria which might 
62Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 134. 
63Polanyi has been accused of leaving no room for the 
traditional notion of belief as "deciding to believe in" some-
thing. ("Michael Polanyi The Responsible Person," Walter 
E. Conn, The Heythrop Journal, 17, 1976, pp. 45-7). To some 
extent this accusation is based on Polanyi's identification of 
the statement "P if true" with the statement "I believe P is 
true" (Personal Knowledge, p. 305). Thus, tacit belief is 
identified, in the eyes of his accusers, with explicit belief. 
And this identification precludes faith as a decision to pick 
up a point of view among other possible points of view. But 
in reality Polanyi does not intend this identification to be 
carried so far. Decisions to believe are different from tacit 
belief; but they are not excluded by it. When faced with 
several different interpretations of a text, e.g., one might 
decide in favor of one without any evidence that excludes the 
others. 
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determine whethe~ our ideas correspond with reality. 64 Briefly, 
if we are committed to the beliefs we hold, it makes no sense 
to "stand outside" of them in order to determine whether they 
are true by virtue of corresponding to what reality "really" 
is. Polanyi holds that such a theory amounts to making truth 
an unasserted assertion, which is a contradiction in terms. 
We must acknowledge the _"fiduciary" element of truth and 
formulate a theory of truth that does not force us to deny our 
commitments. 
Polanyi has trouble also with other theories of truth. 
He denies, eg., that the fruitfulness of a theory is in 
itself a criterion of truth, 65 though it is an element of the 
h . . . 66 trut -crlterlon. The fruitfulness of a theory is its capa-
city to lead to new ideas and adventurous paths of research. 
But some ideas can be fruitful and not true. One might gene-
rate all sorts of interesting evidence to support a geocentric 
theory of the unvierse and still be wrong, despite the massive 
amount of evidence and supporting ideas that can be found. The 
problem is here that no continuous confirming evidence is 
64Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 305; but cf. an earlier appreciation for correspon-
dence-theroy language; Michael Polanyi, Notes on Prejudice (Un-
published manuscript, The University of Chicago Special Col-
lections Library, 11/28/39), p. 1. 
65Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 147 
66 Ibid., p. 148. 
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found--only more ideas: Fruitfulness per~' then, cannot be 
the final criterion of truth, although one must admit that an 
idea which does not lead to new and more penetrating insights 
into reality cannot be true. 
The same thing can be said for coherence. Certainly 
incoherent ideas cannot be true. But coherence itself is 
only an expression of the stability of our ideas, not of 
their truth. 67 Of course, we can expect an idea that is true 
in one field of thought to be consistent at least with a 
true idea in another field and to show signs of leading to 
a more comprehensive truth. 68 But this consistency still 
does not enable us to assert that consistency alone makes both 
ideas true. 
Polanyi is not left, however, without any guides of 
truth. We have already said that an idea must be fruitful 
and coherent in order to be true, even though these are not 
final categories of truth. But, more than this, an idea is 
usually considered worth following up for its fruitfulness 
if it is accurately determined and well defined, if it is 
systematically relevant to its own field, and if it is 
67Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962)' p. 294. 
68Michael 
logy of Science: 
1975), p. 42. 
Polanyi, History, Philosophy, and the Socio-
The Contempt of Freedom (New York: Arno Press, 
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intrinsically interestinf as well as plausible. 69 Simplicity 
is excluded as a guiding principle, since some true ideas are 
more complex than false ones. 70 
None of these "guides", however, are final determi-
nants of truth. Rejecting traditional theories of truth 
while outlining certain marks of truth, Polanyi claims that 
truth is knowable but not demonstrable as such. 71 He means 
to separate the knowledge of truth from a theory concerning 
how we justify truth claims. Indeed, we can know true ideas 
without being able to justify them as true by reference to 
epistemological theories. This is precisely the claim of a 
theory of tacit knowing: to grasp a truth is. always to 
1 . h . d h d d" 72 grasp a rea lty t at lS eeper t an our own un erstan lng~ 
We always know more than we can tell. We can know that what 
we tell bears the marks of truth and that it bears on reality 
in such a way as to enliven us to new worlds which confirm 
the partial truths of our old world and go far beyond them. 
69Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), pp. 135-6. 
701' . d Dl • , p. 166. 
71Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 82. 
72Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 43. 
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But there are no "final" determinants of truth. There are 
no unchanging truths. Polanyi says, 
... man has the power to establish real patterns in 
nature, the reality of which is manifested by the 
fact that their future implications extend indefi~ 
nitely beyond the experiences which they were to 
control. The appraisal of such order is made with 
universal intent and convey~ indeed a claim to an 
unlimited range of as yet unspecifiable true 
intimations.73 
In the end, we must credit our own personal judgment with 
ultimate powers to discern truth and falsehood. 74 
For this reason, Polany~ stresses what I have de-
scribed as the fiduciary element of knowledge: its character 
as grounded in belief-commitment. He points to our capacity 
to doubt whether what we believe is true as itself implying 
b 1 . f f k. d h" h . d 75 a e 1e o some 1n to w 1c we are comm1tte . He says, 
We must recognize belief once more as the source 
of all knowledge ... No intelligence, however critical 
or original can operate outside such a fiduciary 
framework.76 
73Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post 
. Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 37. 
74 Ibid., p. 265. 
75
rbid., pp. 273-4. 
76 Ibid., p. 266. 
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And, concerning the impossibility of final criteria of truth, 
we find him saying, " ... Any inquiry into our ultimate beliefs 
can be consistent only if it presupposes its own conclusions. 
It must be intentionally circular". 77 
Polanyi does not mean, as do critical rationalists, 
h . . d f lf . . . 7 8 R h that e 1s comm1tte to a stance o se -cr1t1c1sm. at er, 
he is committed to an "a-critical" stance in that he believes 
that no critique is possible without reference to some par~ 
ticular frame of commitment. A stance of commitment must 
always precede criticism, though all commitments can be cri-
ticized from within a larger context of knowledge to which one 
is committed. 
Such a position is tantamount to restating Polanyi's 
fundamental tenet of tacit knowledge: that we know more than 
we can tell. Doubt can imply a commitment or a possibility 
of commitment to another frame of reference which itself may 
be doubted. Such doubt is tacit knowledge of other frames of 
reference. and no frame is indubitable. Yet, doubt implies a 
commitment to other possibilities, a knowledge of other pos-
sibilities. Hence, critique, though infinite, is always rooted 
77Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 299. 
78
"Michael Polanyi The Responsible Person", Walter E. 
Heythrop Journal, 17, 1976, pp. 31-49. Conn 
' 
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in a knowledge-commitment which holds itself as true. Con-
travening evidence alone can discredit this commitment; but, 
at the same time, such evidence opens new possibilities of 
truth which form the ground of new commitments. 
This means that knowledge is not just a passive 
entertainment of mental pictures which may or may not be true. 
It always involves a commitment to a truth that is larger 
than our grasp of it, a commitment that is an investment of 
our personal selves. A change in beliefs is not just a 
change of mind; it is a personal re-orientation within a new 
f 0 1 . 79 context o mean1ng, a new persona 1nvestment. 
4. Personal Knowledge of· Values 
The tenor of Polanyi's argument concerning tacit 
knowledge has been to establish the whole involvement of our 
personhood in the act of knowing. From the most fundamental 
bodily perceptions to the highest acts of intellectual prob-
lem-solving, the bodily and i:r..·tellectual commitment of our-
1 . 1 0 80 se ves 1s a persona 1nvestment. Knowledge, in this sense, 
79Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 105. 
80
rbid., pp. 300-301. 
81 is essentially personal. 
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To say that knowledge is personal is not, however, to 
say that it is arbitrary or subjective. Polanyi asserts that 
any knowledge-claim must be a responsible claim; it 
must respond adequately to standards of truth that are 
already present and relative to the field of knowledge in 
which the claim is made. 82 
This means that a personal claim to truth is at the 
same time a claim that meets standards that are proposed as 
universal, at least within the field (truth in art might, eg., 
satisfy other standards ,than those of scientific truth). 
Polanyi says " ... The personal comes into existence by assert-
ing universal irttent, and the universal is constituted by 
being accepted as the impersonal term of this personal com-
mitment".83 Concerning the "personal term", Polanyi says, 
"Every factual statement embodies some measure of responsi-
ble judgment as the personal pole of the commitment in 
81Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), pp. vii-viii. 
82Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 41. 
\ 
83Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 308. 
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in which it is affirmed". 84 This responsible judgment consti-
tutes the personal pole of the commitment because we identify 
our commitments with ourselves, the most intimate recesses of 
85 
our personhood. 
Thus, our personal commitment to our beliefs is at the 
same time a submission to the unviersal intent of these beliefs, 
for we submit ourselves to the universal standards of truth 
. d . t" 86. impl1e 1n our asser 1ons. Clearly, claims of personal 
knowledge cannot be subjective in the sense of being arbi-
trary. For each claim can be faulted by its failure to meet 
the standards of truth it claims to obey even in the process 
of establishing them. 87 
We participate in the act of knowing, then, by project-
ing our conviction as true by virtue of the universal stand-
ards of truth they imply and to which we ourselves submit, ex-
pecting that all other persons shall also submit to the. Thus, 
we say: "I hold this as true and expect everyone else to take 
84Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 312. 
N.y.: 
85 Ibid., p. 59. 
86Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 77-8. 
87The term "personal subjectivity" really means "per-
sonal responsibility"; Michael Polanyi, Remarks sent toM. 
~oupise, Unpublished Manuscript, University of Chicago, 2/2/39. 
Box 26, Folder 1. 
67 
account of its truth when they make knowledge-claims. No 
one, including myself, should contradict this truth." Or, 
"This kind of idea is a good way of understanding such events. 
Everyone, including myself, should understand such events 
this way". Or again, "All such things are instances of x 
and should be understood as such". And, as various claims 
yield their universal standards, the domains of knowledge 
(art, science, politics, history--ethics) distinguish them-
selves, and the standards of truth within them become more 
d f . . 88 e 1n1te. Our personal commitment to universal standards 
is a commitment to believe that they bear on reality. 89 And 
only when we retreat from our commitment does reality seem 
---g 0 
to fall into irretrievable doub~. 
We may wish to formalize personal knowledge in terms 
of highly defined statements, mathematical calculi, satis~ 
tical probability, etc. In doing this we must remember that 
all such formalizations rely on what is unformalized, tacit, 
88 Th . . d h . b h . . lS oes not mean t at, JUSt ecause t e 1mag1-
nation is active in projecting the pathways to truth, the 
truth discovered is imaginary. 
89Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
"Press, 1962), p. 132. 
90
rbid., p. 379. 
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in personal knowledge. For example, defining always relies 
on undefined (tacit) terms and on an undefined understanding 
of how the definition functions. 91 Mathematics even relies 
on tacit knowledge of what its abstractions refer to and of 
how to apply it to the real world. 92 Thus, we must under-
stand personal knowledge as represented in but not as iden-
tical to the narrower scope of its formalizations. "Personal 
knowledge" is a broad concept referring to the tacit and 
explicit terms of knowledge. 
To sum up Polanyi's notion of personal knowledge in 
his own words, 
It is the act of commitment in its full structure 
that saves personal knowledge from being merely 
subjective. Intellectual commitment is a respon-
sible decision, in submission to the compelling 
claims of what in good conscience I conceive to be 
true. It is an act of hope, striving to fulfill an 
obligation within a personal situation for which I 
am not responsible and which therefore determines 
my calling. This hope and this obligation are ex-
pressed in the universal intent of personal know-
ledge.93 
91Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a 
~-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
ress, 1962), p. 250. 
92Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 21 . 
. 
9 ~Michae~ Polanyi, P~rsonal Knowledge: Towards a ~ost-Crltlcal Phllosophy (Chlcago: The University of Chicaao 
ress, 1962), p. 65. · 0 
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To summarize this discussion of personal knowledge as 
a whole, we can return briefly to Polanyi's idea that con-
ceptual knowledge is powered by a kind of intellectual need 
for understanding, a need which "feels" its way to its own 
satisfaction as it moves through tacit clues toward an in-
sight which in some sense it foreknows. This dynamic, in 
Polanyi's opinion, is the answer to Meno's paradox. 94 We 
recognize the answer to a problem because we know its answer 
tacitly through the clues that can be integrated into an ex-
plicit statement. Thus, as we develop and in turn rely on 
our conceptions to approach new insights, we indeed create 
new, sweeping intellectual visions in which we hope to catch 
something of reality. We follow and confirm our intimations 
of reality, a reality which attracts us as the object of our 
intellectual passion. 
The visions we achieve, therefore, are satisfactory 
only as visions of reality. They cannot be mere imaginative 
adventures which expend themselves as subjective passions 
for mental pleasures. We must be committed to what we be-
lieve in as bearing on an aspect of reality while being 
willing to relinquish beliefs that show themselves as wrong 
in the context of living through a commitment to them. Like 
Luther, we must say, "Here I stand and cannot do otherwise". 
94 
.Meno, line SOd, ff. 
70 
If insight into the nature of reality relies upon 
not simply a "sensory registration" of the world but rather 
a total personal engagement with it in terms of our commit-
ments, then insight into value as a proper ordering of pre-
ferences must be seen as a personal knowledge of value-
realities. I.E., personal knowledge, if it can be extended 
into other domains of knowledge besides that of science (as 
we have seen that it can) can be extended to the domain of 
knowledge which is constituted by the claim to know what we 
should do. We have a personal knowledge of values. 
We might not be able to make this argument if Polanyi 
' had restricted his notion of personal knowledge to scientific 
knowing. But obviously the general statement of this concept 
implies a breadth of application which cannot be restricted 
to the sciences. We claim to know what is art and what 
isn't, to know events in history, to know the objects of our 
religious devotion, etc. Polanyi indicates that knowledge 
in any of these domains of experience is valid in so far as 
it obeys the universal standards that are relevant to each 
domain. He does not impose a scientific model on the whole 
of our knowledge claims, excluding those which are not 
"scientific". Rather, he describes in a phenomenological 
manner the essential structure of any act of knowing, com-
prehends it as "personal", and understands this essential 
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to apply to knowing acts in any domain of knowledge. 
A personal knowledge of values cannot be excluded as 
a possibility any more than can the claims of personal know-
ledge in other domains of knowledge. Polanyi seems to allow 
knowledge claims whenever the unique standards within a 
domain are met. Certainly we can view our claim to know 
what we ought to value and to do as a claim of personal know-
ledge which is valid in so far as we meet the tinique standards 
of the moral domain. 
CHAPTER TWO 
EXPLICITATION OF TACIT KNOWING 
This chapter is devoted to one main issue: the 
development of explicit concepts from tacit knowledge. Thus, 
I am extending the argument of Chapter One to cover the asser-
tion that both tacit and explicit forms of knowledge are 
personal. And I apply the dynamic of explicitation to value-
knowledge in order to argue that our value concepts are 
instances of personal knowledge. As a corollary, I w~sh to 
assert that value assertions can be true or false. 
Our visions of reality cannot be tested for truth by 
criteria that stand outside of them or by criteria that are 
a part of any sensible statement (eg., consistency, coherency). 
They themselves set the standards by w~ich they are judged. 
We project our visions as universal truths and submit our 
thinking to them, confident that they deepen our insight into 
reality. The "correspondence" of our ideas with a detached 
"reality", the fruitfulness of our ideas as their consis-
tency, though "marks" of truth, cannot finally determine our 
confidence that our personal investment is right or wrong. 
This is left to our own judgment ultimately guided by hope 
and a responsible submission to the standards we set for 
ourselves as personal knowers. Knowledge, then, is not to 
' 
be identified with the subjective passions that often empower 
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it to develop nor with the cold formalizations that pronounce 
memorial over passions long since spent. Knowledge is respon-
sibly personal, full of visions that are both real and inti-
mately human. 
Polanyi's notion of personal knowledge can be ex-
tended to the domain of ethical knowledge, knowledge of the 
Good. 95 I have already spoken of our everyday experience of 
having to order our preferences by evaluating them, ascrib-
ing relative levels of worth to them. Our innate capacity 
to desire, to need and to reach out to satisfy our needs, 
intimately related to our bodily existence in a world of 
living beings, is a fundamental foreknowledge of values. Our 
desires and the more sophisticated evaluations that we make 
all serve in turn as tacit evaluations which guide our 
efforts to new insights into higher, more comprehensive and 
workable value-structures, including insights into the essen-
i 
tial nature of values themselves. Thus, the structure of 
tacit foreknowledge is applicable in the domain of value 
knowledge just as it is in other domains such as science, 
art, religion, etc. Indeed, our highest conceptions of the 
Good are explicitations of what we already know about it 
tacitly in terms of values we live by. 
95 I capitalize this term not because of any pretense 
to Platonism, but because it represents the ultimate category 
of the ethical domain. 
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The need to evaluate, to order ascriptions of worth, 
is itself a desire to know a proper hierarchy of value. We 
seek not only to discover and order experiences of worth, but 
we also seek an intellectual clarification of values in them-
selves. We seek not only to live through our values but also 
to know them. And this impetus to know values can be satis-
fied only by a commitment to achieve a deeper intellectual 
insight into them, an insight which, in turn, serves as the 
tacit guide to even more comprehensive understandings. Thus, 
the development of a value structure through reflective evalu-
ation is intimately connected with the intellectual grasp of 
. 
values. Evaluation leads to knowledge of values, and this 
knowledge becomes the new platform from which we ascribe 
worth and order our preferences. Intellect and desire 
coalesce here into a kind of intellectual desire for the Good. 
We grope our way to higher conceptions of the Good by 
relying on past comprehensions and present experiences. We 
seek an understanding of the Good that we can live in and 
through which we can experience life as inherently valuable. 
This means that we must be concerned about the rightness of 
our values. Values cannot be mere explicit statements of 
what we want; we must learn to order our sense of worth, to 
value rightly. We must seek to evaluate according to our 
knowledge of value, a knowledge we confidently assert as 
right and which bears on reality. We look for an 
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understanding of the Good that is true and which therefore 
leads us into a real sharing in the Good--in so far as we 
understand it. 
Of course, just as traditional tests of truth are not 
applicable to Polanyi's epistemology, so neither are such 
criteria applicable to our knowledge of the Good. Theories 
of the Good that are fruitful only in the sense that they 
beget more complex theories cannot lead us to experience the 
reality of a growing understanding of the Good. On the other 
hand, theories that are attractive merely because they are 
simple may overlook the highly complex tacit background of 
explicit value ascriptions or statements of value. Again, 
theories which try to build "models" of the Good as a whole, 
models which are supposed to "correspond" to the reality of 
the Good while asserting their function only as models, merely 
attempt to construct another universe of discourse for the 
real thing. Such attempts overlook the bridge between sub-
ject and object formed by Polanyi's expistmology. Values are 
lived in through a commitment we cannot escape by fleeing 
into the detachment of a model which somehow we "hope" cor-
responds to reality. Nor can a coherent theory of value in 
itself enable us to discover right values. We can always 
justify what we want to do by coherent arguments and even a 
coherent theory of values. But such coherent theories do not 
necessarily give us right values, values that manifest the 
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nature of the Good. We seek to know values that bear on the 
reality of the Good, which continue to bear fruit as intima-
tions of ultimate Good. 
We see the Good which satisfies our search for right 
values as an independent reality which attracts us to itself. 
Like any object of knowledge, the Good is discovered piece-
meal through individual and concrete experiences of valuing, 
experiences that are an inherent element of human life. Piece-
meal experiences reveal an attractive object in a piece-meal 
way. Nevertheless, they demand our attention and the eleva-
tion of our whole person, especially the intellect, to under-
stand that object and approP.riate the quality of reality it 
yields. Our understanding of the Good is a temporal process 
that unfolds a reality which alone is the fundamental base 
of a comprehensive knowledge of values: the Good itself. 
Fruitfulness, coherency, consistency, etc., are all 
marks of true intimations of the Good. But they are not 
final determinants of a true knowledge of it for the same 
reasons they can determine no reality as finally known. Thus, 
knowledge of the Good bears the same fiduciary element that 
undergirds all other forms of knowledge. We rely on tacit 
knowledge of values--a reliance that is the full weight of 
commitment--in order to attend to more comprehensive theories 
of the Good. The Good always appears from within the context 
of our commitment. We acknowledge particular goods, some of 
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which may be circumstances; and the Good comes to clarity 
from within these commitments through a graduatl explicitation 
of their tacit components. 
This explicitation of the Good is an act of personal 
knowledge. It is not arbitrary but obeys the standards of 
truth that are maintained tacitly in commitments more lived 
in that thought ought. We "think out" our notions of value 
and of the Good by trying to achieve comprehensive visions 
that are grounded in and unify our various tacit comprehensions. 
So, these explicitations must share the confidence we have in 
our tacit knowledge that the reality of the Good shines 
through our value-commitments. Further, if we were to con-
sider them in isolation from the concept that unifies them, 
we would find them consistent and coherent with the whole as 
represented by the integration. And we would find continued 
and unexpected confirmation of our explicitations in the new 
aspects of the Good which reveal themselves when in turn we 
rely on these explicitations as tacit components of a new 
vision. 
Our intellectual achievements of new visions of the 
Good obey standards of knowledge we ourselves have projected 
as universal. And with each new concept, we build standards 
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by which we judge as true the knowledge of values that shine 
forth from the Good. Thus, in the act of asserting confi-
dently the new visions we achieve, we also submit ourselves 
to the standards they represent. :hese standards must be 
viewed as standards set by a personal knowledge of values. 
Thus, we have a personal knowledge of values and, ultimately, 
of the Good. We are called to this knowledge by the reality 
of the Good that partially reveals itself to us in our ex-
perience of valuation and urges us to find satisfactory 
resolutions of the tensions generated by contradictory acts 
of valuation. We seek a wholeness of life, and this whole-
ness depends upon a true knowledge of the Good.96 
But how do these insights into value develop into 
theories of value or explcit concepts? I have already 
indicated something of the movement of thought by which this 
occurs. But we may return to Polanyi's epistemology for a 
96Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), p. 318. 
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more comprehensive view of the development of truth in general. 
97 The difficulty in clearly distinguishing the personal 
character of knowledge from both the subjective and the objec-
tive senses of knowledge cannot be lightly passed over. One 
might argue that Polanyi does not escape subjectivism merely by 
showing that the claims of personal knowledge are not arbitrary. 
A claim can be subjective in a sense other than that of being 
arbitrary; and, indeed, being arbitrary may not be the most 
dangerous sense of subjectivity. More dangerous, in the sense 
of more subtly illusory and misleading, is the concept which 
seems to follow from a sense of reality, rational reflection, 
a system of right b<:;liefs, etc., but is simply wrong. We be-
lieve something to be true, even with the usual justifications, 
but our belief is ultimately ungrounded and wrong: it is sub-
jective. 
Polanyi may easily avoid the charge of naive realism 
because of his insistence upon subjecting knowledge claims to 
universal standards. But he does not thereby avoid the charge 
that such standards are just as subjective as the knowledge 
claim would be without its benefit. Hence, the knowledge claim 
itself, grounded in what is itself ungrounded in anything other 
than our decision to project our own notions as universal truths 
t~ be obeyed by everyone, is subjective. 
One might enjoin the critic to recall Polanyi's notion 
that knowledge always involves an ontological commitment. Thus, 
we never believe that we are only engaged in an act of belief; 
we believe that our concepts touch reality and thus escape sub-
jectivism. But this argument against the charge of subjecti-
vism cannot succeed because it never qualifies precisely what 
is known objectively. To claim that we have some grasp o-f---
reality without specifying at least part of what constitutes 
that grasp is no more to escape subjectivity than did Kant in 
his distinction between phenomena and noumena. Polanyi's onto-
logical commitment appears to have no more substance than Kant's 
noumena. Hence, if Kant's phenomena can be said to be subjec-
tive in the sense that knowledge claims based on them have no 
right to reality, so Polanyi's ontological claim remains onto-
logically empty and does not save him from the charge of sub-
jectivism. 
However, Polanyi might be saved from this charge if we 
note that the subjective-objective distinction is itself 
grounded in the Cartesian model of an ontology bifurcated by 
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The explicitation of the tacit is a process of two 
mutually supportive directions: from a recognition of a whole 
toward identification of the tacit particulars that are inte-
grated to comprise it; and the recognition of particulars 
two fundamental substances, mind and matter. The Cartesian 
and Kantian dilemas of the mind-body dichotomy cannot be over-
come as long as this model is maintained. But it is precisely 
this model that is assumed in criticising Polanyi for not being 
"objective". 
Polanyi does not accept the Cartesian model; hence, 
criticisms which are grounded in it miss the point. For Polanyi, 
the world as known and the knower mutually disclose each other, 
with neither being primary. The alternation from world to em-
bodied knower and back again is responsible for the distinction 
between~inner and outer, internal and external, subjective and 
objective. But this distinction more adequately represents the 
subjective as that which proves mistaken rather than that which 
is truly "inner" as opposed to a truly "outer". Polany'i's on-
tological commitment is not restricted to assertions about an 
"external" reality. It is a commitment to acknowledge that our 
assertions are true in so far as they grasp reality, considered 
as a continuously contirming series of concepts in which our 
deepest tacit sense of what is real comes to make sense while 
new vistas of research are opened to us. Our ontological com-
mitment is not empty, as is Kant's noumena. It is as full as 
the assertion concerning reality itself, while it also leaves 
room for change and development--even eventual contradiction. 
Such changes, even when implying that we were wrong in our 
assertions, still leaves room for being right in so far as we 
have experience to organize into concepts. To be "wrong" means 
merely to ascribe to a model of exploration or understanding 
which does not adequately account for what we come to know even 
if it accounts for what we presently know. 
Personal knowledge, whether of the moral domain of of 
other domains of knowledge, is, then, neither subjective or 
objective. But it avoids the scylla and charybdis of this 
dilemma not by residing within the terms of the distinction 
and attempting to mediate between them but by passing beyond 
the distinction to the fundamental ambiguity of knower and 
World, an ambiguity in which commitment and certainty also 
mutually determine each other. 
: 
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98 tolvard grasping their integrated \vhole. When we attend from 
particulars to their meaning, we "interiorize" them; and when 
we look away from the meaning toward the particulars, we 
"alienate" them: we single them out by standing aside and 
looking at them. 99 We may see interiorization as the act of 
1 . . 1 100 h < • 1 tacit or subsidiary re 1ance on part1cu ars, w ereas s1ng -
ing out particulars is a wav of_seeing them uncomprehenditigly 
rather than understandingly in the context of their par-
ticipation in the whole. 
Polanyi calls this focusing on and singling out of 
. 1 "d . 1 . " 1 0 1 part1cu ars estruct1ve ana ys1s . Despite the negative 
overtones of the word "destructive", Polanyi does not mean 
that such analysis is inappropriate to the development of 
knowledge. On the contrary, it is the means by which the 
tacit becomes objectified in explicit statements. We perform 
destructive analysis whenever we single out an object in per-
ception, 102 trace out conceptual possibilities of the cause 
98K . d now1n an 
by Marjorie Grene, 
p. 125. 
99 Ibid., p. 146. 
100 Ibid., p. 128. 
. . 
101M~chael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Cr1t1cal Ph1losophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
19 6 2) ' pp. 50-52 . 
102K . d B . now1ng an e1ng: 
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: 
p. 115. 
Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited 
University of Chicago Press, 1969), 
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103 
of an event or stop the bad performance of a skill in 
order to focus on what we are doing wrong. Thus, the ultimate 
purpose of destructive analysis is to enable us, once we have 
singled out and corrected a faulty element in perception, skill, 
skill, or conceptual knowledge, to reintegrate it into a 
h 1 h . h 1 . h d f"d l04 tacit w o e upon w 1c we can re y w1t renewe con 1 ence. 
We cannot replace tacit knowledge by a continued growth of 
explicit statements developed under destructive analysis; we 
can only correct and develop tacit knowledge by using such 
analysis as a too1. 105 Tacit knowledge can be corrected in 
the sense that mistaken assumptions which are often woven into 
the fabric of basically true commitments can be isolated and 
modified or eradicated from the functioning tacit integration. 
Being tacit is no guarantee of being true, though tacit truths 
are lived as well as "known". Some truths, indeed, are func-
tional only as tacit. Imagine, eg., replacing knowing how to 
.ride a bicycle or tie a knot with a detailed description of 
how to perform such skills. 
103Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), p. 57 .. 
104Knowing and Being: E~says_by Micha~l Polanyi, edited 
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: Un1vers1ty of Ch1cago Press, 1969), 
p . 12 5 . ; Michael Polanyi, Tacit Dimension (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1966), p. 19. 
105Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 20. 
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The process of becoming explicit, then, is a process 
of destructive analysis. The rules of procedure we adopt to 
perform such analysis may vary with the object of knowledge 
which we seek; they must only be adequate for isolating the 
data we wish to make explicit: a mathematical analysis 
~elds abstract, formalized data; a religious inquiry yields 
knowledge different from that in art, history, etc. Fact 
and method determine each other in that only facts which 
respond to the question posed by the method can appear as 
true explicitations of the domain of tacit knowledge in which 
one seeks truth; and these facts:in turn may guide our ques-
tions toward a more penetrating gaze which uncovers and 
brings to light entire domains of tacit knowledge. 106 
The word "explicitation" suggests making known what 
is implied. But the common understanding of implication can-
not be applied to Polanyi's concept of explicitation. Apart 
from the obvious sense of this word ln mathematics and logic, 
it is also used to describe how "objective" forms of know-
ledge are contained in tacit forms. But here we can see 
that deduction does not itself define the whole process of 
106 
.Michael Polanyi, Histo-ry, Philosophy, and the 
__ __ Sociology of Science: The Contempt of Freedom (N.Y., N.Y.: 
-~rno Press, 1975), pp. 1, 161. 
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elucidating the tacit, though it may be one part of the pro-
cess. The explicit appears as such more through a free play 
of the imagination guided by certain questions than by a pro-
cess of chain-logic (though such logical thinking does not 
preclude the discovery of new ideas which are more "tradi-
tionally" implied in tacit thoughts). 
The existence of explicit concepts does, however, 
h h . . d" . f k 1 d 107 imply t at t ere 1s a tac1t 1mens1on o now e ge. I 
have already shown why and how this is so. We need only 
note here that, since knowledge develops by an alternation 
of destructive analysis and re-integration of particulars, 
Polanyi's creative sense of implication functions on both 
sides. We "see" the tacit particulars we wish to single out 
because they respond to a question we are asking of the 
whole, such as "Why doesn't it behave as I expect if I 
understand it properly?" We see elements of knowledge as 
"contained in" the whole; but we may arrive at the knowledge 
of them through means other than deduction. Nonetheless, 
because there truly is a "containment" of the explicit in 
lO?Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 12. 
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the tacit and of tacit notions within explicit statements, we 
may reasonably say that they are related by implication. 
Further, since knowledge develops by an alternation 
of analysis and integration, we may see the dangers of stres-
sing as worthwhile, only the "objective" side of knowledge. 
The benefit of formalization is that when we rely on it to 
attend to new problems, it opens new vistas of insight. 108 
Partial formalization·is essential in knowledge. But 
one cannot objectify everything; and one ought not to try. 
109 The possibility of systematic errors, mi~application of 
facts or procedure, etc., are only mechanical difficulties 
which nevertheless form permanent barriers to total formali-
zation of knowledge. So when Polanyi says "I start by re-
jecting the ideal of scientific detachment"110 he means that 
the attempt to define the scope and limits of knowledge by 
the borders of explicit statements is inherently a misguided 
ideal. Such an ideal does not properly represent the way 
108Michael Polanyi, History, Philosophy, and the 
Sociology of Science: The Contempt of Freedom (N.Y., N.Y.: 
Arno Press, 1975), pp. 5-6; Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowl~dge: 
Towards A Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 29. 
109Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), p. 19. 
11 o Ib ·a .. l • , p. Vll. 
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in which we actually gain knowledge, 111 as I have already 
demonstrated; and it ends in the absurdity of defining ad 
infinitum every speck of cosmic dust while losing the crucial 
perspective of knowledge as a human reality born in and sup-
d b 1 · I 112 porte y persona cornrn1tment. 
The loss of the human perspective leads us to an 
absurd, Laplacean mechanical interpretation of the universe. 113 
And this is a universe in which even the highest concepts of 
justice, morality, custom, law, Good, and evil are reduced to 
111Michael Polanyi, Scientific Thou ht and Social 
Reality, ed. by Fred Schwarz N.Y., N.Y.: International 
Universities Press, Inc., ~974), p. 60. 
112This loss of perspective is Polanyi's major criti-
cism of the drive to perfect formalization. Most positi-
vists will admit, of course, that perfect formalization of 
knowledge is an unattainable ideal. But, they might insist, 
this is no reason to stop seeking the ideal. After all, 
small victories are better than no victories at all--or 
fleeing the battleground altogether! But Polanyi is saying 
that even these "small victories" must be put into a per-
spective whose knowledge-content exceeds the "field" of 
formalization if they are to yield any sense at all. And 
this perspective is gained only by recognizing that it re-
presents a personal though intentionally universal commit-
ment to view reality in a certain way--a way not justified 
by the terms of formalization alone. 
113Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), p. 153 
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statistical descriptions of what people believe. 114 Human 
experience becomes something to manipulate through prediction 
and control rather than valuable in itself as the prime re-
. . 115 
vealer of th1ngs. 
The ideal of total formalization, then, is a rampant, 
uncontrolled orgy of destructive analysis uncorrected by a 
human effort to understand from committed perspectives. 
Reality presents itself with its richness of experience and 
knowledge to those who engage the whole of their persons in 
it and who develop their knowledge out of an engagement that 
seeks a universal perspective for all formalizations. 
How, then, does an explicit understanding of values 
develop in the light of this analysis? We ~ave already 
shown how the knowledge of values develops tacitly from 
human experience and the need to order ascriptions of worth. 
We may now apply the process of destructive analysis to the 
development of value-knowledge. For if knowledge of values 
is, as we have shown thus far, a matter of tacit knowing, 
then it must become explicit in the same way in which the 
-~----- --
114Michael Polanyi, Scientific Thought and Social 
Reality, ed. by Fred Schwarz (N.Y., N.Y.: International 
Universities Press, Inc., 1974),p. SO; Intellect and Hope, 
ed. by Thomas A. Langford and William H. Poteat (Durham, N.C.: 
Duke University Press, 1968), p. 54. 
115Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), p. 197. 
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tacit dimension becomes explicit in other domains of know-
ledge. The burden df unfolding the unique explicitation of 
value-knowledge lies upon us, since Polanyi does not develop 
his theory of tacit knowing in this area. 
In the process of finding our value-structures in-
adequate to meet the new situations to which they inevitably 
bring us, we single our particular values, making them 
"objective" and "theoretical". From experiencing friendship, 
eg., one might conclude that the good in friendship lies in 
the fact that friends are available to help us. This may 
lead to our igTioring friends except in times of trouble. 
And, when we discover that they are no longer available to 
us because of our long neglect, we may suspect that something 
is wrong with our understanding of the value of friendship. 
Thus, we focus on this value, objectifying it for the pur-
pose of gazing at the structure we have bee~ living in. We 
raise this value out of tacit waters like the hull of a boat 
in order to inspect its structure for seaworthiness. Clear-
ly, this value is part of our whole value structure just as 
the hull, hidden below the waters, is an essential part of 
the boat. And once structural repairs or even rebuilding has 
been done to this section, the boat will be renewed and fit 
again for travel. The hull is resubmerged, where it tacitly 
supports a renewed voyage. In the case of our value of 
\ 
friendship, we may observe that our error lay in failing to 
89 
to see that the good of friendship lies in a two-way sharing 
of help and understanding. We may then place renewed confi-
dence in our re-structured understanding and come again to 
rely on our value of friendhsip in life. 
Thus, our theoretical and explicit gaze on this value 
led us to a renewed understanding of the value which was able 
to function tacitly and resolve the"tension of the question. 
Our gaze contemplated the inadequate structure, tracing out 
possible lines of re-structure toward the sense of adequacy, 
still tacit within us, which we required. Thus, even this 
tacit sense of adequacy is contained within our sense of the 
failure of our value, the object of our g~ze. We cannot 
escape the tacit ground of our values by objectifying them; 
but we can deepen and improve this ground by correcting our 
tacit misunderstandings explicitly--and then returning them 
to our tacit confidence. 
We should be warned, however, that an understanding 
of values and of the Good cannot be identified with a 
theoretical structure. Personal knowledge of these ethical 
realities includes the tacit understanding that grounds all 
of our explicit theories, including the standards to which 
we submit them. Polanyi would not accept as valid any 
approach to values or the Good which attempts to capture 
their reality in a theoretical structure. This is evident 
in his assertion that concepts of justice, morality, custom, 
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laW, Good, and evil cannot be reduced to descriptions of 
what people believe. And such would be the case if we turned 
our understanding of values into a description of them. 
Here Polanyi explicitly admits the reality of these 
experiences and indicates that they have an independent im-
portance in determining how we should understand the knowing 
process. His point seems to be not only that these ethical 
notions cannot be comprehended by mere description but also 
that the realities they denote whould be acknowledged in 
every knowledge-claim and that such acknowledgment is part 
of the reason why we should not attempt to objectify all 
knowledge. Our tacit commitments, it seems, being acts of 
the whole of our person, are confidences which include moral 
realities within their scope as well as conceptual commit-
ments. What we believe is importantly connected to our moral 
commitments. That is, there are some beliefs we feel we 
ought to have (eg., belief in friendship) and others we feel 
we ought to deny. We are influenced deeply in the selection 
of the beliefs to which we commit ourselves by our moral 
beliefs. Polanyi even asserts 116 that we ought never to 
116 r am touching here on ideas which are developed 
later concerning Polanyi's explicit moral assertions. We 
shall find that Polanyi believes there are perversions of 
our moral entanglement with knowledge and that its true 
function is a moral commitment to truth. But in this sec-
tion I merely want to establish the basic structure of value-
explicitation and how it functions to deepen our understand-
ing of moral realities. We can also acknowledge here that 
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accept beliefs that deny the reality of moral values. 117 
we are involved in a domain of knowledge that is an element 
of all knowing since it strikes at the heart of commitment, 
which is at the root of tacit knowing. But we must wait for 
later chapters for a careful description of how knowing 
itself is in part a moral act. 
117one might question whether Polanyi's concept of 
explicitation can be classed as a methodology. Methodolo-
gies, one might argue, establish knowle;dge claims by means 
of rules which are explicit and well known. Hence, logical 
truths obey rules of logic, scientific truths obey rules of 
induction, and other truths obey rules appropos and commonly 
know to pertain to the mode of knowledge in question. But 
although Polanyi includes deduction and induction as modes 
of explicitation, he seems to view explicitation as a much 
broader activity than one that can be regulated entirely by 
rules. Indeed, rules seem to be more a crystallization of 
certain modes of explicitation than an ~ priori guide of the 
process. 
Does this mean that processes of explicitation which 
do not obey already established rules--as in deduction and 
induction--are still valid? I believe Polanyi would answer 
"yes" to this question on the grounds that insights are not 
justified by the rules by which we are guided to them but by 
the intimations into reality to which they provide access. 
Further, the rules which these insights establi~h in our 
act of universalizing our understanding in terms of new in-
sights to which we oursel~es submit become the guideposts 
to them. We do not arrive at new discoveries via paths 
already well-trod. 
Explicitation, fundamentally, becomes a process de-
termined only by a free play of imagination when we are in 
pursuit of new truths. The experience of insight itself, as 
a novel and powerfully renewed access to reality, establishes 
the route only after the fact. This means that imaginative 
freedom is the fundamental methodology of discovery, even 
when that freedom makes use of rules which it embodies and 
transcends. 
If this extended meaning of "methodology" be 
accepted, especially in the light of the rules which insight 
establishes, then explicitation in any sense and in any 
domain of knowledge is a methodology. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF KNOWLEDGE 
In this chapter, I wish to extend Polanyi's notion of 
conceptual knowledge to a social, interpersonal ground of all 
knowledge. We shall see that we do not understand the dyna-
mic of the achievement of knowledge unless we take into account 
the essential communal nature of our deepest experiences and 
the communal bond in which they are grounded. This bond is 
immediately relevant for drawing out the ethical implications 
of Polanyi's thought, since it is essential for an ethic that 
. 
some notion of the nature of interpersonal realities be esta-
blished. Polanyi's concept of "conviviality" meets this need 
and lends itself handily to the development of a notion of a 
social code of ethics. 
I shall apply the concept of "tradition" and of "connoi-
seeurs" which Polanyi develops in the context of a socially 
grounded epistemology to value-knowledge and push his concept 
of discovery to a notion of value-discovery. Thus, I will 
argue that we learn ethical truths from within the communal 
bond, ind~eli_them in the process of coming to maturity, and 
move toward the Good (which is the "whole" in which individual 
insights into value participate) as an end. The process of 
maturing can "break out" of the traditional mores of society 
and lead to individual and communal grasps of moral truth 
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which are entirely novel. In establishing that the dynamic of 
tacit and personal knowing can be applied to the domain of 
moral knowledge, I will have completed the epistemological 
argument for moral knowledge. 
1. Indwelling and Conviviality in Value-Knowledge 
We must now precede to an understanding of how our 
individual insight into worth, our personal comprehensions of 
value, enliven our lives and extend themselves to the human 
community as a whole. To accomplish this, we must return to 
Polanyi's notion of knowing, particularly his concepts of 
indwelling and conviviality. 
Indwelling is the deepest form of commitment. We be-
gin the process of discovery by pouring ourselves into the 
subsidiary elements of a problem and continue to spill our-
selves further and further into tacit clues until we arrive at 
the discovery fully committed to it as an aspect of reality. 
For Polanyi, this is the sense in which the existential dictum 
"existence precedes essence" has its appropriate meaning. The 
"thrusting forward" of our existence into a position of com-
94 
mitment in relation to a discovery that follows it is the way 
we make the truth our own. Imagination strains to find a path 
to a superior life of the mind. Existential choices are made 
in response to a tacit insight into potential discovery and 
follow a "gradient" of understanding toward this expansion. 
Although whole worlds are rarely ever chosen; there 
is a personal center of control capable of responsible choice 
according to already established criteria. 118 Consider-
ed as fundamental in man's being, existential 119 changes, 
considered as depth "world-new" changes, do not impair the 
rationality of our personal judgment; they merely affect our 
calling. 120 
118Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 81. 
ll9Polanyi' s sympathy with existnetialism in s·o far 
as it affirms commitment as fundamental in knowing should not 
be construed as an alignment with existentialism. Polanyi 
agrees that existentialism has affinities to his notion of 
indwelling. But existentialism, in his view, has not faced 
the fact that science itself is the product of commitment/ 
decision. Existentialism forces a dichotomy here, setting 
itself up as a revel in relation to scientific thought. Thus, 
existentialism fails to take up Polanyi's task: to find a 
concept of knowing that applies to both science and existential 
thought. (Points from a conversation with Paul Tillich, Feb. 
21, 1963, Box 25, folder 4, pp. 3-4 of University of Chicago 
collection). 
120Knowin 
by Marjorie Grene, 
p. 134. 
Michael Polan i, edited 
C 1cago Press, 1969), 
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Polanyi then extends the use of the term "indwelling", 
unlike existential thought to both science and the humanities. 
Indwelling, as tacit knowledge, is characteristic of all know-
ledge.121 It is a kind of "interiori:ation" of kno1dedge in 
that we inwardly identify ourselves with an object of knowledge. 
I have already shown how the dialectic of destructive 
analysis brings forth explicit, focal knowledge. Another way 
of saying this in regard to indwelling is that there is a 
dialectical production of meaning through the alternation of 
d 1 . . f ,.. k 1 d 122 indwelling an a 1enat1on rom a context ror ·now e ge. 
In this sense, indwelling is a term which also opposes the 
meaning Polanyi expresses in the terms "looking at". 123 
121Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 17. 
122 Knowing and Being: Essays By Michael Polanyi, edited 
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 
p. 148. 
123Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 18; Interesting exam-
ples of this are reading and playing the piano. One is aware 
only of the meaning of sentences in reading as he indwells the 
words and letters. But a confusion in meaning may send one 
back to a close, explicit scrutiny of the words where one may 
discover that a misspelled word changed the entire meaning of 
the sentence. Beginning from a different point of view, cor-
rected by an explicit (alienated in relation to indwe1t) grasp 
of the words of the sentence, one goes on to grasp the point 
of the entire work. Similarly in pl~ying the piano, one in-
dwells the musical scores from which one plays. But a diffi-
cult finger movement may require that the pianist explicitly 
scrutinize a certain part of the score for a better sense of 
how to procede. The music stops, and the indwelling has become 
an alienation from the music. But immediately the music begins 
96 
Thus, Polanyi says we use theories (as well as systems 
of signs, notations, etc.) by dwelling in them; and this dwell-
ing can be gusied by a shaft of focus. Indwelling requires a 
surrender of oneself to a context of meaning and consists in a 
living in rather than a controlling of experience. Through in-
dwelling we control neither ourselves nor our environment. Our 
- f . 124 
attitude is that of contemplating the content o exper1ence. 
Music, poetry, painting, and all arts lie on a con-
tinuum of indwelling somewhere,between science and worship. 125 
I contend that knowledge of ethical realities--values, orders 
of worth-ascription, intimations of the Good--also belong on 
this continuum. Our tacit knowledge of values, eg., is a form 
of indwelling a reality to which we are committed. As indwelt, 
ethical realities are not merely ideas we constitute by reflec-
. 
tion upon past experience. An indwelt perspective does not 
again, this time with better execution and much improvement. In 
both cases (the reading and the music) the alternat~on of in-
dwelling and alienation deepened the comprehension, the meaning, 
of the performance. 
124Michael Polanyi, Personal Know led e: Towards A Post-Critical 
Philosophy (Chicago: The University o icago Press, , p. ; on-
ternplation, then, is impersonal only in the sense of being a complete par-
~icipation in the object rather than a detachment from it. Contemplation 
1s self-abandonment (p. 197) an abandonment to all levels of intellectual 
~ife. Polanyi, reverses the usual sense of "contemplation" here. He re-
Jects the notion that contemplation is the same as "theory" or "sight" from 
an objective distance. 
12~icahel Polanyi, Personal 
_thilosophy (Chicago: The Uni ver-=s....,.i7ty~o~r;r.....--:-~:-----=~'?{'"7~--~,_..----
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seek the ideological essence of any reality, including ethical 
realities. We find ourselves confronted with an aspect of 
reality we can only acknowledge as intimately ours and yet as 
something we have discovered, something we can contemplate and 
to whose reality we can abandon ourselves. The personal know-
ledge of values and of the Good, then, should be seen not 
merely as a product of "existential commitment" (in the sense 
of "making" our values). We find ourselves already indwelling 
them; and we develop this indwelling with increasing capacity 
to appreciate ethical realities and to order our lives in 
accordance with them rather than to make them subservient to 
our lives. 
. 
We must turn, then, to a more comprehensive view of 
the nature of the ethical realities we indwell. Polanyi says 
that all knowledge, as committed indwelling is convival: 
Since both individual and interpersonal commit-
ments are related socially and established insti-
tutionally, the perspective of commitment widens 
here to the whole of humanity pursuing its course 
towards an unknown destination.l26 
The pursuit of knowledge, according to Polanyi, is not simply 
an individual affair. It is communal--or convivial--not only 
in the sense of being a necessary achievement for each person 
in community but more specifically, in being the necessary 
. _
126 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Cr1t1cal Philosophy (Chicago: The University 
1962), p. 328. 
Towards A Post-
of Chicago Press, 
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basis of any individual, personal engagement in truth-seeking. 
Polanyi argues for the interpersonal character of 
knowledge in a number of ways. One of these is to tackle the 
question of knowledge of other minds in a direct manner. In 
reference to knowledge of others, Polanyi states "mind is not 
the aggregate of its focally known manifestations, but is that 
on which we focus our attention while being subsidiarily 
aware of its manifestations".l27 The parallel here between 
tacit knowing in general and this knowledge in particular is 
intentional.l28 We never, e.g., merely observe the external 
workings of another body. We see the body as a clue to the 
presence of something else: the mind.l29 Thus, "A man's 
mind can be known only comprehensively, by dwelling within 
the unspecifiable particulars of its external manifesta-
tions."l30 Such an approach side-steps questions of solipsism 
12 7Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962)' p. 263. 
N.y. : 
128Michael Polan,i, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 32. 
129I~id., p. 31-32. 
130Michael Polanui, The Study of Man (Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 33. 
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or of how the other is "inferred". The same dynamic that 
fundamentally governs all acts of knowing permits real 
access to the personal quality of the other. 
Further, a belief in truth as a communal achievement, 
a belief essential to science, requires that one open up to 
others in an attitude of fairness and tolerance, that one 
believe that he shares with others a disposition to the 
truth. 131 This participation of the knower in the shared 
attitude of the other increases steadily as we proceed to 
higher levels of existence until, in the case of knowing 
others, indwelling is so full that there are no longer two 
logical levels. We apply the same standards in knowing the 
other as we do in knowing ourselves and, thus, transcend 
mere scientific "observation". 13 2 We come to know that 
we do not know others by observing their bodies or see what 
they see by observing their neurological processes. 133 
131Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Societb 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 7 . 
132Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man, (Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 94-5. 
133Meaning, Michael Polanui and Harry Prosch, The 
University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1975, p. 49. 
100 
An immediate result of this realization is that we can 
no longer ask merely for the cause of an act since the cause 
becomes logically distinct from the reasons for an act. And 
when we ask for the reasons of an act, we encounter the person 
instead of an object of positivistic, mechanistic science. 134 
our appreciation of others, manifested in our respectful atten-
tion, is a fellowship in which we acknowledge that we share 
with him the same firmament of obligations. We understand 
f "bl h . 135 p 1 . each other as capable o respons1 e c o1ces. o any1 
refers to this understand1ng as a !!communal art of confi-
136 dence.n And he asserts that we must commit ourselves to 
this art as an act of trust, of faith. Only be adhering to a 
choice to trust others even when this trust is most unfounded 
can we discover friendship or a true human bond. And this 
134scientific Thought and Social Reality, ed. by Fred 
Schwarz, International Universities Press, Inc.: N.Y., N.Y., 
1974; Polanyi identifies this encounter with Martin Buber's 
ni-Thoun encounter of persons, an encounter in which love 
becomes possible. But, more than love, Polanyi says that the 
I-Thou encounter necessitates that we move from the assertion 
of facts (as in science) to a continuous encroachment on the 
area of moral and civic commands; Michael Polanyi, Personal 
Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, (Chicag()": 
The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 346. 
135Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 66. 
136Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 71. 
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principle is valid not only for dyads and small groups but 
also for the whole range of social interplay. Faith, con-
sidered as "indwelling" is a method of discovery in all human 
relations and a condition for human disclosure and truth. 
And it makes possible the good works that are based on the 
recognition of trust. 137 A belief that others are motivated 
only by ambition, greed, lust, and violence is responsible for 
producing and forwarding these motives in any society. 138 
But aside from these ways of approaching the problem 
of how we know other persons, there is abundant evidence of 
an interpersonal coincidence of tacit judgments continuous 
from language to the pre-linguistic interaction of powerful 
emotions (e.g., sympathy with another's pain).l39 Sentiments 
of fellowship, e.g., exist prior to articulation and form 
the ground of our capacity to trust in any formalized commun-
ity.140 So Polanyi can say, "The tacit sharing of knowing 
137Notes on Prejudice, 11/28/39, box 26, folder 1. 
138Ibid. 
139Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 205. 
]40Ibid., p. 209. 
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d 1 • • 1 f • 1 • • II 141 un er 1es every s1ng e act o art1cu ate commun1cat1on. 
Communication occurs only when both speaker and listerner rely 
mutually on one another's correct understanding and use of words. 
Both must trust the authority for correctness and one another's 
proper obedience to it. Trust and authority must be combined.l42 
And, when it is, any linguistic move between persons contributes 
to this conviviality in so far as it is a reaching out and a 
sharing. 143 This may not in itself form an organized society, 
but it is the sine qua~ of such. 144 And it sets the stage 
for impersonal obligations to the community. 
This sharing of experience is one kind of conviviality. 
A second kind is participation in joint activities. Such par-
ticipation affirms communal existence and, by identifying the 
life of the group with antecedent groups, establised historical 
continuity and reconciliation within the group. It confirms the 
l41Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 203. 
14 2rbid., p. 206 
143rbid, p. 210. 
144rbid., p. 212 
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convivial existence of the group as transcending the indi-
145 
vidual. 
The conviviality of knowledge does not mean that man 
is incapable of pure thought undertermined by social influ-
ences. But such thought must be done within the limiting 
structures of society to which one must submit since they are 
beyond the scope of one's own personal responsibility and are 
the framework on which one relies. 14G Evidently, Polanyi does 
not consider our tacit, convivial sharing to be an "influence" 
in the negative sense of blocking our original or even radi-
cally opposing ideas. It is clear, however, that tacit shar-
ing is an influence in so far as it grounds the dynamic of all 
thought in any culture. 
Polanyi refers to this positive sense of "influence" 
as the "authority" for thought. Clearly, we must rely on the 
authority of others in the community who are accredited with 
knowledge of things do not know. 147 This does not mean, of we 
145Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 211. Polanyi, offered this about ritual, but I think 
this point of view can be extended to all shared activities, 
Si~ce they all require evidently the same mutual indwelling. 
146Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 68-9. 
147Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
1962)' p. 163. 
Towards A Post-
Chicago Press, 
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course, that we should submit ourselves naively to the view-
points of others. Thoughtful submission to authority includes 
some opposition to it. We accept authority as competent but not 
as supreme. 148 Thus, reasonable submission includes conflicts 
in views and changes in belief and values on both sides. 149 
The authoritative traditions of the past are not just "handed 
down" but are our interpretation of the past as we view it from 
f • 1 b 1 . h 1 5 0 TtT the context o part1cu ar pro ems 1n t e present. ne re-
mold authority to meet the problems with which we struggle and 
yet rely on it as a universal measure of what is right for the 
community as a whole. 
This is possible, of course, because we are capable of 
learning the rules of a skill, art, or science through the 
tacit dynamic of knowledge. And, more than that, we are capa-
ble of teaching these rules to others and of using them to im-
prove our p~rformances by re-integrating into our performance 
the understanding represented in the rule. 151 In teaching 
these rules to others--or to ourselves--we must never impress 
148Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962)' p. 164. 
149 Ibid. 
150
rbid.,. p. 160. 
151 rbid., p. 162. 
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our particular slant which we give them on others. They must 
be free to respond in their own creative way to the authority 
that binds the community. 152 We are not the perfect 
embodiment of our own rules. 
Tradition, then, is the convivial embodiment of know-
ledge and requires an active, creative response as it is 
transmitted. It is composed of both explicit and tacit 
elements. Where no explicit prescription exists, the tradi-
tion must be learned by example from the master as an "art". 
The apprentice submits uncritically to his authority (but not 
naively!) and thus learns rules of which even the master is 
unaware. He learns the tradition of the art and often sur-
passes the master. 153 His skill is then called "connoiseur-
ship".l54 
In this sense, the learner must believe before he 
can know. He must rely on others; he must submit to the 
152Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Societt 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 4 . 
153Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
19 6 2) ' pp . 52 - 4 . 
154Ibid., pp. 54-5. 
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d . . b . h. lf . . 155 tra 1t1on y pour1ng 1mse 1nto 1t. At the same time, 
he must bring his own modifications to that to which he sub-
mits, even though radical dissent still implies a partial 
submission. For he cannot dissent from something in which 
he has absolutely no involvement. 
Traditions are always in a state of creative renewal. 
They invite their own opposition. Thus, the personal element 
must appeal to a tradition not merely as it is but as it 
ought to be. The person aims at a reality which is both 
embodied in the tradition and transcends it. His view of 
this transcendent reality from within the tradition is the 
ground of the modification of the tradition. This dynamic 
is universal for science, law, religion, and other domains. 156 
All creative activities are based on traditions of a structure 
similar to those found in science. 
The discussion of knowledge of the Other, convivi-
ality, submission to tradition, and connoisseurship leads 
naturally to ethical implications. Indeed, the description of 
155Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), p. 208. 
156Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 56-7. 
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the ontological and epistemological link which Polanyi unfolds 
in relation to the other leads us to see quite easily how one 
might, in Polanyian terms, argue for a communal or convivial 
knowledge of values and of the Good. 
The importance of indwelling in value knowledge shows 
itself on two levels. First, since all integrations of mean-
ing involve a tacit indwelling of clues, then any assertion 
that X is valuable (i.e., tends toward the Good) or that X 
manifests an insight into the Good must rely on a tacit 
indwelling which allows us to perceive the value or insight. 
Such assertions represent meaningful integrations, if we . 
take Polanyi's epistemology seriously. And the fact that we 
do make such insights leaves our insight into value to be 
explained in the same manner in which Polanyi explains how 
we come to know in general. 
The parallel seems obvious. Polanyi does not attempt 
to justify all knowledge claims by some fundamental, unques-
tionable datum. Indeed, the tenor of his epistemology would 
rule against such an attempt. Instead, he begins with a 
description of how we come to have the knowledge we claim to 
possess and developed from this perspective. Thus, a legiti-
mate extension of knowledge into the ethical domain need 
only begin with the same starting point: with a description 
of how we come to meaningful integrations of insight into 
Value. It is consistent, indeed necessary, for a Polanyian 
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thinker to investigate the standing of knowledge claims in 
the form in which they are made by an analysis of the tacit-
explicit dynamic that underlies the experience to which they 
refer. Thus, we can assert with confidence that claims of 
value-knowledge are appropriately analyzed and justified in 
the light of such a dynamic; and value-assertions are, there-
fore, integrations of meaning which we perform as an act of 
personal knowing through an indwelling of a tacit awareness 
of various partial insights and feelings into value. 
Value-knowledge comes to explicit focus through a 
personal indwelling, more specifically, of the value-laden 
communal experience. Even if we cannot agree with Polanyi's 
argument for an intersubjective reality, we cannot deny the 
importance of such a reality for the ethical domain. If we 
indwell an intersubjective reality, and if value-knowledge 
is made explicit from an indwelling of tacit value-awareness, 
' 
then we indweil an intersubjective, value-laden reality from 
which we integrate our personal values. An intersubjective 
reality means a communal field of values. 
This intersubjective sharing of values can occur on 
an explicit level, of course, as when people discuss points 
of view and persuade others to their own viewpoint. But the 
argument for an intersubjective sharing of values finds its 
focus in the tacit realm of communal life in which a funda-
mental ontological congruency between persons makes common 
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values, tacit or explicit, possible. Without an intersub-
jective sharing of values, we are reduced to a solipsistic 
inference that others feel and believe as we do. But an 
acknowledgment of this sharing enables us to understand that, 
when we acknowledge the personal reality of another, we also 
acknowledge a fundament of values that binds us together 
as human being. 
The intersubjective sharing of values, then, makes 
ethical life fundamentally a communal affair. Our insights 
into value are grounded most deeply in a tacit sharing 
within a community of shared values upon which we rely in 
.. 
coming to our own insights. 
The other elements of the model of the epistemological 
community of tacitly shared insight must be extended, if we 
are to be consistent, to value-knowledge: i.e., authority, 
tradition, connoisseurship. 
The community which we indwell forms the tradition 
which we take over for ourselves in ascribing worth (and 
standards of worth) to things, events, persons, acts, etc. 
We indwell a tradition of values which we project as we face 
present issues and orient ourselves to the future. These 
values are to some extent reconfirmed in each of our acts, 
forming, by "repetition", a continuous tradition of value. 
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We cannot, of course, "look at" our standards in the 
process of using them. We attribute absoluteness to them 
because we rely on them absolutely. Yet this reliance is 
itself temporal and constitutes the continuity of tradition. 
Even if the capacity to rely absolutely is potentially eternal, 
however, there is no necessary reason why such absoluteness 
should itself be employed as a value. We must remember that 
we are responsible for the continuance of the value-tradition 
through our indwelt commitments. Otherwise, we lose sight 
of the perspectival character of all knowledge, including 
value-knowledge. 157 Such a loss would condemn the free 
growth of cultural life and destroy society's capacity for 
. . 1 h h 158 or1g1na t oug t. 
Thus, having a tradition of values does not mean that 
we cannot meaningful oppose the value-standards of our com-
munity. True, we learn what values are and how they aim at 
achieving the Good from within our community. But each per-
son is free to discover new realms of human value that may 
surpass those of his community to the extent that assertion 
157Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), p. 184. 
158 Ibid., p. 220. 
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. 11 f~ . h d" ,159 of the latter 1s mora y o ±ens1ve to t e 1scoverer. 
We can, thus, change the standards of worth by which 
our community lives. We can, as the "master" of a new under-
t ndl·na of val•1es, teach others a new aspect of ethical s a . eo ._ 
reality. And when they become connoisseurs, firmly entrench-
ing the master's teachings in the community, they themselves, 
relying absolutely on what they have learned, can come upon 
new discoveries which again demand dissent. They are, 
indeed, the authorities of the ethical domain until a new 
159For example, one man's ethical insight might per-
ceive that there is no real relation between the sacrifice of 
children and the productivity of crops. The value of child 
sacrifice plummets in his view; he sees such activity now as 
futile, self-defeating (since it robs the fields of potential 
workers), and generally abhorrent. This departure from the 
normal understanding is not due in this case to ignorance or 
a lack of "connoisseurship" of values; he is skilled in the 
art of ordering his ascriptions of worth within his community 
and has placed his confidence in the standards of his society. 
But, let us say he is a farmer whose crops failed after the 
sacrifice of his first-born son. His confidence in his com-
munity's value of sacrifice is shaken; he has lived by them, 
and they have failed him. He now sees the abhorrent act for 
what it is, released from the blindness invoked by a belief 
that only such an act could protect the crop that helps feed 
the community, He takes up a position of dissent, not wish-
ing to overthrow the tradition but to re-make it in a more 
humane way. Perhaps he finds the freedom to do this and per-
haps he does not. But, in Polanyi's view, he should be 
allowed the freedom of dissent since this is the way in which 
the tradition is both re-vitalized and re-molded. We should 
all recognize that we are not the perfect embodiment of our 
value-standards and that our standards may not represent the 
Ultimate Good. 
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ethical reality begins to assert itself in the form of 
160 dissent. 
160
we might question Polanyi's notion of "indwelling" 
in respect to its vagueness. The clearest notion available for 
understanding what Polanyi means is that of a sharing of ideas: 
two or more people with the same idea. But obviously, even if 
the model is relevant it is not adequate for understanding the 
importance of the term "indwelling". Even Polanyi w·ould reject 
it as an adequate model. 
More specifically, Polanyi is referring to a tacit 
sharing not only of ideas but of habits and patterns of life. 
Such sharing occurs on two levels. First, Polanyi seems to 
assume an "ontological congruence" of persons within a culture 
in which the sameness of influential factors produces human 
beings who share a fundamental "sameness". Second, the cul-
ture itself tends to reproduce itself in the shape of individuals 
who learn to share common assumptions and patterns of life. The 
second kind of sharing can be understood to some extent as an 
explicit sharing of ideas. But obviously Polanyi intends even 
this kind of sharing to have its tacit dimension. 
The tacit dimension of this sharing and that of the 
"ontological congruence" which constitutes the first level of 
sharing is ·supposed to constitute "indwe 11 ing". Polanyi wishes 
to distinguish between indwelling as an intellectu~l act and 
indwelling as an existential act. He means by this distinction 
only to divide a partial act (intellectual) from a whole (per-
sonal) one. Indwelling includes intellectual forms of indwell-
ing as part of a total, personal involvement in culture. 
B~t these distinctions, though they help explicate 
Polanyi's concept of indwelling to some extent, cannot serve to 
eliminate the vagueness of the term. Ultimately, "indwelling'', 
in its most significant sense as "ontological congruence", seems 
to rely upon an assumption of a sameness of being throughout a 
"field" which includes persons and the cultural or "civic" en-
vironment. Polanyi seems to want to retain a strict epistemo-
logical meaning for indwelling; but his epistemology is consti-
stuted by a description of the tacit-explicit dynamic, the 
ontological assumption remains an U?grounded ground. One must 
accept it or else find an alternative way to explain indwelling 
strictly as an epistemological act, unless the ontological 
assumption can be grounded within the purview of Polanyi's 
Philosophy. Polanyi himself does not resolve this issue. 
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This does not mean that Polanyi gives us no guides to 
its resolution. His notion of ontological commitment, eg., 
allows us to understand how all of our beliefs carry with them 
a commitment to consider them as aspects of reality. One might 
argue that indwelling, considered as a self-interpretive con-
cept, itself reveals the aspect of reality to which it refers: 
the "sameness" of the person and the cultural environment which 
makes the "ontological congruence" possible. This insight may 
not itself resolve the problem of how to understand dwelling, 
but it points in the direction of an answer that would be im-
possible to unfold in the context of the present work. 
The problem of indwelling extends specifically to the 
problem of the Other. Polanyi claims that we know the Other 
by indwelling the tacit clues to the presence of mind so that 
mind reveals itself naturally as the meaning of these clues. 
Hence, we do not infer the presence of mind but perceive it as 
the meaning of the clues we indwell. 
Polanyi seems to adhere too closely to the language 
in which the traditional problem of other minds is stated. He 
appears to be interested in establishing a means by which we 
know the presence of mind in others and, thus, appears to be 
bound by the Cartesian metaphysical difficulties which are 
responsible for the problem in the first place .. He ends up 
asserting the existence of mind as though it were a metaphysical 
entity in itself. 
But before we are misled by appearances, we should re-
cognize that Polanyi's main objective in discussing the problem 
is to illustrate how the notion of indwelling overcomes the 
problem even in its traditional statement. The point is that 
knowledge of others is not an inference but part of the per-
ceived world; Polanyi is not attempting to justify the meta-
physical separateness of mind in accordance with a Cartesian 
mental~ty, 
Again, however, we might question the assumption that 
indwelling represents some sort of "ontological congruency" in 
which the Other is, in some sense, "part" of ourselves and our 
perceived world. Polanyi does not offer any specific justifica-
tion for this assumption in regard to knowing others. Indeed, 
he appears to acquiesce to Cartesian dichotomies. But again, 
his .1otion of ontological commitment may release him from the 
fangs of this critique. Indwelling, in the perspective on onto-
logical commitment, lets us see the Other as an aspect of 
reality in the sense that, under ordinary conditions, we are not 
deceived in our belief that we are dealing with real others who 
are real in the same sense and manner in which we are. This 
;----
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~ew values, then, are discovered as part of a process 
of "breaking out" of old ones. To understand this more clearly, 
we must return to Polanyi's epistemological understanding of 
"breaking out". 
z. Discovery in Value-Knowledge: Breaking Out 
We may recall some of the things we have already esta-
blished. Personal knowledge claims to establish contact with 
a reality beyond the clues on which it relies. It commits us 
passionately and beyond comprehension to a vision of reality 
which we can neither verify or falsify in its own terms. We 
live in it as we live in our own skins. Yet this passion 
answers to a demand for universalizability, which is true ob-
jectivity.161 The relations of tool to purpose, meaning to 
meant, and part to whole are sustained through the belief that 
162 they are discovered and not created by the knower. We may 
have appetities, including intellectual ones, whic~ we aim at 
I 
satisfying, but the discover~r seeks a solution to a problem 
163 that is satisfying not only for himself but for everyone. 
ascription of a value of reality to the OtheY need not involve 
~n acceptance of the reality of a Cartesian "mind", Its intent 
1s_to l0ave ~he ultimate mystery of personal reality in tact 
~~h1le assert1ng that others also participate in such a reality 
1n a manner that is accessible to us. 
161Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
1962)' p. 64. 
162 
Ibid., p. 63. 
163 Ibid., p. 301. 
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Discovery is a response to our convivial obligations as it 
draws us beyond ourselves. 
Discoveries are made by pursuing possibilities suggested 
. . k 1 d 164 by existing now e ge. But when it occurs by leaping beyond 
a hitherto accepted structure toward a new heruistic vision, it 
is called "breaking out". The old structure is thereby de-
molished, and a new one leaps into sight. 
At the root of such "breaking out" is the constantly 
1 f h h . d 16 5 Th . questing, rest ess nature o t e uman min . e questing 
mind has the power to break out into new visions because higher 
levels of meaning are essentially accessible through the frame-
work of tacit reliance, a framework that has the power to evoke 
within the searcher the process and means of discovering them. 
Such creative releases, then, are controlled by their own poten-
. 1" . 166 t1a lties. 
The language of discovery should not be confused with 
the language that describes a natural event. A discovery is a 
uniquely human achievement, not an event that can be described 
like other events in the world. Discoveries differ from inani-
mate events in that 1) the field evoking and guiding them is 
164Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) p.67. 
165Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), p. 196. 
166Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 90 
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not that of a stable configuration but of a problem; 2) their 
occurrence is not spontaneous but due to an effort toward the 
actualization of certain hidden potentialities; and 3) the 
uncaused action which evokes them is usually an imaginative 
thrust toward discovering these potentialities. 167 
One can locate the premisses of science in the means 
by which we get out hidden and potential discoveries. It is 
in the process of discovery and verification that the premis-
ses of science exercise their guidance over the judgment 
of scientists. 168 Thus, recognizing a problem and seeing it 
as worth solving is a discovery in itself.l69 This means that 
science neither precedes by a prescribed operation from clues to 
discovery, nor does it yield an established manner of verify-
ing (or falsifying) a theory. The history of science and its 
controversies demonstrates that discovery is always separated 
167Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) p. 89. 
l68Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), p. 165. 
169 Ibid., p. 120. 
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from its clues by a logical gap. 170 The surmises of scien-
tists are born of imagination seeking discovery. And imagina-
tion is not so much a logical as a creative thrust; it risks 
defeat for this reason, though it never seeks defeat. 171 And 
when we break through to discovery, we do so with the convic-
tion of trust because discovery itself is the satisfaction of 
the intellectual desire that points to the solution compris-
. "t 172 lng 1 . 
A discovery is original when it allows persons to see 
~ore deeply into the natureof things. 173 When a strenuous 
search beyond the tradition of knowledge loosens bits of a 
solution, the discovery may be achieved in an original way 
b ff 1 . . f h b . 1 7 4 p 1 . d y an e art ess 1ntegrat1on o t ese 1ts. · o any1 oes, 
however, distinguish between intuitions that indicate the 
potential for discovery ("antieipatory" intuitions) and those 
that are claims of discovery ("final" intuitions). 175 This 
-~ ~17o~-- -· · -· · 
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a 
~Post-Critical· PhilQsophy_ (Chic~go: __ The_ Unbz:e:r:si_ty of Chi~ago ~ ~~-
Press; 1962), p. 167. . . 
171Mithael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,------
. ---~---Y'· : __ _l)_()Ub 1 ~d~y _&- Cg. ~'- I Il.C.. L_19~6 6) p ·-~6 9 • - -- -- -- ~~"- ·-- -~~ - -- -- ~~- -- - -
. . 
172Michael Polanyi, Personal_ Knowledge:.. Towards- a~~ 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
'Press, 1962) ,_ p. 1~0. 
l 7 3· Ibid . , p . 1 7 8 . 
174Knowin 
by Marjorie Grene, 
p. 201. 
and Bein 
Chicago: 
175 Ibid., p. 202. 
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distinction shows that intuitions themselves may be integrated 
into "higher" intuitions. Thus, an idea given in intuition is 
pondered by the imagination, which is let loose to ferret out 
a path of possible clues, guided by intuitive feeling. Then 
ff . 1 f . . . 1 . b 1 1 . 17 6 it o ers 1tse 1ntu1t1ve y as a poss1 e cone us1on. 
We may recall here Polariyi's notion of irreversibility. 
No discovery is irreversible if it is achieved by a procedure 
following definite rules. Thus, true discovery is not a 
strictly logical performance. Only the gift of originality, 
' 1 ...... 
which leaps across a logical gap, can yield a true discovery. 11 
True discovery, then, is irreversible in the sense that, once 
it has occurred, we cannot see things again in the same way. 
We must observe, however, that, though true discover-
ies leap across logical categories, they are not entirely with-
out guidel~nes for acceptance. P5lanyi says they must show 
a sufficient degree of plausibility; they must be accurate, 
systematically important, and intrinsically interesting; and 
th b . . 1 178 ey must e or1g1na . The criterion of plausibility, of 
course, does not yield demonstrability and is itself based on 
intuition. 179 But let us remember that such intuition is tacit 
17~reaning, f.lichael Polanyi and Harry Prosch (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 96-7. 
1 77 Knm..ring and Being: Essays by Michae 1 Po 1anyi , edited by 
r.Iarjorie Grene, (C~icago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 123. 
178 b"d 53 4 I 1 . , pp. - . 
179rb·d '76 1 , ' p, I , 
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and convivial. We cannot even let strong confirmation of some 
important predictions make an implausible theory acceptable, 
since even false theories can predict true consequences. This 
may mean that we risk rejecting a theory that is true; but this 
risk is less than the consequences of setting predictibility up 
h f . 1 . . 180 p· 11 b h h as t e 1na cr1ter1on. 1na y, we must remem er t at t e 
criterion of interest means for Polanyi not a "subjective 
interest" but an objective interest: an idea that is "of 
interest" or shows promise in advancing the truth of a domain 
181 
of knowledge. 
In addition, Polanyi reserves a central place for the 
notion of beauty as a criterion of true intellectual achieve-
ment. Even scientific theory, in so far as it calls attention 
to its own beauty as a partial criterion for its validity as 
representing empirical reality, is akin to a work of art and 
to the mystical contemplation of nature, both of which claim 
t d h h . 18 z Th . 1 b o o t e same t 1ng. us, 1nte lectual eauty is a guide 
to the participative flow of passion in knowledge and is a 
180 Know ina 
by Marjorie Grene, 
p. 79. 
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mark of truth. 183 
How important is intellectual beauty? Polanyi says 
that the vision that accompanies discovery is less than know-
ledge in being still a guess and more than knowledge in being 
a foreknowledge of the yet unknown. This vision acts as an 
indispensable guide to knowledge. It protects us against pur-
suing trivialities. It suggests what is reasonable and 
interesting to explore and what is plausible. Only a grasp 
. "f" b k h" . . 184 of sc1ent1 lC eauty can evo e t lS v1s1on. 
Nonetheless, the intellectual beauty of a theory is 
not the same as artistic beauty. It is too harmonious and 
does not combine incompatible elements by imaginative integra-
t . 185 lOll. Its beauty is the beauty of harmony and synthetic 
compatibility, not of juxtaposed elements. Even so, it has 
the power to reveal the truth about nature, though this power 
should be distinguished from that of mere formal attractive-
ness.186 Polanyi is correct to distinguish between a new 
183Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
1962)' p. 300. 
184Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
1962)' p. 135. 
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insight into the nature of things and a mere formal advance. 187 
The inherent rational excellence of intellectual beauty 
often overrides both counter-evidences or verifications of a 
theory. A theory may be more acceptable because of its intel-
lectual beauty despite certain counter-evidences to it and 
despite verifications of it on other levels. 188 Such considera-
tions should militate against ·any doctrine that discoveries 
d b II 1 b · • 11 189 shoul e pure y o JeCtlve . 
This discussion of discovery confirms much of what 
seemed obvious in the flow of Polanyi's epistemological thought. 
And it has a bearing on how we describe the discovery of new 
values. 
We find ourselves passionately committed to the values 
we share in our community. We live in them as a passive accept-
ance of our communal life. But we are constantly moving beyond 
the borders defined by the values we live by. They themselves 
suggest new possibilities of truth within the ethical domain, 
possibilities we must develop because of our need for an ade-
quate system of values and knowledge of the Good. If such a 
187Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. ISO. 
188 rbid., p. 14. 
·
189 Ibid., p. 15. 
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knowledge is clearly necessary for individual survival, then 
it is even more so for the development and maintanence of a 
community. For association of persons can function without 
shared values, if we understand "community" to mean a sharing 
of vital interests. 
Following new possibilities of ethical truth, develop-
ing new insights into what is valuable and what is not is an 
inevitable process of communal life. Developments in other 
fields of knowledge (science, technology, etc.), eg., may force 
entire communities into a re-evaluation of their ethical stan-
dards of value. But in every community at all times there will 
be adventurous souls who are born to discovery. And some of 
them will be discoverers of knowledge in the ethical domain.-
Guided by problems unnoticed by the masses, they will seek out 
the hidden potentialities of their communal value system. Thus, 
they exercise their imaginative skills or integrations of 
thought, striving to bring new forms into being. Such adven-
turers, masters of the tradition, are those who break out of 
tradition and discover new values, new intuitions of value, 
which will serve eventually to enhance the life of the commu-
nity--or disrupt it irreversibly. 
The discovery of new insights into value is not a de-
ductive or inductive enterprise, though these may be employed 
in the process of the discovery. As in all fields of thought, 
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a true discovery in the ethical domain is an irreversible 
tacit integration, a leap across logical borders to more pro-
found meanings. 
There may be many guides to this leap. We may be 
motivated by a number of subjective reasons and interests. 
But the idea that promises to satisfy these reasons and 
interests is not a valid insight into value and the Good un-
less it is of "objective" interest. An idea is worth pursuing 
if it presents a plausible solution to the difficulties of 
the present value system, reflects an accurate and adequate 
comprehension of the tradition, relates in important ways to 
a new system of values which is in the making, and is intrin~ 
sically interesting in the sense of promising deeper access to 
ethical realities. Insights into ideas which confirm them-
selves in the community as guided properly by these concerns 
generally lead to new life to the community. Finally, the 
harmony or "beauty" of an insight is a mark of its integrative 
power and may be at times our sole reason for pursuing it over 
other possibilities. 
Discoveries in the ethical domain of knowledge, then, 
are rational in nature. They make sense of things yet uncom-
Prehended by the inquiring mind and follow rational guides 
in doing so. Discoveries of values of new comprehensions of 
the Good may not be found at the end of an unbroken chain of 
deductive logic; but they are rational. 
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Discoveries of values aim at being universal. We have 
already noted how they project universal standards that they 
submit themselves to. But they also aim at the highest intel-
lectual concepts possible: universals. Again we return to 
Polanyi's epistemological thought for a view of what he means 
by a universal. 
The movement of discovery, as tacit knowledge, may 
penetrate its object in stages. That is, each aspect may be 
itself a cue to a more comprehensive entity. Indeed, we pass 
from more tangible entities to less tangible entities as we 
progress in knowledge. But, just for this reason, the less 
tangible entity is the more real since it has a wider range of 
. d f. . f. . f .f . 190 1n e 1n1te con 1rm1ng uture man1 estat1ons. 
these "less tangible entities" wholes. 191 
190K . now1n 
by Marjorie 
p. 168. 
Polanyi calls 
191
we shall deal more extensively with his doctrine of 
wholes or universals in the section dealing with his ontology; 
but for now it is important to note only that we make sense of 
things by considering them in a variety of levels. Elementary 
entities combine to compose complex ones. But these complex 
entities are not simply aggregates of elementary ones. They are 
wholes which make sense on levels of understanding which are 
higher than those which comprehend their composing elements. 
(cf. Intellect and Hope, ed. by Thomas A. Langford and William H. 
Poteat (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1968), p. 2. 
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Polanyi says that when we focus on wholes we are sub-
sidiarily aware of their parts, though, as already noted, 
not necessarily with a difference in the intensity of the two 
kinds of awareness. 192 Something that is subsidiary to the 
whole participates in sl;3taining the whole, and this susten-
ance constitutes its meaning within the framework of the 
1 f th '-'hole. 193 1' 1 1 th t" 1 "th framewor~ 0 e n wve re y on ese par lCU ars Wl -
. h f 1 . 194 out nam1ng t em as we ocus on genera mean1ngs. 
Universals, then, are developed from a tacit reliance 
on knowledge of individuals: a universal is their joint mean-
ing as a comprehensive entity. This entity is real in that it 
has the power to disclose itself in still hidden and yet con-
195 firming ways. Thus, universal concepts may anticipate 
future instances of particular things or events, even though 
192Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962)' p. 58. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited 
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 
p. 166. 
195 
Ibid., p. 149. 
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there will be some individual differences between each par-
196 
ticular. 
Polanyi considers the :miversal or "whole" to function 
at times as a heuristic "empty" center of our groping concepts. 
we are capable, as we seek a discovery, of focussing on a cen-
ter that still is empty and yet "brings out" the joint meaning 
of particulars which is yet unknown. 197 Thus, Polanyi says, 
'' ... The understanding of a whole appreciates the coherence of 
its subject matter and acknowledges the existence of a value 
b f h • • 1 11 198 that is a sent rom t e const1tuent part1cu ars . This is 
why Polanyi says that the less tangible a thing (or focus) is, 
h 1 d 1 . . . 199 t e more menta an conceptua 1s 1ts mean1ng. 
196K . now1ng 
by Marjorie Grene, 
pp. 170-1. 
and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 
197 Ibid., p. 171. 
198Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962)' p. 327 
19 9K . d B . E b M. h 1 P 1 . d. d now1ng an e1ng: ssays y 1c ae o any1, e 1te 
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 
pp. 189-190; Nonetheless, he does not want to be identified as a 
"conceptualist". He affirms, as I have shown in some detail 
already, the reality of minds, classes of things, justice, etc. 
And he is adamant about his criticism that if our theories regard-
ing the impossibility of the reality of such things is not to 
block our kno1vledge of such coherences, we must develop an epis-
temology that will explain how their meanings are no less real than 
those of science and perception (cf., Michael Polanyi and Harry 
Prosch, Meaning [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975], 
p. 68.). 
127 
To precede with our argument, the knowledge of values 
and of the Good aims at universals that are no less real than 
those discovered in other domains of knowledge. This does not 
mean, of course, that Polanyi thinks of the Good as a Platonic 
reality which is either perceived or unknown in its entirety. 
Ethical universals are discovered gradually as our knowledge 
of the Good extends over more comprehensive areas of human life 
and becomes less and less tied to concrete aspects of human 
experience. This loss of tangibility is the mark of the devel-
opment of a universal. Particular values, tied strongly to 
concrete experiences, are integrated into more comprehensive 
values. These bear more directly on the reality of the Good 
as universals that impinge upon all areas of our lives. In 
this .sense, particular values become the tacit clues upon 
which we rely for this higher integration. 
Universal values are the deeper and more comprehensive 
meanings of particular values. They are the hidden realities 
which our commitments to particular values are trying to dis-
cover and live by. Our particular values seem incomplete be-
cause they do not yet encompass a whole toward which we are 
called by the intangible reality of the Good. We dwell in 
them and yet seek beyond them until at last we are ready to 
break out of them toward a higher vision, a vision that so 
deepens the meaning of each that all are united in it. 
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This higher vision then becomes a universal in two 
senses: it becomes the universal standard by which we deter-
mine what a value is and to which we submit all of our value-
claims. And it is universal in the sense of bearing univer-
sally (in regard to all values) on the reality of the Good. 200 
200one might complain that Polanyi's notion of dis-
covery is nothing other than a stock intuitionism in which 
the only appeal for justifying an idea is a demand that others 
promote the same intuition in themselves. Such intuitionism 
smacks of an arrogant subjectivity which is attempting to pass 
as justified objectivity. 
I have already dealt at length with the question of 
whether personal knowledge is subjective or objective and will 
not repeat that argument here. We can take note, however, that 
Polanyi's intuitionism is not an attempt to establish a tradi-
tional objectivism and is certainly nqt a subjectivism in de-
fault of such an attempt. Polanyi's intuitionism is an intui-
tionism of personal knowledge in which the justifications are 
numerous enough to guide minds to a proper access to intuition. 
Polanyi is not demanding that everyone put forth some mysteri-
ous effort in order to see things as he does. He abides by 
intuitionism in so far as he insists that original discoveries, 
novel integrations of meaning, are leaps beyond rule-guided 
thinking which is beset by built-in justifications. But he 
does not leave us with no guides to an insight into new dis-
coveries; even if a justification comes "after the fact" of a 
discovery, like a trail blazed by an explorer, the discovery 
is still justified in so far as it opens new vistas of reality 
for all who follow behind to see. 
Polanyi, then, intends to frustrate our expectation 
that discoveries are made by following a pre-established 
methodology. There might be common procedures and justifica-
tions in the various domains of knowledge; but these consti-
tute descriptions of methods by which discoveries have been 
made rather than rules by which they must be made. 
Polanyi is quite willing to accept the common criti-
cism that a discovery which leaps beyond the usual rules of 
thought might well be wrong. Of course one can always be 
wrong, even when rules are followed. But wrong ideas have 
certain earmarks which give us early warnings of their un-
truth; and they show their falseness in time if we remain 
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Conclusion 
In this section on Polanyi's epistemology, I have 
tried to show how his epistemology represents a way of know-
ing that may be extended into the ethical domain. In so far 
as Polanyi's epistemology is concerned, I have tried only to 
show how we develop and justify our knowledge of values and 
of the Good. I have reserved the question of knowledge of 
the right for the next section on Polanyi's ontology. I 
believe I have shown how the ascription of worth becomes in-
volved inextricably with a knowledge which grows into the 
highest visions of the Good. 
committed to discerning the truth. Falsehood is a risk we 
cannot avoid even if we attempt to explain discoveries without 
recourse to intuitionism. 
Polanyi intends to resurrect a form of medieval real-
ism in his notion that the less tangible reality is the more 
real one. But we should not absurdly accuse him of claiming 
that something is more real tust because it is less tangible. 
Air, eg., is not more real tan lead just for being less 
tangible. The lack of tangibility must occur in a specific 
way: the higher reality is less tangible in the sense of being 
more general (and not more "ethereal"). 
Polanyi's notion of the universal differs from the medi-
eval (and Aristotelian one), however, in that his universals are 
not statements of absolute realities. His universals, although 
our most general understanding of things, are themselves guides 
to a fuller experience of reality. Universals are constituted 
by our most penetrating and original discoveries; they are 
the most real because they give us the most intense and wide-
ranging access to reality in so far as we follow its leader-
ship to its own self-confirmation. Thus, for Polanyi, univer-
sals are not the end-points of thought but are developed as 
growing parts of the process of corning to know reality. 
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Value knowledge, like all knowledge, develops out of 
our incarnate indwelling in a communal world in which we 
satisfy our personal and communal needs for survival, com-
panionship, and knowledge according to standards we ourselves 
project. We can draw a line of continuity within the struc-
ture of tacit knowledge from the most fundamental perceptions 
and skills to the most sophisticated visions of various domains 
of human experience: science, art, history, religion--and 
ethics. 
Value knowledge, then, is tacit knowledge or else 
relies on tacit knowledge for the validity of its explicit 
assertions. That is, we rely on tacit experiences of worth 
of our needs to make and order our ascriptions of worth in 
order to objectify notions of particular values. The motive 
of such objectifications may generally be our need to under-
stand what we are doing and what we mean by ascribing worth 
to something; and the notion toward which we move in satisfy-
ing this need is that of value. 
No single level of knowledge, however, is ever fully 
satisfactory. As we develop our notions of value, we become 
familiar enough with them to indwell them as tacit forms of 
our thought. They become fundamental in the way we view the 
world. But, as masters of the tradition, we begin to trace 
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out by imaginative thrusts new possibilities of thought which 
answer the inevitable questions that arise out of such indwell-
ing. We dissent from tradition and project new standards of 
thought for what counts as a value and as a vision of the Good. 
And we submit ourselves to these standards, indwell them, and 
move intellectually toward a tacit integration of our total 
knowledge of values, toward an intellectual vision of the Good. 
Our knowledge of the Good is knowledge of a universal 
which draws us toward itself as we commit ourselves, step by 
step, to its reality. Our knowledge is personal; thus, we 
commit ourselves to the reality of what we believe and submit 
ourselves to the standards of truth our beliefs imply. We are 
personally engaged in the reality of the Good and discover 
values--and an ultimate vision of the Good--as we come to under-
stand this personal engagement. We move from a tacit compre-
hension that guides us by subtle feeling toward itself as an 
explicit and universal vision forms, a vision we contemplate 
as an intrinsic element of our communal life. 
Briefly, this is the vision of values and of the Good 
which I think Polanyi would agree to as a legitimate extension 
of the structure of personal, tacit knowing into the ethical 
domain of human experience. We turn now to Polanyi's ontology, 
which we will extend into a knowledge of the right. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PARALLEL OF KNOWING Al\JD BEING IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF A NOTION OF FREE AND RIGHT ACTION 
THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
This chapter introduces the argument for moral know-
ledge and action based upon Polanyi's ontology. Rather than 
leave epistemological and ontological issues separated, only 
later to be joined loosely by some third consideration, I 
discovered that Polanyi's epistemology and his ontology can 
be viewed as intimately connected. Knowing itself is an 
action and can be described in ontological terms; and Polanyi's 
ontology can be viewed as an ontologizing of his epistemo-
~ogy. Thus, there is a parallel between the knowing 
act viewed epistemologically and the same act viewed onto-
logically. 
Given this parallel, it becomes possible to view the 
knowing act as an act to which moral categories are applica-
ble. That is, knowledge of a value is at the same time a 
commitment to act in certain ways. Thus, knowledge of the 
Good is a move toward the Good, a move that obeys standards 
of right action just as knowledge must obey standards of 
truth. In essence, I find a parallel between knowledge of 
value-truth and commitment to right action. In the argument 
from ontology, I emphasize the concept of right action rather 
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than the knowledge of values. For I believe Polariyi's 
ontology has more to say about the being of man (particularly 
his advancement of himself as a bio-p~ychic organism) than 
about his knowledge. 
Man's advancement toward the Good and the conse-
quent development of higher insights into the Good follows 
the ontological dynamic described by Polanyi in his inter-
relationship of higher and lower principles. Just as 
higher principles rely on lower ones (which support them), 
so higher moral insights depend upon less penetrating visions 
of the Good and are not possible without them. Our moral 
knowledge "emerges" into novel shapes, and, vis ~vis 
the parallel between epistemology and ontology, our actual, 
biotic lives function under new principles. I argue in this 
chapter that Polanyi's notion of freedom can be directly 
applied to moral responsibility for decisions and actions. 
Thus, in this chapter, I present the fundamental ideas of 
Polanyi's ontology and draw out the tacit dynamic of moral 
development that may be inferred from it (if we begin with 
the presupposition that we do know something about moral 
life and that we commit right and wrong acts). 
1. The Origin of a Notion of Right Action 
We may now turn to the notion of right as an exten-
sion of personal knowledge in the ethical domain. To do 
this, we may return to Polanyi's epistemological language. 
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We have established that persons come to know values 
and gain insights into the nature of the Good as they attempt 
to grow and live successfully within the community of human 
beings. The solution of life-problems is essential for any 
living organism, and man's intellect seeks for a way of 
ordering life which solves the increasingly complex problems 
he finds confronting him in communal life. Values are ascrip-
tions of worth to an object, act, or event. They are ordered 
into a functional, organic hierarchy which meets the needs of 
' 
the individual, needs that are informed by communal life. 
From an epistemological point of view, the scope of 
a value is determined by our intellectual grasp of the object 
it refers to as desirable, whether inherently so or as a 
means to something that is. But Polanyi's view of the intel-
lect aces not allow us to reduce the notion of a value to an 
intellectual grasp of the worth of something. We have ob-
served that tacit knowledge requires the reliance of the 
person as a whole upon ideas which form the ground of new 
discoveries. This reliance is never classed, however, as 
mere intellectual reliance in the sense of remaining strictly 
within the realm of ideas. Indwelling is an act of the whole 
person; even within the realm of ideas alone, it represents 
a commitment to pursue a line of thought. But such pur-
suance itself is a form of activity and not merely a passive 
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idea. And it necessitates all kinds of action, whether physi-
cal, mental, and social in its own support. The indwelling 
of tacit knowledge necessarily involves human action as well 
as human thought. 
The ordering of goals to be pursued according to a 
hierarchy of ascriptions of worth is in itself an ordering 
of human activity. Knowledge of values can be true or false 
in the sense that it may or may not be an ascription of worth 
that responds adequately to the problem of successfully 
ordering one's life. A "true" value opens up a route to 
further value-discoveries and continues, despite changes or 
even reyersals in our commitment to them, to confirm our 
knowledge of the aspect of reality they reveal. A false 
value manifests itself as such by its systematic contra-
diction of our committed hierarchy of values or by its in-
capacity to resolve value-dilemmas. 
Since value-knowledge can be true or false in so far 
as it is part of our grasp of reality, we can view the 
actions they involve or imply as being right or wrong. 
Actions which support and sustain or are directly involved 
in pursuing the values held to be true are right actions. 
Those which fail to do so, whether by omission or commission, 
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b . 201 may e wrong act1ons. Thus, valuing is a human activity 
which, in so far as it involves actions in pursuit of the 
truth of a value, may be right or wrong. 
Let us remember that the personal knowledge of values 
is informed deeply by our necessary involvement in the com-
munity of persons. Thus, a personal knowledge of values is 
also a projection of those values as universal standards to 
which each person submits. We judge the truth of our values 
by the universal standards of value-knowledge to which the 
community of which we are a part submits. And, thus, we also 
submit ourselves to the standards of action or behavior which 
support the values of the community. Communal value-·stand-
ards imply communal actions which pursue these values; and 
these actions cannot be random but are ordered toward reali-
zation of these values. This ordering is a standard of 
behavior to which we submit ourselves as we order our lives in 
pursuit of our communal values. Thus, committing ourselves to 
201 r k h. · d. · 1 b rna e t 1s assert1on con 1t1ona ecause one 
might assert a value or advise an action which appears rele-
vant to the situation but may actually be irrelevant. In 
addition, the value or action advised may be universally ac-
claimed as a true value and a right action; but under certain 
circumstances, it may not be helpful or harmful. One might 
conceive of a man who is young and swift of foot being 
approached by a mad man with an ax. He might drop to his knees 
and begin to pray for his safety--certainly no one would con-
demn prayer as a valued action. But, after all, one can run 
and pray at the same time! Praying--if immediately ineffectual 
a~d the only action taken--seems to be-a wrong action in such 
Clrcumstances, particularly if the safety of the man's family 
is involved. 
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a value is a commitment to certain standards of behavior. We 
find ourselves obligated to certain standards of behavior and, 
thus, pursue values by doing what we ought to do. Our actions 
are right in so far as we do what '-.re ought to do. 
A hierarchy of values constitutes the indwelt tacit 
realm upon which we rely in order to attend to an ultimate 
vision of what we aim for: the Good. We gain a personal 
knowledge of the Good in so far as our knowledge of values 
is adequate to reveal it. 
Thus, our knowledge of what we ought to do, of what 
is right, is part of this hierarchy and opens the way to a 
knowledge of the right. A right is .a universal standard of 
behavior which not only indicates what actions ought to be 
taken in pursuit of the Good but also what actions may be 
taken by all persons who submit to the standards of right. 
Thus, an obligation to pursue the Good according to the stan-
dards represented in the hierarchy of values found in one's 
community is also a right to pursue the Good in this way. 
An obligation to right action implies a right to pursue the 
Good rightly. Thus, we can see that the concept of a per-
sonal knowledge of values rna~ be extended to that of a tacit 
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commitment to standards of action which pursue these values 
1 . . 1 f . h 202 - d f. d and to at east a m1n1ma concept o a r1g t as e 1ne 
by the values we seek to realize. 
Doing right is a demand of our value system, a demand 
authorized by our total personal commitment to it. The in-
sight toward which our standards of right action aim and out 
of which they flow is that of justice. Just as values are 
grounded in and aim at the Good, so do right actions aim at 
justice. 203 That is, standards of right are developed and 
corrected in the light of what they reveal about the rightness 
of actions within the context of the community; and these stan-
dards become standards of justice in so fa~ as they judge in 
general what constitutes the communal rightness of an action. 
ZOZI will forego · an indepth discussion of human 
rights since I wish only to make the formal point here that 
standards <bf the Good also tacitly imply standards of right 
and wrong and that these standards are known inthe contexts 
of personal knowledge. One might imagine that a grasp of 
fundamental human rights might be achieved by a comparison 
of relative value standards among a large number of cul-
tures. But I wish only to establish the formal point that 
knowledge of values and insight into the Good implies know-
ledge of right action and, therefore, also a concept of a 
right. 
203 r t . t . d .1 d d. . am no go1ng to en er 1nto a eta1 e 1st1nc-
tion between retributive and distributive justice. But I 
shall define justice fundamentally as a rightness of action 
Within the community of persons. And this definition, though 
minimal, applies to both retributive and distributive forms 
of justice since each of these aims at the Good through right 
action within the society. 
139 
Standards of right--and rights--are judged by the insight into 
justice which they afford; and this insight, universalized as 
are all personal commitments, establishes the goal toward which 
right actions aim and judges what constitutes wrong or injust 
actions. 
We do, then, have a personal knowledge of right and 
wrong as a part of our knowledge of values and of the Good. 
This knowledge, of course, depends upon the particular values 
we pursue and the insight into the Good that these afford us. 
But no insight into values or the Good is unattended by at 
least some vague notions of the direction action must take to 
meet the standards implied in such insight. Thus, the intel-
lectual grasp of a value is itself a move toward a higher life 
in which the whole person is committed, involved, and partici-
pating. 
2. The Parallel Between Epistemology and Ontology 
In attempting to understand the transition which one 
can easily make in Polanyi's works from epistemology to 
ontology, we may ~e helped by observing the parallel between 
tacit reliance in knowing and the development of levels of 
. 
being as we find it in Polanyi's ontology. We may then see 
more clearly how a knowledge of values involves an activity 
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of pursuing the Good through right action. 
I am not simply surmising that there is a parallel 
between the order of knowledge and the order of reality in 
Polanyi's thought. He asserts this explicitly: 
Viewed in themselves, the parts of a machine are 
meaningl~ss; the machine is comprehended by attending 
from its parts to their joint function, which operates 
~machine. To this structure of knmving there cor-
respond two levels controlled by different principles. 
The particulars viewed in themselves are controlled 
by the laws of inanimate nature; while viewed jointly, 
they are controlled by the operational principles of 
the machine. This dual control may seem puzzling. 
But the physical sciences expressly leave open cer-
tain variabilities of a system, described as its 
boundary conditions. The operational principles of 
a machine control these boundaries, and so they do 
not infringe the laws of physics and chemistry, which 
operate within these boundaries. 
The same dualism holds for biology. Biologists will 
tell you that they are explaining living beings by 
the laws of inanimate nature, but what they actually 
do, and do triumphantly well, is to explain certain 
aspects of life by machine-like principles. This 
postulates a level of reality that operates on the 
boundaries left open by the laws of physics and 
chemistry. 
This opens up a perspective to a whole sequence of 
levels, all the way up to that of a responsible 
humanity.204 
We can see that the dual activities of "looking at" and "at-
'tending from" have their foundation in the existence of dis-
tine~ levels of functioning within the organism. Such levels 
204 Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited 
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 
PP. 153-4 
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manifest themselves in the way the principles determining the 
stability and power of an organism exercise a multi-leveled 
control over its parts. 
This kind of multi-levelled control extends to nature 
as a whole. While particulars viewed in themselves may be 
controlled by inanimate nature, viewed jointly they are con-
trolled by operational principles known only by a joint com-
prehension of the particulars. Polanyi's epistemological 
dualism of reliance and attention, then, parallels the onto-
logical dualism of control and f~nctiOn in organized systems. 
Just as one relies on elements tacitly known to attend to a 
focal, comprehensive object, so ontological principles also 
show a hierarchy of reliance; thus, all entities develop and 
function by the principles or laws that apply to single ele-
ments themselves as well as the laws that control the com-
prehensive entity formed by them. 205 
Polanyi extends his parallelism of epistemological 
and ontological realms especially to living organisms and 
to man. He claims that the operations of living organisms 
resemble an integration of particulars by means of tacit 
knowing. Living organisms survive by solving life-problems, 
and their survivial is contingent~upon such solutions. Thus, 
living organisms may succeed or fail in solving their 
ZOSK . now1n 
by Marjorie 
pp. 153-4. 
Michael Polan i, edited 
o icago Press, 1969), 
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problems.2° 6 And, to fail or suceed is living. Their solu-
tions may be as primitive as the extension of a pseudopod 
toward a fixe4 object or as sophisticated as a scientific 
theory! 
We have already noted how we use the body as a tool 
for our subsidiary awareness of the world. Our body is not 
an object to us, but the means through which the world appears. 
Further, the tools (machines, ideas, etc.) we use in explor-
ing the world become an extension of our body. Thus, we are 
\ 
subsidiarily aware of them in attending to the world through 
them. We "pour ourselves out into them and assimilate them 
as parts of our own existence. We accept them existentially 
by dwell1·ng 1·n them". 207 K · th · 1 · · t now1ng, en, 1nvo ves an 1n en-
tional change of being. Knowing is a way of intending or 
grasping an object of knowle~ge as well as a way of being: 
a pouring of oneself into a subsidiary awareness of particu-
lars in order to skilfully achieve the comprehensive whole~ 08 
Polanyi, then, acknowledges that knowing is an act of being, 
And, as such, knowing is a shaping of the knower's being. 
206K . fi0W1n 
by Marjori~Grene, 
PP. 153-4. 
Michael Polan i, edited 
C icago Press, 1969), 
207Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), pp. 58-9. 
208 Ibid., p. 64. 
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Knowing is an intimate ontological participation in the whole 
of reality. Thus, Polanyi's epistemology is itself an entrance 
into ontological knowledge. 
We see, then, that knowing itself is an activity which 
in turn must be described ontologically. This ontological 
description relies upon tacit knowledge; and tacit knowing 
may be described by the same dynamic principles that pertain 
to the ordered activities of all things. Man's knowing acti-
vity is itself an emergent reality in the universe of events. 
We have already anticipated this conclusion from an analysis 
of Polanyi's epistemology. Now we may enter into his ontology, 
particularly his ontology_of man the knower, with confidence 
that such concrete analysis-will lead us to the ordered acti-
vities that obey standards of right. We precede then with an 
analysis of the fundamental notion of change and development, 
which Polanyi iunderstands as a form of emergent evolution. 209 
2o9w . h . f . . . e can ralse t e questlon o startlng polnts ln 
relation to Polanyi's parallel of epistemological (tacit) 
reliance and ontological reliance. Do we begin with his on-
tology and base upon it the doctrine of tacit knowledge? Or 
do we instead begin with an epistemological doctrine and 
reflect "tacit reliance" in an ontological doctrine? 
Clearly, Polanyi begins as an epistemologist. But 
his own starting point does not throw light on this question, 
since he adduces no reasons why one ~ begin with the episte-
mological question. The fact that he does raise the issue 
of tacit knowledge first in his works may be only accidental 
to the question at hand. 
Fundamentally, we are asking whether we ought to 
make a beginning with the insight into the nature of reality 
that Polanyi reflects in his ontology or with a statement of 
"truth" about the process of coming to know. Do we begin 
With methodology or content? 
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3 . Knowing and Being in Emergent Evolution 
Polanyi appr~aches fundamental ontological questions 
from the point of view of a scientist. More specifically, he 
Close attention to the biological sciences as an entrance pays 
into a wide-ranging understanding of man and the nature of 
reality. 
Polanyi does not answer this question for us. He 
begins with epistemological methodology, but he does not make 
methodology "primary" merely by beginning with it; and he does 
not derive, in a logical progression, an ontology which re-
flects this methodology because it is derived from it. Nor 
does he make his ontology the "tacit" ground of his methodo-
logy. In short, he does not give primacy to methodology or 
ontology any more than he gives primacy to the body or the-
world in the knowing act. 
But I do not think that we can accuse Polanyi of ar-
bitrarily and naively opting for one beginning over another, 
despite appearances to the contrary. The point is that 
Polanyi could begin with either methodology or content and 
still maintain his position 1n both. If he were, eg., to 
begin with a description of the ontological dynamic of hier-
archical reliance, the ontology itself would necessitate a 
concept of ~acit knowledge. For the description of ontologi-
cal reliance would have to be extended to the bio-psychic act 
of knowing and would consider knowing as an ontological aspect 
of the human being. The ontological reliance of one act of 
knowing upon another translates, in epistemological terms, 
into the reliance of explicit i_deas upon tacit knowledge. 
Similarly, the explication of tacit knowing necessitates the 
ontological dynamic which Polanyi expounds and extends beyond 
acts of .human knowing to the fundamental dynamic of reality. 
If methodology and content mutually imply one another, then 
one can begin with either and comprehend the other. It makes 
no difference where one begins; the implications of one's be-
ginning will make explicit the other term. Polanyi's position, 
~hen, is that methodology and content are so intertwined that 
1t does not matte~wher~ one begins as long as one begins with 
a commitment to truth, a commitment generally taken for granted 
Whether one begins with an epistemology or an ontology. 
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The reason why Polanyi considers biological science 
so important is that value-free observation is impossible 
within it. Even at the vegetative level we accept the 
interests of the living organism as the standard of our evalu-
ation of it. We say that an organism succeeds or fails. Thus, 
the biological sciences are convivial in a way in which the 
. . . b 210 1nan1mate sc1ences cannot e. Further, biological know-
ledge cannot be just a matter of statistics and prediction. 
In order to bring order into biological knowledge, one must 
look at its multiplicities and pay attention to characteris-
tic shapes, markings, etc. This is done, of course, within 
a prior system of morphology and has the appearance of sci-
entific sophistication. But this morphology is grounded in 
a kind of phenomenological approach to the content of bio-
logical study. 211 
Such an approach, combined with the acknowledgment 
of value (in the sense of the success or failure of the bio-
logical organism) as a legitimate category of understanding 
210Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) p. Sl. 
211Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
1962)' p. 353. 
Towards a Post-
Chicago Press, 
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in the biological sciences, enables Polanyi to extend the 
knowledge and manner of knowing in biology indefinitely 
toward more wide-ranging theory. 
Biology is an extension of the theory of knowledge 
toward a theory of all kinds of biotic achievements, of which 
knowledge is only one. Biology is an analysis of the bio-. 
legist's commitment in understanding the realities upon 
. 1. . h f 1. . 212 which a living organ1srn re 1es 1n t e strategem o 1v1ng. 
Thus, for Polanyi, it forms the basic theoretical ground upon 
which an understanding of reality can be based. 
In view of this, Polanyi envisages a knowledge of 
"knowers" preceding from biology to a sort of "ultra-bio-
logy''· One moves from knowledge concerning primordial, 
vegetative commitments to that concerning primitive active-
perceptive commitments. And from this point one moves on 
to intelligent commitments with universal intent and ulti-
mately to a study of the convivial intellectual and emo-
tional life of human peers where observation is replaced 
by pure indwelling where we may recognize another as superi-
or to us. At this point we may even a-critically accept 
the other's standards as our own, forming ideals which con-
t .t t th . 1 1 f 1 •t 213 s 1 u e e un1versa po e o our persona comm1 ment. 
212Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
1962)' p. 347. 
213 rbid., pp. 378-9. 
Towards a Post-
Chicago Press, 
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Thus, Polanyi envisions levels of knowing life from the most 
b . t• knowing to a human knowing beyond our own primitive ~o ~c 
capacities. 
Again, we must keep in mind that this development in 
knowledge cannot be separated from our claim of a parallel 
development in the order of being. A science that moves from 
biology to ultra-biology is also essentially both an evolving 
science and a science of evolution. Polanyi is firmly commit-
ted to a theory of evolution as fundamental to his understand-
ing of reality. 
Polanyi says "The evolutionary process forms a con-
tinuous transition from the inanimate stage to that of living 
d k · 11 214 an now1ng persons ... And he asserts in the Tacit Di-
mension that evolution is a continuous process. 215 Thus far, 
we cannot find anything that contradicts or adds to tradi-
tional scientific understanding. But Polanyi's understanding 
of evolution is not really so traditional. Le~ us note 
that two basic theories concerning evolution separate Polanyi 
from traditional scientific evolutionism. First, Polanyi re-
jects the idea that accidental mutation and natural selection 
is responsible for all evolutionary development or that all 
214Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
1962)' p. 345. 
Towards a Post-
Chicago Press, 
215Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) p. SO. 
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evolutionary change can be explained solely in terms of 
these. He asserts that a sort of gradient of meaning is 
operative in addition to these forces. 216 
A key idea in describing this gradient is to be found 
in Polanyi's notion of emergence. He says, "Evolution can be 
21'"' 
understood only as a feat of emergent". 1 The notion of 
emergence involves novelty in evolutionary change. An emer-
gent reality cannot be explained by a deterministic theory 
concerning the dynamics of its composite elements. A creative 
development is released, evoked, even controlled, but not 
determined by its accessible meaning potentialities or by the 
releasing agent of the change. In this sense, the creative 
development is emergent. 218 Thus, the development of a new 
and higher species of animal, eg., would be explained not 
merely as accidentally successful mutation but as a move of 
the organism toward a more successful mode of life. The poten-
tial mode of life "releases" or "evokes" the organism to seek 
a more successful mode of life, a mode discovered through a 
"feeling out" into various possible responses to complex 
stimuli. 
216Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 173. 
217Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962)' p. 390. 
218Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 177. 
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This does not mean that emergence is inherently a 
mystery or a movement motivated by "magical" forces. All 
emergent realities can be understood as produced from prior 
elements. But just how the production occurs may remain 
'f" bl f h . f . f h k 219 unspec1 1a e rom t e po1nt o v1ew o t e nower. Thus, 
while one may conceive emergence as an explanatory notion in 
itself, one may remain unable to specify exactly how any par-
ticular emergent reality comes into being. Polanyi says, 
eg., that the emergence of new life forms are inexplicable in 
f h . d h . 220 terms o p ys1cs an c em1stry. 
One can say with certainty, however, that nothing 
that ought to be can be determined by knowing what is. The 
boundary conditions between the lower and the higher levels 
of development are left open and the higher emerges by prin-
ciples not contained in the lower levels. 221 
A corollary to this principle is Polanyi's assertion 
that solutions to problems and higher visions of reality 
"emerge" in the same way and are part of all evolutionary 
219Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy ~Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962, p. 394. 
220Ibid. , p. 383 
221Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 44-5; we shall analyze 
in some detail Polanyi's notion of "higher" and "lower" levels 
in later sections. 
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. 2 2 2 A 'I . . G h . d t 2 2 3 p 1 . innovations. s ~arJorle rene as po1nte ou , o any1 
is anxious to avoid the paradoxes that attend the extension of 
Cartesianism into science, such as a biology without reference 
to the categories of life. The process of evolution, in 
Polanyi's vie,v, has led to our capacity to seek and discover 
truth, to articulate and preserve it. This points to a trust 
placed in one by all creation. Polanyi views it as a sacri-
ledge to contemplate any actions which may lead to the extinc-
tion of humanity. 224 We must recall that, for Polanyi, to live 
b h . ' 11" 225 11" d . h y trut 1s man s ca 1ng, a ca 1ng note 1n t e movement 
of evolution toward a higher humanity. 
What then, are the key elements that account for or 
describe the feat of emergence? ~v"e have mentioned the evoca-
tive power of potentials. Another factor is that of randomness. 
Randomness cannot be handed over to the consequences of acci-
dental motions. We must try hard to avoid even accidental 
order; yet randomness is most easily achieved when we do not 
222Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) pp. 87-8. 
z'J-~~Marjorie Grene, The Knower and the Known (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1966), p. 185. 
224Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 69. 
225
rbid., p. 70. 
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know how exactly to produce it, such as when we shuffle a 
deck of cards. In s~ch a case, we can observe the randomness 
as such, but we can never specify in the detailed and exact 
terms of the system below the emerging one how the lower one 
produced the randomness. 226 Polanyi says, "Random impacts 
can release the functions of an ordering principle and suit-
able physical-chemical conditions (eg.) can sustain its con-
tinued operation; but the action which generates the embodi-
ment or a novel ordering principle always lies in this prin-
. 1 "t lf 227 c1p e 1 se . 
Randomness, then, cannot be precisely defined, though 
it can be clearly recognized as such. The background of any 
focussed figure, for example, is relatively random. Randomi-
city can be overcome by stability; but too much randomicity 
can overcome stability, a principle necessary to the growth 
and functioning of living beings. 228 Emergence, then, is an 
achievement of a unique tension between an ordered being and 
a new order discovered through random exploration. And this 
tension, necessary to emergence, aan be dissolved if there 
is either too much randomness or too much order. 
226Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
jritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
962), pp. 390-92. 
227 Ibid., 401. 
228 Ibid., pp. 37-40. 
Towards a Post-
Chicago Press, 
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The emergence of a new order is more a process of 
"maturing" into it than that of a sudden leap: "Novel forms 
of existence take control of a system by a process of matura-
tion". 229 Furthermore, these "maturing orders" are establish-
ed generally through changes in ~ rather than through 
individual mutations. Polanyi calls the emergence of type 
"phylogenesis". 230 And he classes phylogenesis as a develop-
ment of fundamental potentials of being: " ... phylogenetic 
emergence - is a process of maturation which differs in the 
most curious manner from that of ontogenesis; for it is a 
maturation of the potentialities of ontogenesis." 23 1 
This dynamic of emergence is the key to understand-
ing how Polanyi can assert human freedom to act as one chooses. 
Polanyi extends the notion of creative emergence to individual 
229Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowled 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago-:~~~~n-1~v-e_r_s~1~ty~-o~~~----~r-e_s __ s_, 
1962, p. 395. 
230Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co, Inc., 1966), p. 48. 
231Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A Post 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 400. 
232 
creative acts. 
4. Freedom 
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Let us examine two related images that apply to this 
notion. First imagine a graph on which a sloping line indi-
cates a gradient from a higher chemical ~oncentration of 
z 3 2 Ob . 1 P 1 . . . d . . v1ous y o any1 1s re1ntro uc1ng 1nto contempor-
ary philosophy--and science--the notion of finalism. Besides 
Alfred North Whitehead (Process and Reality) and Teilhard de 
Chardin (The Phenomenon of Man) he is one of the few contem-
porary philosophers to do so. 
I could rehearse here the various arguments against 
finalism and ask whether Polanyi escapes what might be con-
sidered fatal charges against it. But rather than defend 
Polanyi here, I think it is better to clarify in what sense 
he is a fina~ist. 
. . 
Polanyi's finalism lies in his assertion that the 
movement of an organism from a less successful mode of life to 
a more successful one is not accidental but is guided by a 
tacit "feeling toward" a higher level, which "exists" as a 
potential mode with "powers" to guide the movement as a whole. 
This finalism rests at first upon a purely descriptive notion 
of how higher, more complex levels of functioning rely upon 
simpler and more primitive ones. From a purely descriptive 
point of view, such a finalism might make sense. When the 
reliance of the higher upon the lower as well as the supposed-
ly obvious "goal" of the lower in the higher can be spelled 
out in the presence of both terms (the lower and the higher). 
Such a description migh~ an alternative way of describing 
reality as a fait accompli. 
But Polanyi wishes to extend his notion of evolution 
to present biotic achievements in such a way as to make the 
higher term of an evolutionary movement still a potential term. 
For this reason, Polanyi's finalism must face up to enquiries 
concerning the status of being for such "potential" realities. 
For they cannot be said to exist in any tangible manner, yet 
they appear to have tangible causal relations. Clearly, 
Polanyi does not develop his ontology deeply enough to explain 
how the tangible relates to the intangible in terms of actual 
causality. And he does not develop the distinction between actual being 
and potential being in any clear way other than to define such a distinc-
tion in terms of the finalism or teleology inherent in things. 
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something to a lower concentration of it. The line indicates 
the temporal interval that lapses as the solution passes into 
a state of chemical change (a state of perfect distribution 
of the soluble substance, eg., as a salt). The gradient 
slopes in the direction of a minimization of potential energy; 
i.e., the chemical bonding that will occur in the solution 
actually takes place: it is transformed into kinetic energy. 
A related image is that of the energy generated in 
a chemical reaction as the reaction moves from less stable 
to more stable configurations. Again, potential energy is 
collected into meaningful patterns that tend toward stabi-
233 lity. Polanyi is indicating in these examples that the 
heuristic tension in a mind seems to be generated much as 
kinetic energy in physics is generated by the accessibility 
of more stable configurations. He does, however, note one 
difference between mental heuristic tension and chemical 
reactions: the former are often deliberate, whereas the 
latter never are. In Polanyi's view this excludes the pos-
sibility that the dynamic of personal knowing--and being--
is causally determined. Certainly the efforts of the person 
are not random or free in the sense of being absolutely non-
contingent.234 But this does not mean that human acts are 
233Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 176. 
234 Polanyi does not adhere to a Sartrean sense of radical free-
dom, since he asserts that the mind guides its efforts by its intentions. 
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d . d 235 are etermJ.ne . We must look for a more common-sense 
meaning of freedom in Polanyi's works'. 
Mental acts are temporal. As such, their assertion 
is a matter of making decisions which cut into situations 
fraught with the risk of hesitating too long or acting too 
hastily. 236 These decisions may appear to be determined 
only if we accept "scientific" standards of explanation as 
valid for decisions and attempt to fulfill them in action. 
But they are really indeterminate in so far as they are 
achieved by an intensification of uniquely personal intima-
tions. One can decide, eg., whether be will strive to ful-
fill self-set standards of behavior or not. Decision is 
not to be understood in terms of causal methods. Indeed, 
every act is engendered by a commitment that has two poles: 
the universal standard (the determinant) and the personal 
commitment (the indeterminate). 237 Concerning this latter, 
Polanyi says, " ... the personal pole of commitment retains 
its autonomy everywhere, exercising its calling within a 
material milieu which conditions but never fully determines 
its- actions". 238 
23 \iichael Polanyi and Hairy Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: l_'he 
University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 176. 
23n_ · · 
'"Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowled e: Towards a Post-Cri-
tical Philosophy (Chicago: The University o icago Press, 19 2 ' p. 314. 
237 Ibid., p. 396. 
238
rbid., p. 397. 
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In Polanyi's view, then, indeterminacy and creativity 
are logical implications of tacit knowing. The unspecifiabi-
lity of tacit clues makes a deterministic model impossible. 
Since the knowledge that would make determinism possible--that 
of the entire mental state of the person--is ruled out by the 
dynamics of tacit knowledge. Thus experience itself is in-
239 determinate, constantly novel. And, as a result, one can-
not consider reality or human action to be anything less than 
creative and novel. Polanyi's parallel between the dynamic 
of knowing and the structure of being and its dynamic of 
emergence means that novelty in experience is novel--undeter-
mined--development in human activity. 
Human reality, then, is a free, creative, emergent 
reality. Like all living organisms, man's life is defined in 
terms of its movement toward success in surviving and develop-
ing toward its calling. In the case of lower animals, this 
calling may extend only to the ordered activities that enable 
them to feed themselves, find adequate shelter, and form a 
primitive community. But in man this calling extends to 
responsibility for his free decisions. Man is called toward 
achievements which require that he take in hand his own free-
dom and move with responsibility to fulfill and continue to 
develop the standards of action which fulfil the highest 
239
"A Bridge from Science to Religion Based on Polanyi's 
Theory of Knowledge''. William Scot, Zygon, 5, S0-57, 1970. 
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goals his intellect can grasp. 
Man's freedom and his responsibility are given to-
gether. We are free to act as we wish only in relation to 
ordered activities or standards of action which have supported 
our existence and which demand that we responsibly support 
them or find better ways of ordering life. Our freedom allows 
us to act to our disadvantage, to act against accepted stan-
dards, even to overthrow them. We can move toward ultimate 
anarchy if we wish, destroying communal standards of behavior 
and refusing even the most primitive biological needs. Our 
calling is just that: a guiding vision that requires respon-
sibile and creative development; it is not a mechanically 
determining impetus toward unthinking, blind response. But 
this freedom must acknowledge its relation to the organization 
of life in which it is grounded and accept responsibility for 
how it shapes--or destroys--this organization. 
This freedom is moral since it involves making deci-
sions, making a difference in things. And this difference 
has no determinative reasons other than the act of choosing. 
But this does not mean that we must buy Sartre's notion of 
radical freedom in which values do not exist until we have 
chosen them. Polanyi considers this view unnecessarily anti-
intellectual. Freedom is most essentially freedom when 
th ht . f t . . b . f d 240 aug 1s ree o ra1se quest1ons a out 1ts own ree om. 
240Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 4. 
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And such a question points not to a radical, ungrounded free-
dom but to a freedom with definite grounds in conscience. 241 
This does not mean that moral freedom can never be 
arbitrary. Arbitrary choice is justifiable as a heuristic 
process since it is only by narrowing our focus (arbitrarily) 
in some respect that we are able to perceive certain patterns 
hitherto unknown. Arbitrary choice is a "guide" or "fruit-
ful belief" which leads us to new insight. 242 
Polanyi, then, accepts the existential tenet that 
morality demands moral commitment in the form of decisions. 
Indeed, he extends this concept through to an assertion that 
no animal can be certain that its purpose will be successful 
and that every movement is a commitment which takes the risk 
of failure. 243 But he condemns existentialism as a hybrid 
of scepticism and moral perfectionism. It employs ·moral 
scepticism to blast existing society as artificial, ideolo-
gical, and hypocritical. And this only means that moral 
passions themselves become filled with contempt for their own 
241Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 65. 
242Michael Polanyi, The Re ublic of Science: Its 
Political and Economic Theory C icago: Roosevelt University, 
1962), p. 2. 
243s . .f. c1ent1 1c 
Schwarz (N.Y., N.Y.: 
1974), p. 59. 
Thought an~ Social Reality, ed. by Fred 
International Universities Press, Inc., 
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ideals! 244 The distinction between good and evil is then 
eliminated, and appeal to moral ideals is seen as futile and 
245 dishonest. 
Polanyi does not reject the moral tradition of his 
culture by means of a radical scepticism. Nor does he hold 
delusions of moral perfectionism. Instead, he holds that 
freedom must be rooted in tradition and that no generation can 
be radically self-determinative. But this acceptance of tradi-
tion must be integrated into a system cultivating radical pro-
gress. Not all labor for a common purpose can be determined by 
the will of the people, since public will is known only 
fragmentarily and requires for its fulfilment individual ini-
tiatives aiming at fragmentary problems. This freedom which 
allows a certain amount of directionlessness in a society is 
nonetheless indispensable to the pursuit of social self-
. 246 1mprovement. 
In the realm of ethics, then, Polanyi is a firm be-
liever in t·he sort of human freedom that makes us morally 
responsible for our actions. Ascribing creativity and novelty 
to the most fundamental dynamic of reality, especially of 
N.y. : 
244Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
Doubleday & Co., Inc.~~~p. 58. 
245 Ib.id., p. 5~. 
246Knowin 
by Marjorie Michael Polan i, edited J.cago ~Pre-ss-,--1969--) , 
p. 71. 
r 
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life, he must naturally regard man as responsible not only 
for his total evolutionary emergence to higher levels of 
being but also for his individual decision to participate 
responsibly in the life-standards of the community. 
But how does this free power to organize life toward 
the emergence of higher forms actually create "levels" of . 
reality? We must investigate further the nature of Polanyi's 
f h . h f 1" 24 7 concept o a ~erarc y o rea ~ty. 
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clearly, Polanyi identifies that human freedom 
over which so much philosophical ink has been spilled as 
the power of choice. More specifically (since even deter-
minsts believe in "choice", if only as the last considera-
tion of a series of deliberations), Polanyi believes in the 
power of human beings to inject novelty into the world through 
both arbitrary and reasoned choices. 
Again, Polanyi's argument for freedom is not so 
much an argument as a description of change. If he has an 
argument at all, it rests on the principle that, since we 
cannot ever totally describe an event, we cannot prove a 
determined chain of events. Here Polanyi injects the unspeci-
fiability of tacit knowledge into an age-old issue with the 
intention of resolving it on epistemological grounds. But 
clearly his argument commits the fallacy of an ad ignorantium. 
Merely because we cannot specify the reasons whyan event 
occurs does not mean that there are no unknown reasons. 
In so far as Polanyi argues the issue of freedom, 
he commits the ad ignorantium. In so far as he considers the 
ontological dynamic Gf freedom, he merely describes the event 
of change without a functioning presupposition of determinism. 
Such a way of preceding is not a resolution of the philosophi-
cal issue of freedom. It is hardly anything more than an 
assumption of freedom decorated by elaborate description. And 
one might observe that this lacuna in Polanyi's philosophy is 
an important one since he emphasizes political and social 
freedom (which can only be seen as rooted in this deeper, on-
tological sense of human freedom) as the key to man's emer-
gence into higher realities. 
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The only classification possible here is simply to 
note that, if Polanyi has no conclusive argument for human 
freedom, neither has anyone produced a successful argument 
for determinism. Thus, since both freedom and determinism are 
unproved, one might as well accept one rather than the other 
and include his assumption within a consistent world-view. 
Polanyi is at least consistent with his option for freedom 
throughout the whole of his thought. The point here is that 
I am attempting only to accept and clarify Polanyi's own some-
what uncritical acceptance of moral freedom with the aim of 
showing that his notion of freedom is an important element of 
his tacit ethic. I believe Polanyi accepts moral freedom as 
a radical choice of world-views. We may disagree with his 
choice; but we can hardly deny the important ethical conse-
quences of it. And this latter point is the one I wish to 
advance. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
"RULES OF RIGHTNESS" AS LEVELS OF HUMAN ACTIVITY 
This chapter carries forth the momentum of the pre-
vious chapter. We may now see that Polanyi's ontology is 
very much oriented around a hierarchy of being in which 
higher levels rely on lower levels (which in turn support 
and participate in higher levels). This notion is extended 
to the moral realm in which man is viewed as freely pursuing 
the Good through a process of maturing toward the achieve-
ment of wholly novel modes of human being, modes which re-
present new insights into value, right, and the Good. 
In this chapter I apply Polanyi's notion of "rules 
of rightness" (which he applies to the structures of reli-
ance and marginal controls in the functioning of organisms 
and machines) to the moral domain. Just as the stabiliza-
tion of processes tend to create rules of correct function-
ing (rules of rightness), so moral structures which work 
and which keep access to moral truth open tend to stabilize 
into rules of rightness. These rules are moral rules or 
codes by which we judge beQavior. Our moral concepts, grounded 
in individual and communal experience, tend to be expressed 
in the form of rules by which actions are judged to be right 
or wrong. These rules do not, however, preclude emergence 
through insight into new forms of moral life; and it is at 
162 
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this point that Polanyi's ontology seems to coalesce with the 
moral domain: his concept of "ultra-biology" describes not 
only a "scientifically" conceived destiny of man but, by 
reference to Teilhard de Chardin's noosphere, touches difi-
nitely upon a concept of a moral end of man. This chapter 
ends the discussion of Polanyi's ontology, having moved this 
discussion from the key elements of his ontology to a con-
ception of man's;ultimate organismic ~estiny which coincides 
with a moral end of man. 
1. Levels of Being 
To trace Polanyi's thinking on this subject in more 
detail, we can develop more deeply hi~ thesis that each 
level of being (including life, human reality, etc.) relies 
for its operations on all of ~he levels below it. Thus, 
each higher level imposes on the one immediately lower to 
' 
I 
it a boundary that harnesses it to the service of the higher, 
a control that is transmitted stage by stage to lower 
levels. 248 This structure does not, however, make the higher 
levels reducible to the terms of the lower (we cannot, eg., 
1 . l'f . f h . 1 ) 24 9 exp a1n 1 e 1n terms o c em1ca structures ; nor can 
one account for the principles of the higher level in terms 
248,,. . d B . ~now1nq an e1n~: 
by Mariorie Grene, (Chicago? 
p. 234. 
Essay~ by Michael Polanyi, edited 
University of Chicago Press, 1969), 
249Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) p. 85. 
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of the lower (we cannot reason from chemical knowledge to 
the necessity of the properties of life}:so 
Again, this ·ontology parallels the dynamic of tacit 
knowledge: 
... the two-levelled logic of tacit knowing performs 
exactly what is needed for understanding this 
mechanism. 
Tacit knowing integrates the particulars of a 
comprehensive entity and makes us see them forming 
the entity. This integration recognizes the higher 
principle at work on the boundary conditions. left 
open by the lower principle, by mentally performing 
the workings of the higher principle. It thus 
materializes the functional structure of tacit know-
ing. It also makes clear to us how the comprehen-
sive entity works by revealing the meaning of its 
parts. We have here the semantic aspect of tacit 
knowing. And since a comprehensive entity is con-. 
trolled as a whole by a higher principle than the 
one which controls its isolated parts, the entity 
will look different than an aggregate of its parts. 
Its higher principle will endow it with a stability 
and power appearing in its shape and motions and . 
usually produce also additional novel features. We1 have here the phenomenal aspect of tacit knowing.25 
Lower levels, then, are highly illuminating to the 
higher levels of reality when viewed as part of the opera-
tional principles of the higher. The higher level defines 
the conditions under which the lower may operate, 252 whereas 
ZSOK . now1n 
by Marjorie Grene, 
p. 155. 
251 Ibid., p. 218. 
252 
Michael -Polanyi, Persenal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
1962)' p. 133. 
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lower levels define the conditions for the success of failure 
of systems in so far as the higher relies on them. 253 Thus, 
Polanyi says, "Everywhere the potential operations of a higher 
level are actualized by their embodiment in lower levels which 
makes them liable to failure". 254 
Polanyi uses the terms "marginal conditions" and 
d d . . 11255 d .b h 1 . b t "boun ary con 1t1ons to escr1 e t e re at1on e ween 
higher and lower levels. Higher levels exercise control over 
lower ones by shaping them, when they fulfill the conditions 
higher levels lay down, into new entities functioning under 
principles different from those formerly governing them. Eg., 
consider the difference· between hydrogen and oXygen as separate 
elements and these two in chemical combination as water. The 
gaseous state of these two elements functions by principles 
appropriate to gases until they are mixed together under the 
proper circumstances. When they combine to form water (which 
is the only element they can form under certain conditions, 
since they are bounded on all sides by the higher principle 
254Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 67. 
255Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) p. 55, 40-41, rsp.) 
253Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
1962)' p. 382. 
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of their combination), they fulfill the conditions of the prin-
ciples governing water. The principles governing the struc-
ture of water in this case are the boundary conditions which, 
when "crossed over" by the combination of hydrogen and oxygen, 
create the unique properties of water. 
Levels of reality, then, seem to "slope upwards" 
toward more and more complex entities governed by principles 
which exercise control over the lower principles upon which 
they rely. Polanyi intends to describe the hierarchical 
development of reality as a teleology toward higher levels 
of reality. He argues that even mechanisms of various kinds 
acquire their organization by reference to som'e aim, goal, 
or purpose that i~ to be achieved by it. This purpose can-
not be deduced from the physical and chemical laws that make 
h . .bl 256 b . "f . lf . . . mac 1nes poss1 e, ut 1t man1 ests 1tse 1n 1ts organ1za-
tion toward a function relying on but not defined by the 
elements making up the machine. Thus, Polanyi is a "final-
ist" in that he believes all things organize themselves to 
ends not defined by the elements of combination themselves. 
This finalism is explicitly applied to the develop-
ment of human activity. The achievements of human life act 
as heuristic guides to a yet hidden reality and, because they 
form a base on which to stand as well as elements of a higher 
256Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 169. 
167 
achievement, every achievement has the power to promote the 
realization of a new level of insight or activity. 257 Polanyi 
orders the grades of commitment, eg., as primordial (biologi-
cal commitment to life and centralized functioning), primitive 
(active-perceptive centering), and responsible (requiring con-
. d l"b . ) 258 H l"f th f . sc1ous e 1 erat1on . uman 1 e, en, moves rom pr1~ 
mordial biological commitments to responsible moral ones as 
a multi-levelled, finalistic movement toward higher centers 
of organization and operation. 
Polanyi's notion of levels of reality may be extended 
to the ethical domain. We have already seen how values may 
be developed in a hierarchical order. Now we may see more 
concretely how we may order our action in society to pre-
serve these values and promote stability in standards of be-
havior. 
The human organism controls its behavior in increa~­
ingly complex ways as it pursues its goals. But, as we have 
seen, its goals are not merely biological. The person lives 
in a community in which he finds his support and to which, 
to some extent, he is responsible. His responsibility is 
defined by his inescapable participation in the community. 
257Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 399. 
258 Ibid., 363. 
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He has an obligation to sustain and forward his community's 
values because his own life is to a larg.er extent than he 
can explicitly ever know, identified with the community. 
This much has already been established. 
Moral acts are acts motivated by the concern to sub-
mit to the moral standards of the community in order to sh~re 
in its life. They constitute an "organismic" participation 
in the community which attempts to dwell successfully in the 
community. As such, they are guided by an insight into right 
action in specific situations (or what seems to be right). 
This insight orders action, guiding a person's choices con-
cerning what he does. This ordering is done in the light of 
a principle: what is deemed right. And this principle be-
comes a "higher level" control of behavior, shaping individual 
acts into complex and related acts which aim at the right. 
The higher principle, the right, relies upon indivi-
dual acts which, considered separately, have no bearing on 
the right. For example, fulfilling one's obligation to pay 
taxes relies upon acts like filling out the tax forms pro-
perly, figuring the required mathematics, and sending the 
check for the required amount. Right action relies on the 
complex of ordered actions that fulfill one's tax obligation. 
A failure in any of these destroys the possibility of meet-
ing one's obligations (despite the fact that a mathematical 
169 
error would not be viewed with the gravity that would pertain 
to a refusal to send the required sum). 
The higher principle, however, is not reducible to 
any one of the separate acts which achieve the right, nor are 
they reducible to the series of acts as a whole. The goal of 
such acts is the sense of acting rightly, and this goal shapes 
behavior by defining the conditions of a right action. In 
each specific ethical action, the right embodies itself in 
particular acts upon which it relies in order to exist. And 
these particular acts are no longer to be viewed in their 
isolation but rather as elements of one movement toward right 
. h h . 1 d . . I 2 5 9 Th . h . 1n t e et 1ca oma1n. us, an attempt at r1g t act1on, 
informed by the values and standards -of the community and by 
one's own ethical insight, transforms the elements of human 
behaviour into entirely different and novel types of acts. 
There is, if you please, a "phylogenetic maturation" in human 
ethical behavior toward higher and higher guiding principles 
which aim at transforming the whole of human activity into 
new and still hidden shapes. 
Of course, this maturation is all a matter of freedom. 
We are free to choose to act rightly or to act with disregard 
259An attempt to save a drowning man, eg., is not 
stmply "swimming" but rather a complex of acts whose character 
is irremediably changed by the relations established between 
them in fulfilling, as a whole, the end toward which they aim. 
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for what is right. The development of the person within the 
community depends upon a commitment to seek higher truths 
and right action. One can choose to act against the community 
and against one's own interests; and one can even oppose the 
-------
community in the interest of a higher insight into right than 
that possessed by his community. 
We can see, then, that, if we extend Polanyi's notion 
of a hierarchy of reality into the ethical domain, human 
actions themselves become levels of human reality--indeed, 
the highest levels of biological existence. Human actions 
can be graded from sporadic, blind attempts at survival to 
committed, cooperative and partic-ipative sharing within a 
community of persons. Each level introduces a new depth of 
insight into right action in general and manifests itself as 
the boundary conditions for all of the right actions which 
participate in it. Clearly, then, ethical action is an 
instance of the development of human reality toward higher 
levels of a hierarchical arrangement. 
2. Rules of Action 
Insight into right, based upon a responsible commit-
ment to communal values, then, is an ordering principle of 
behavior. We can understand what this means by investigating 
the ontological meaning of an ordering principle. 
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Polanyi defines an operational principle as any "col-
lection" of parts which function according to a principle 
which orders activity in a way not defined by the parts so 
ordered. He distinguishes, however, between the actions of 
an ordering (or operational) principle from the conditions 
h h 1 d . . . 261 w ic re ease an susta1n 1ts act1ons. Thus, the prin-
ciple is not identical to the parts that functionally consti-
tute it and upon which it relies. It is in fact the origi-
nator of the potential within an open system, a group of 
elements which can be harnassed and developed into new func-
tions--and even n~w elements--by a principle that stands out-
side of them until released to function by the presence of 
these elements. 262 
Once harnessed by an ordering operational principle, 
the composing elements tend to endure within th~ order that 
is produced. For example, life, once produced from non-
living matter, tends to remain life and resist breakdown. 
Thus, the ordering principle is an initiator of an order which, 
by a momentum of its own, tends to stabilize a new order. 263 
261Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
1962), p. 382. 
262 Ibid., 384. 
263 Ibid. 
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This is why the ordering principle is often innovative. Once 
having stabilized a system, it can effect random motions which 
h . h 1 1 of order. 264 discover even 1g er eve s 
Polanyi credits living organisms with improvising 
alternative ways of achieving the end of an ordering prin-
ciple as well as the capacity to achieve higher levels of life. 
These "equipotential" modes of alternative orders within a 
single ordering principle are part of the originative power 
of the principle. 265 Living organisms centralize their 
efforts and split this center into relatively self-regulating 
sub-centers of organization. 266 And the result of this split-
ting or distribution of regulative functions enables the 
organism to explore randomly alternative ways. of integrating 
its life toward ultimate purposes--or discovering new pur-
poses. 
In relation to the development of persons, Polanyi 
I 
says that the unconscious, spurred by conscious effort is 
capable of changing consciousness by reference to an original 
insight. He calls this power to originate a change in 
264Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
1962)' p. 386. 
265 rbid., p. 337. 
266 rbid., p. 356. 
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. h . . . 1. 267 consc1ousness morp ogenet1c or1g1na 1ty. Th_us, the mor-
phogenetic principle is the top operative principle through 
which equipotential processes have their being as a comprehen-
sive rightness under the principle. They all disappear if 
h . . . 1 d. 268 the morp ogenet1c pr1nc1p e 1sappears. Thus, thought 
itself, together with the general consciousness of the person, 
develops by the same processes applicable to all other aspects 
of reality. 
Polanyi himself sums up this discussion of the power 
of originality in ordering principles. He distinguishes 
three types (or stages) of originality.· First, we are re-
sourceful enough to find alternate ways to achieve our goals 
even when normal means are cut off. Second, we are capable, 
of course, of normal maturation toward our goals. And third, 
we can discover altogether unprecedented operational prin-
. 1 269 Clp es. All of these ways ensure a continued, creative 
movement both of a personal knowledge of the right and of our 
power to order our lives rightly. 
267Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
1962), p. 339. 
268 Ibid., p. 340. 
269 Ibid., p. 399. 
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An insight into right is, then, an ordering principle 
which collects previously unrelated acts into a unified move-
ment toward right action. This insight is something different 
from the action of pursuing the right in the sense that it is 
the condition which releases and sustains the actions which 
aim at establishing the right. It is the originator of our 
potential to order our actions rightly. 
Decisions to act rightly establish eventually an 
order which has a power of its own to stabilize and resist 
destruction. Such decisions are grounded in an insight into 
right action and are the effective, originative agents of 
order. They establish systems of behavior, not merely iso-
lated acts; for they are informed by insights that yield 
principles covering wide-ranging areas of action. Thus, 
once a general principle of behavior is decided upon and 
grounded in commitment, a certain "stabilizing" force tends 
to establish this commitment as a general order of behavior. 
And from the base of such an ordered system, the person may 
direct his surplus energies toward an imaginative explora-
tion of alternative ways of fulfilling his obligation to 
right action or even discover higher obligations. 
Thus, moral action may seek out "equipotential" 
alternatives which bring change and development to the moral 
order. A system of moral behavior need not be a total, com-
prehensive control of behavior. Instead, the moral prin-
ciple (eg., refraining from doing injury to others) may, 
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need a special response in times of war or personal attack. 
The general principle may require modification through the 
allowance of extenuating circumstances for protective action 
which may necessitate harming others. And such exceptions 
may open a community to new principles, eg., those govern-
ing the conduct of war or the treatment of prisoners. Thus, 
new insights into what is right--as well as new rights--are 
discovered and put into practice. 
The growth and development of moral principles is 
partially the growth and development of the person as a 
whole. Moral principles are .sustained by the continued com-
mitment, indeed the life, of the whole person. And the 
behavior that is collected, shaped, and which constitutes 
the moral principle in action is in turn sustained by the 
principle itself. If the principle ceases to exist as a 
prime motivator of the person, the behavior cannot continue 
its ordered behavior. The moral act ends as a moral power. 
We are morally free, of course, to devolve morally. 
We can refuse our commitment to moral values and cease 
acting morally. The reasons--or causes--for this are myriad. 
But we can also choose to fulfill our moral objectives, find 
alternative routes to them, or discover new ones. Moral 
life, like all aspects of life (such as knowing), is crea-
tive and not determined by external circumstances. 
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We may not extend this inquiry into the dynamic of 
moral action toward the establishment of a general sense of 
moral rules. We have spoken thus far about moral principles 
but not as they are codified through the tradition of the 
community. To understand how such codification occurs, we 
must turn to Polanyi's notion of "rules of rightness", 
Operational principles, embodied in a system of 
action, are called "rules of rightness". 270 These rules 
codify the successful functioning of a system, whether the 
system is that of a machine or an organism. They account for 
why a system functions in a way which accomplishes its goals. 
Thus, the rules tell us how a thing or system is supposed to 
work; and they are determined by a careful observation of 
the standards of functioning directly bearing on the success 
of the system. 271 This pertains both to machines and biotic 
achievements with the difference that, in biotic achievements, 
rules of rightness are discovered not by analyzing fixed 
structures but by a skillful connoissuership·of their forms 
. . 2 72 
of ach1evement. But in both machines and living organisms, 
rules of rightness constitute a rational strategem for success.273 
270Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowled e: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: 
1962), p .. 329. 
271 Ibid., 345. 
272 rbid., pp. 342-3. 
273 Ibid., 332 
177 
Rules of rightness pertain not only to somatic, biotic 
achievements in general, but specifically also to the act of 
knowing. Thus, Polanyi speaks of intellectual rightness as a 
species of general rightness of response which involves the 
274 
whole person. It is in this context that Polanyi defines 
h h . h f t" 275 And b t . trut as t e r~g tness o an ac ~on. , y ex ens~on, ~e 
can see that insight into right action is a truth upon which 
we base our action. 
Rules of rightness pertain, then, both to right know-
ing (defined as truth) and right acting (based on truth). Thus, 
subjectivity and error in knowledge and perception break the 
rules of rightness that pertain to them just as abnormality, 
malformation, or disease interferes with the proper function-
. f 1" . . 2 76 ~ng o a ~v~ng organ~sm. 
We can easily understand. how Polanyi's notion of rules 
of rightness can be extended to the ethical domain of know-
ledge and action. On a personal level, the truth of right 
guides us to right action. And our actions tend to systema-
tize, to become "rules" of action based upon moral truths to 
which we are committed. Thus, because we participate in the 
community of persons, we also develop rules of rightness that 
274Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
jritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
962)' p. 368. 
275 Ibid., p. 320. 
276 Ibid., p. 361. 
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are shaped by this participation. We establish within our 
own commitments to act rightly an obligation to submit to 
the rules constituting right action within the community. 
This submission is, of course, a free act. And it 
is, as we have seen, a creative one in that we can seek new 
means to achieve communal as well as personal goals and 
establish new, universal rules of rightness to which we our-
selves submit. Such ethical rules may be taken up by the 
community, systematized, and developed into the custom, ethic, 
or law of the community. As rules, they may be explicitly 
developed and modified. 
We have, then, established in Polanyi's notions of 
a hierarchy of reality and rules of rightness a continuum of 
human activity from perceptual rightness to moral rightness. 
He claims that beyond sentience in motive and knowledge in 
the person is the effort to do the right and know truly\ in 
th f . d d 1 . 2 7 7 A d 1 e presence o an ln epen ent rea lty. n , est anyone 
doubt that my extension to the moral realm of his concept of 
doing "rightly" is an exaggerated employment of his bio-
logical ideas, we may note this statement: 
277Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
1962), p. 363. 
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Our inquiry into the logic of machines is, therefore, 
capable of generalization over a domain extending 
from mathematics to physiology. And we may add to 
this domain, as further rules of rightness, the prin-
ciples of ethics and law.2J8 
Further, we must note his explicit hierarchy of levels within 
man: 1) embryological life; 2) vegetative organic functioning; 
3) perceptive-motor activity; 4) conscious behavior and intel-
lectual action; 5) moral sense, guided by his own standards. 
Each level gives rise to the next by morphogenesis, Polanyi's 
general word to describe the dynamic of creative emergence as 
we have described it. 279 
3. The Ultimate Aim of Human Reality 
We may now turn to a general view of the goal toward 
which individual cultures and the entire human race moves. 
Such a view will allow us to see how profoundly Polanyi con-
siders the moral development of man. 
Polanyi would admit that deep cultural forces create 
changes in culture. Indeed, the knowledge claimed by a cul-
ture extends to all that is believed to be right and excel-
lent within it, including the utterances of prophets, poets, 
278Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
19 6 2) ' pp . 3 3 2- 3 . 
279Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) pp. 36-7. 
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' . 1 . . 1 d . h" t t 280 1eg1s ators, sc1ent1sts, ea ers 1n 1s ory, e c. But 
Polanyi is not really a proponent of the idea that change 
comes only through cultural forces. He believes that the 
superior knowledge guiding a free society is formulated by 
d b d . d . . d" . 281 Th th "d 1 great men an ern o 1e 1n 1ts tra 1t1on. us,. e 1 ea s 
of a culture are proposed through individual insights and 
are learned only when an entire culture follows them. 
Polanyi advises us to study the influence of great men if 
we are to understand cultural growth, including growth of 
moral ideals. He calls this study an extension of biology: 
"ultra-biology". 282 
Human greatness is man's power to transcend the 
culture in which he participates toward higher ideals and 
values which will open new vistas for the entire culture. 
The possibility of human greatness includes, of course, the 
potential for devolution toward the demonic. But, con-
sidered as forward moving, human greatness can be recognized 
only by submission to it. Only by a commitment whose value 
reaches out toward what greatness discovers can the dis-
covery be recognized for what it is. Human greatness 
stretches communal tacit knowing toward a knowledge and a 
281Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
T§6z), p. 397. 
282
rbid., p. 377. 
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standard projected by one man: " ... man stands rooted in his 
calling under a firmament of truth and greatness". 283 The 
power of a living, vital morality lies in this commitment, 
h h . h 1" b . . 284 wit out w 1c mora 1ty ecomes a convent1on. 
Toward what end does moral development strive? 
Polanyi has indicated that acts of knowing and of moral intent 
hope to capture aspects of reality: the Good, the right as 
serving the Good, etc. The search for truth moves forward 
in the hope that other findings will coincide with and sup-
plement each other toward the development of one truth. 285 
From the ontological point of view, this transcendence toward 
one truth is a transformation of man from a self-~nterested, 
survival-conscious organism to a person transcending the con-
cerns of individuality and death. The body becomes no longer 
an instrument of self-indulgence but a condition of the call-
ing of man. Polanyi calls this development "noogenesis" 286 
283 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
1962)' p. 380. 
284 Ibid. 
285 Ibid., p. 315. 
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the development of new heuristic passions which reveal worlds 
of human greatness and freedom. 287 This development reaches 
beyond even individual societies to the highest fundamental 
principles of humanity. Such principles are so wide-ranging 
as to create a "cosmic field" of hidden but infinitely great 
. 1 288 potent1a . 
Polanyi, inspired by Chardin's works (The Phenomenon 
of Man, p. 200), calls this "cosmic field" the "noosphere". 
The noosphere is composed of a holistic development of lin-
guistic, mental, and social realms toward a completely novel 
creation. The change and development of a system, eg., 
scientific knowledge, is not specifiable in terms of strict 
rules. The guide of heuristic activity is an intimation of 
a hidden reality, and the change occurs as a self-modifica-
tion of an entire interpretive framework. Each noospheric 
development is believed to be real and entitled to the claim 
of universal validity. Such change develops the noosphere 289 
th h . . . 290 roug ontogenet1c 1nnovat1on. 
At last we can understand Polanyi's integration of 
truth, right, and free emergence. He says, " ... the emergent 
287Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
I9 6 2 ) , p . 3 8 9 • 
288
rbid., p. 405. 
289Ibid., pp. 395-6. 
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another. · 
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noosphere is wholly determined as that which we believe to 
be true and right; it is the external pole of our commitments, 
the service of which is our freedom. It defines a free 
society as a fellowship fostering truth and respecting the 
right". 291 Moral development is part and parcel, then, of a 
complete development of man into a reality in which truth, 
right, and freedom are the highest motivating values. 
Polanyi moves into religious language to describe the 
emergence of the noosphere toward its highest insight of 
truth and commitment to right and justice. He says 
The stage on which we thus resume our full intel-. 
lectual powers is borrowed from the Christ-scheme 
of Fall and Redemption. Fallen man is equated to 
the historically given and subjective condition of 
our mind, from which we may be saved by the grace of 
the spirit. The technique of our redemption is to 
lose ourselves in the performance of an obligation 
which we accept, in spite of its appearing on reflec-
tion impossible of achievement. We undertake the 
task of attaining the universal in spite of our ad-
mitted infirmity, which should render the task hope-
less, because we hope to be visited by powers for 
which we cannot account in terms of our specifiable 
capabilities. This hope is a clue to God ... 292 
This religious language sums up the absoluteness and totality 
with which we procede toward higher insights and higher life 
as human beings. It shows the ultimate ground of moral and 
291Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
i~itical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
62), p. 404. 
292 Ibid., p. 324. 
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total human development as our highest comprehension of this 
life, a comprehension that can be manifested only in religious 
language. And Polanyi affirms that this cosmic panorama is 
intended to offer us a framework within which we can define 
responsible human action, of which moral decisions are a 
. 1 . 293 part1cu ar 1nstance. 
We may conclude this section on the ontological 
thought of Polanyi with a brief summary of its relevance for 
an extension of his ontology to ethical standards of action 
and knowledge of the right. We began by pointing out the 
parallel between epistemological and ontological thought in 
Polanyi and how this parallel enabled us to speak of tacit 
reliance in knowledge in terms of a reliance of one level 
of reality upon another. Thus, I see knowledge of the Good 
as a reliance of behavior upon standards of behavior to 
achieve the Good. Tacit commitments in knowing the Good thus 
become tacit support for the standards of action which sup-
port the values of the community. 
The notion of and commitment to right action in the 
community of persons is a matter of emergence into higher 
forms of moral life. What we termed "discoveries" in our 
discussion of Polanyi's epistemology is termed "emergence" 
{ 
293Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) p. 52. 
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when viewed ontologically. Emergence is a free, creative 
act which occurs on all levels of reality, particularly in 
biological reality. Thus, one level of reality, higher than 
another, relies on it for its own existence and controls the 
basic scope and limits of lower, less complex realities. But 
these higher levels themselves may, by a free exploration of 
alternate modes of reaching their specific aims, discover 
higher realities which control their own and, thus, release 
this higher reality to an effective and active embodiment in 
lower realities. 
Moral realities are controlling principles of behavior 
which rely upon individual acts and are embodied in them. 
Man emerges from individual self-assertion to an acknowledge-
ment of his communal participation and then toward the ''ultra-
biological" transcendence toward concept of the Good and 
right which are contained only tacitly in culture. 
The right is a responsible action in respect of com-
munal standards to which one submits in pursuit of the com-
munal Good even when one's understanding of these transcends 
what culture believes and is committed to. It emerges free-
ly through responsible commitment and evolves toward more 
wide-ranging principles of control of human thought and 
action. It establishes rules of rightness which enable com-
munities to function by virtue of custom and law. But these 
rules themselves develop as humanity emerges from ignorance 
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to the Good toward a free movement to higher moralities. We 
come at last to Polanyi's cosmic panorama in which the high-
est vision calls us constantly to give embodiment to ever 
new vistas of the Good, the right, and continued free emergence. 
We may now turn to Pola.nyi' s notion of symbols to 
clarify an important point concerning moral knowledge and 
action. And here we must grapple with an argument recently 
put forward by Harry Prosch. 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE INADEQUACY OF SYMBOLS FOR UNDERSTANDING 
THE ETHICAL DIMENSION OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 
In this chapter I wish to take up Polanyi's conception 
of metaphor and symbol. My aim is to show how these relate 
to the extension of personal knowledge into the ethical domain. 
Opening with a brief statement concerning the consis-
tency of certain chapter~ of Meaning, with prior works of 
Polanyi, I move into an explication of Harry Prosch's view of 
how these chapters relate to ethics. I take issue with his 
view that the Meaning material is the primary source for un-
. 
derstanding how to extend personal knowledge to ethics. Prosch 
believes that only with this material can one finally con-
struct the outline of a Polanyian ethic. I have already shown 
how value, right, and the Good can be understood in Polanyi's 
epistemological and ontological works; so, I disagree that 
Meaning is essential to understanding a Polanyian ethic, though 
the text is helpful in demonstrating how symbols function in 
the ethical domain. I argue that one can understand the devel-
opment of ethical knowledge and action in Polanyi's works with-
out reference to the power of symbolism, except for those par-
ticular incursions of symbols developed around important events 
or great persons. I do not think such symbolism is necessary 
for the development of a Polanyian ethic, but I do think it 
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plays a role in such development. And in this way I differ 
from Prosch, who thinks a Polanyian ethic cannot be conceived 
apart from the power of symbolism. 
The text of Meaning has been attacked on the grounds 
that it does not represent the ideas of Polanyi, a criticism 
grounded in the credit of authorship: Michael Polanyi and 
Harry Prosch. Some Polanyi scholars (eg., James Wiser, 
Loyola University) have raised the question whether the hand 
of Prosch is heavier in this book than that of Polanyi. I do 
not think Prosch has in any way distorted Polanyi's later 
thought, however, and I think various evidences and testi-
monies concur with this opinion. 
The texts most likely to be questioned in Meaning are 
Chapters five through ten. Prosch is responsible for the 
division of this book into chapters. But the texts themselves 
are essentially the ideas Polanyi set forth in a series of 
lectures at the Universities of Texas and Chicago in 1969. 
Polanyi specifically requested Prosch's aid in developing 
these lectures for publication and studied the text Prosch 
prepared for ten months before approving it. I think the 
main reason questions are raised about these chapters is that 
Polanyi is breaking new ground in them, extending personal 
knowledge to areas he had never considered befDre such as art, 
myth, religion, and poetry. In the context of such a study, 
he developed a concept of symbol which enables us to 
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understand how personal knowledge functions in these areas. 
Thus, because Polanyi breaks new ground so briefly and ten-
tatively before the end of his academic career, some raise 
questions whether he ever broke it at all. 
A close study of Polanyi's previous work, however, 
indicates clearly that what Polanyi says in his later work 
does not contradict or seriously modify his earlier work. 
His notion of symbol in fact relies on his concept of sense-
reading and sense-giving, which is grounded in his concept 
of tacit knowing. One cannot understand what Polanyi means 
by a symbol without relying on his earlier work (though one 
can understand his earlier work without reference to his 
concept of symbol). Thus, his concept of a symbol is con-
tinuous with his earlier development of tacit knowledge in 
other areas. Prosch denies authorship of Meaning in any 
way except as a spokesman for Polanyi's own thought, even to 
the extent of making the word "I" self-referential for 
Polanyi. 
On both external and internal evidences, then, I 
conclude that Meaning is a valuable text--indeed the only 
text--for understanding Polanyi's concept of symbol and how 
it applies to the domain of ethical knowledge and action. 
I am not alone in this conclusion, as it is shared by Don 
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Musser 294 and other Polanyi scholars. 
The only serious problem with Meaning's application 
to ethics is the application Prosch himself makes of it in 
his article on Polanyi's ethics. 295 Here we are dealing with 
Prosch and not directly with Polanyi. And so his application 
of Meaning to this area is fair game for critique. 
I agree with much of what Prosch says about the pos-
sibility of developing an ethic from Polanyi's works. He 
points out that the motivation for Polanyi's work in episte-
mology was an attempt to counteract the destruction of moral 
ideals by positivist scientism (p. 91) and that moral ideals 
are just as real as scientific discoveries for Polanyi. He 
even argues that Polanyi intended his epistemology to apply 
to the discovery of moral ideas just as peadily as scientific 
ones, though he does not show in any detailed way how this 
can be done. 
He indicates, as I have argued, that~ethics involves 
a hierarchical and teleological movement toward the Good 2 
which manifests itself as a reality (pp. 92-4). Moral prin-
ciples are, then, higher operative principles which rely on 
294Review of Meaning, Don Musser, Zygon, 12, Sept.,_ 
1977' p. 259. 
295
"Polanyi's Ethics", Harry Prosch. Ethics, 82, 
19-72, 91-113. 
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but cannot be reduced to such levels as the neurological and 
the physiological and which project standards of behavior to 
which they themselves submit (p. 95). Prosch further argues 
a point I shall also stress: that ethics must take up free-
dom as a prime ideal if culture is to develop in all areas of 
science, art, religion, and morality (p. 95). 
Clearly, Prosch outlines a direction of thought in 
his article with which I can in large part agree. Indeed, I 
have tried in my previous chapters to argue in some detail 
for the positions Prosch only indicates as a fruitful line of 
research. But he goes on to apply Meaning to ethics in ways 
of which I cannot approve. 
We remember that Polanyi calls the inte~ration of 
joint clues which produces the appearance of something of the 
"semantic" meaning of the thing. 296 Originally he extended 
semantic meanings to include all meanings achieved by man and 
not just linguistic ones. For example, perception and sounds 
are included as well as conceptual meanings. But in Meaning 
he wishes to be more specific about linguistic meanings and 
to distinguish them clearly from non-linguistic meanings such 
as those integrated in perception. 
296K . now1n 
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. . 1" . . . 297 restricts semant1c mean1ngs to 1ngu1st1c mean1ngs. This 
is the only explicit change from past positions that Polanyi 
makes in Meaning. 
In the context of the restriction of semantic mean-
ings to linguistic meanings, Polanyi considers integrations 
in which the subsidiaries bear on a focal meaning to be "self-
centered". That is, they are made from the self as a center 
h b . f f 1 . 298 Th. . th t !£ t e o Ject o oca attent1on. 1s 1s e pa tern we 
have already seen in our discussion of Polanyi's epistemology. 
It is the fundamental "from-to" pattern. And we have seen how 
in moral knowledge we rely on present value-commitments to 
focus on new insights into value and the Good. Concerning 
reliance upon signs in order to focus on new meanings, Polanyi 
says "This reliance is a personal commitment which is involved 
in all acts of intelligence by which we integrate some things 
subsidiarly to the center of our f~cal attentiori. 299 
Polanyi distinguishes between linguistic meanings 
that are sense-giving and those that are sense-reading. Sense 
reading is the act of making sense out of clues that are pre-
sent before us, such as is performed in scientific discoveries. 
The 
297Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning 
University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 74. 
(Chicago: 
298 Ibid., p. 71. 
299Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
1962), p. 61. 
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sense giving is the act of creating new meanings out of 
apparently unrelated meanings, eg., a technical invention. 
our moral lives require both sense-giving and sense-reading: 
we must understand moral values and standards in order to 
submit to them; and we must responsibly create new visions of 
value and right. Thus, Polanyi says that the growth of intel-
ligence in language is a combination of sense-reading and 
sense-giving. 300 Indeed, even the most fundamental linguis-
tic achievement reveals this combination. The definiton of 
words depends ultimately an some kind of ostensive gesture, 
a kind of sense-giving. And picking up the meaning of this 
gesture will depend on our tacit abi~ity to "sense-read" what 
is meant. 301 
We must remember, of course, that sense-reading and 
sense-giving are both tacit acts and that both refer to 
reality. Polanyi does not distinguish between the linguistic 
mode and the "material" mode. Language is not a mere conven-
tion for expressing thought (this is nominalism in his view). 
The use of language requires a tacit indwelling in the mean-
ings it conveys, whether by sense-reading or sense-giving. 
And our personal judgement stands at the root of all 
300K . nowJ.ng 
by Marjorie Grene, 
PP. 20 5-6. 
and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 
301Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) p. 6. 
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d . 302 d . . 303 sense-rea 1ng an sense g1v1ng. Thus, we indwell 
language and are tacitly committed to the realities language 
reflects. When we disagree on the nature of things, we are 
not simply having a verbal dispute. We judge and indwell 
reality through language and develop a rational vocabulary 
through an acknowledgement of reality. I have already made 
this point in regard to tacit knowledge, but we should remem-
ber it in order to avoid thinking of language as somehow 
divorced from reality. 304 Thus, Polanyi says "To talk about 
things ... is to apply the theory of the universe implied by 
our language to the particulars of which we speak" .305 
In Meaning Polanyi distinguishes two types of seman-
tic meaning: indication and symbolization. Indication pro-
jects meaning away from the self as center (the person makes 
judgements, discovers, creates new objects or ideas), and 
symbolization is a reversal of this movement from self to 
object: symbols draw the person to themselves and, thus, 
give themselves to persons. Indication, then, is 
302Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
1962)' p. 80. 
303 Ibid., pp. 113-14. 
304 Ibid. 
305 rbid., p. 81. 
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self-centered; and symbols are self-giving. 306 
We must distinguish this self-giving, however, from 
sense-giving. As we have seen, indications can be sense-
giving. Eg., the meaningful use of a word sometimes makes us 
look through the word toward inventing a new meaning, and this 
• • II • 1 • • 307 is "sense-g1v1ng s1nce we app y a mean1ng to exper1.ence. 
Polanyi considers all verbalizations to be forms of sense-
giving. Acts of interpretation are instances of sense-read-
ing since they attempt to make sense jointly of a text and the 
experience described by the text. 308 
Sense-reading and sense-giving are cyclical activities. 
The p~rson's integration of meaning is sense-reading, and his 
projection of meaning in words is sense-giving. But another 
person's interpretation of his projection of meaning is sense-
d . 309 rea 1.ng. 
Symbols, however, are not projections or readings of 
sense. A symbol is an object of some kind which has a mean-
ing that does not bear on reality in the same way in which 
308 Ibid., p. 188 
309 Ib1·d., 185 6 pp. - . 
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1v-ords denote objects. Instead of denoting objects, symbols 
"stand for" objects. An example is a flag or a medal. As a 
focal object, a flag is apparently meaningless. But subsi-
diary to the flag as a focal object are the meanings it is 
intended to give to us: a sense of patriotism, pride in 
country, etc. Thus, in symbolization the subsidiary clues 
are more important than the focal object since the focal 
object is of interest only because of its symbolic connec-
tion with the subsidiary clues through which it becomes a 
focal object. In this sense, symbolization reverses the self-
d f · d · . 31 O Th b 1 f 1 centere movement o 1n 1cat1on. e sym o J as a oca 
object, draws us into its subsidiary meanings, thus carrying 
us away into what it stands for. 
The subsidiaries that bear on a sybmol become, 
through our surrender to it, embodied in it. Through this 
embodiment, the symbols reflect back on their subsidiaries, 
fusing our diffuse responses and memories so that we are car-
ried away toward an experience of these subsidiaries which 
bear on the focal symbol. We are "picked up" into the mean-
ing of the symbo1. 311 
Obviously such symbols as flags, medals, logos, etc., 
do not have any intrinsic meaning as focal objects. In fact 
310Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 72. 
311 . ~ Ib1d.,p. ;3 
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what they are as objects are generally incompatible with the 
meanings they give us when we surrender ourselves to them. A 
flag is painted or dyed cloth; but patriotism has nothing to 
do with paint or cloth. Yet these elements, though incompatible 
with feelings of patriotism, are joined in such a way as to yeild 
these feelings. 
We may infer that, since the subsidiaries of a 
symbol are embodied in it through our surrender to it, we our-
selves indwell the symbol. This irtlwelling gives the symbol 
body; yet the symbol itself has the power to draw our lives, 
our committed responses, into it so that we give embodiment 
to it. Thus, symbols are self-giving not only in the sense 
that it gives us its meaning; but it is self-giving in that 
we invest ourselves in it and, thus, empower the symbol to 
yield what we have invested as a community in it: we find 
ourselves in the s~mbol, and are empowered by it to grow into 
new· meanings. 
Not all symbols, however, are composed of "incompati-
ble elements''. Some symbols are composed of elements which 
are themselves of intrinsic interest as well as the subsidiary 
m . h . ld 312 eanlngs t ey yle . Polanyi classes metaphor as a third 
type of semantic meaning which is composed of elements that 
are as important as their subsidiaries. 
312Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 74. 
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Metaphors are symbols which have meaning in them-
selves. Thus, a metaphor is itself a meaningful relation 
between the vehicle (the words, materials, acts, etc.) and 
their tenor (intention, meaning); and this relationship itself 
(the metaphor) draws us as a symbol into itself, integrating 
us to the meaning of its subsidiary clues as we surrender to 
it. 313 The "tenor" of a metaphor is the object of principle 
interest which we embody through another intrinsically interest-
ing object (the vehicle), thus giving the first object a new 
emotionally charged meaning. 314 
The word "metaphor" brings immediately to mind liter-
ary or poetic metaphor; and, although Polanyi intends the 
word to have a much wider-ranging meaning, such metaphors are 
excellent examples of what Polanyi means. In poetry, eg., 
words which have meaning are vehicles to express a much dif-
ferent tenor of meaning than the words themselves have. 
Words in poetry have meanings which are essential for the 
tenor of meaning to "come off". Thus, we must pay attention 
to their meanings while surrendering ourselves to the higher 
meaning of the symbolism that they constitute. Polanyi says 
that this act necessitates an act of the imagination that is 
313Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 77-79. The 
314 Ibid., 151. 
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, . h h h . d . . d. . 315 mucn rlc er t an t at requlre ln ln lcatlon. And, 
like jokes, metaphors lose their point when explained in 
detail in terms of the literal meanings of their vehicles. 316 
Their meaning is destroyed when we shift our focus from their 
317 
meaning to their constituent parts, as is the case with 
all destructive analysis. 
To sum up, Polanyi distinguishes between self-cen-
tered and self-giving semantic meanings. Self-centered 
meanings are acts of indication and are patterned after the 
normal "from-to" dynamic of tacit knowing. Such meanings 
may be instances of sense-reading o~ of sense-giving and 
involve a commitment to reality-beliefs that are embodied 
in language. Symbolization, however, reverses the "from-to" 
pattern in that the subsidiary meanings are of intrinsic 
interest over the focal object constituting the symbol. 
Symbols stand for the feelings and memories and ideas which 
they have the power to invoke in us by drawing us into their 
subsidiaries. Metaphor, however, as a special case of 
symbol, utilizes as its vehicle elements which are of in-
trinsic and important interest in order to constitute higher 
The 
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meanings that require imaginative effort to understand. 
The importance for ethics of this explication of 
symbolism and its distinction from non-symbolic meanings lies 
in Polanyi's concept of metaphor. We have already seen in 
detail how meanings developed by sense-reading and sense-
giving are operative in ethical knowledge and action. Now 
we can understand how symbols in the form of metaphor are 
operative in the ethical domain. 
As we have seen, the development of knowledge and of 
standards of action in all areas of human endeavor often 
take leaps forward by the individual initiative of single 
pers@ns. Such leaders, after mastering the tradition of 
their field, achieve insights that show promise of a continued 
self-confirmation and of truly developing knowledge in a par-
ticular field. The masters of particular traditions who 
achieve such insights become the leaders of their field. 
They have the power to break the mold of past understandings 
and of shown "apprentices" deeper truths within their field. 
In establishing new forms of thought, new inventions, new 
political structures, etc., they become "great men". 
A great man can become a symbol which stands for an 
ideal, a political ideology, or a religious concept among 
many other things. We can readily think of how the jowly 
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visage of George Washington affects A~ericans, as well as 
the figure of Lincoln--or, negatively, Lenin. Such men are 
symbols which stand for deep cultural commitments in which 
we all participate. Washington stands, perhaps, for a 
national pride in integrity; Lincoln stands for sheer human 
greatness; Lenin, negatively, stands for a mistrust of com-
munist ideology. The mention of these great men, the sight 
of their figures in painting or statuary, etc., draws our 
feelings and memories to the tales of their deeds and the 
values which they embody. We are carried away by their 
symbolic appearance to the values which they stand for. 
Great men, then, are symbols of cultural values in 
which we participate. But they are not symbols in the 
sense that flags, medals, etc., are symbols. That is, they 
are not meaningless in themselves and dependent for their 
power as symbols on the investment of meaning the culture has 
committed to them. Great men are metaphors for the values 
they realize in changing cultural life for the better. 
They have meaning in themselves, since we can observe the 
dynamic of their lives and understand how they lived and what 
motivated them. But to understand the values they stand 
for, we must make a special effort of the imagination. With-
out such an imaginative act, the tenor of their meaning 
falls flat, just as we can fail to understand the point of a 
Poem while understanding all of its words. 
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Great men in the ethical realm, then, are metaphors 
which continue to preserve the ideals they established and 
to inspire further ethical development. Meeting them, 
hearing of their deeds, seeing pictures of them, etc., draws 
our feelings, memories, ideas, and commitments into their 
subsidiaries: ethical values and acts. Thus, they have, 
as metaphors, the power to preserve cultural values and 
standards and to inspire creative acts representing higher 
values. 
In sum, then, we can say that an extension of 
Polanyi's notion of symbol into the ethical domain of know-
ledge and action relies on his concept of metaphor. And 
the particular metaphor that is relevant to ethics is that 
of great men whose personalities and accomplishments have 
so impressed a culture that they act to draw us into an 
appreciation of the values their lives embodied. 
But what is the dynamic by which this appreciation 
is developed through participation in the metaphor? For a 
closer look at how the metaphor of great men draws us into 
the life-stream of their value-insights, we may turn to 
the manner in which it affects us. Polanyi says that 
world views are to be judged not by the standards of sci-
ence but by the criteria by which art is judged: as a work 
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h . . . 318 of t e 1mag1nat1on. The metaphor of Great Men is indeed 
a work of the imagination, as we have noted, and must be 
approached as Polanyi would approach and judge a general 
world view (for this is actually what such metaphors repre-
sent!): by criteria pertaining to art. 
This does not mean that Polanyi thinks root meta-
phors of reality (including what I term "ethical metaphors" 
of great men) are simply works of art, as though they bore 
no import for our commitment to seek reality. In the first 
place, we shall see that Polanyi believes that art itself 
does bear on reality in its own way. But, more importantly 
for our purposes, we need not identify ethical metaphors as 
mere art forms. Polanyi says we should judge them by the 
criteria of art, but he does not say that they are art in 
the same sense in which poetry, literature, painting, sculp-
ting, etc., are art. If he did believe this, we could not 
distinguish the domain of art from that of ethics or philo-
sophy. 
By the "criteria" of art I think he means that, since 
ethical metaphors are products of the imagination, we must 
examine the manner in which imagination functions in art to 
318Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 104. 
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judge whether our imaginative i~sights in other domains are 
indeed integrations through imagination or are mere assump-
tions. And, since art gives the best illustration of how 
imaginative integrations, including art's power to integrate 
us into its symbolism, functions, we may turn to art for 
insight concerning how to understand a similar imaginative 
process in ethical metaphors. 
We may, then, lay to rest any idea that art does not 
bear on reality. It does introduce us to imaginative reali-
ties which may or may not open doors to new insights into 
the world of perception and thought. An artistic problem 
is an imaginative anticipation not of unknown facts that 
already exist but of a fact of the imagination that could 
exist. 319 The artist is not necessarily interested, then, 
in "realistic representation". He is not after realism in 
this sense but rather he seeks an artistic reality. 320 This 
artistic reality requires an act of the imagination; and 
such an act may lead one into a world quite different from 
the one he lives in--yet still a world to be judged as such 
on the merits of its own power to draw us into it. 
The difference between acts of imagination 1n meta-
phor and those in science or the other domains we have 
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already discussed is that others may reap the benefit of 
original work in science (and other fields of thought) with-
out repeating the imaginative effort of the scientist. But 
a work of art is independent of its author and draws us into 
itself demanding that we re-create the vision of its 
author. 321 
Ethical metaphors, then, are realities despite the 
fact that they are imaginative productions. They draw us 
into a world of value that could not be seen until, by a 
unique combination of self-surrender and imaginative inter-
play we are shaped by their power to inform us. This act 
of imagination is different from that of the ethical thinker 
who, after a long period of study, achieves creative insights 
and discoveries concerning ethical realities. Such work is 
more like that of science than art. But this is not the full 
scope of ethics. Ethical metaphors are more like art than 
science in that they require us to perform the same act of 
imagination that the great man performed in order to achieve 
and benefit by his insight. As an ethical thinker, one may 
build upon another's thoughts and advance ethical thinking. 
But one cannot build upon the insights of a great man until 
one has surrendered to his metaphor: and this requires re-
enacting the imaginative act that produced the metaphor. 
321Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 84-5. 
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Concerning the basic dynamic of artistic symbolism, 
Polanyi says, 
First the artist produces from his own diffuse exist-
ence a shape circumscribed in a brief space and a 
short time--a shape wholly incommensurable with the 
substance of its origins. Then we respond to this 
shape by surrendering our own diffuse memories of 
moving events a gift of purely resonant feelings. 
The total experience is of a wholly novel entity, an 
i~agin~z~ve integration of incompatibles on all 
s1des. 
Important for understanding the relation of an ethical meta-
phor to society, however, is Polanyi's claim that symbolic 
integrations of art, poetry, myth, etc., do not enter our 
lives in a practical way. They do not "work" in the prac-
tical sphere. They have to be re-enacted through imagination 
with each encounter and are not made functional in society. 323 
Thus, the metaphor of a great man does not itself lay down 
rules about how to achieve the Good. Such metaphors are 
ideals, outside the realm of practical ethical life. They 
may draw us into a world of inspiration and give us insights 
never before attained. But they themselves do not enter into 
our everyday world and demand reform. We must apply the in-
spiration of the metaphor to our practical efforts and in-
sights before any change can occur. And this practical acti-
vity is clearly different from a pure indwelling within the 
The 
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metaphor. Only when the meanings yielded 1vi thin the metaphor 
have become, with much human effort, eventually integrated 
into the communal vision of value and the Good and have been 
employed to inspire change do they effect cultural develop-
ment. And, at this stage, they are no longer metaphors but 
are communal, indwelt forces of change. They no longer 
require an imaginative effort to be comprehended, but require 
only a commitment to submissive and creative participation. 
Art, then, affects life by crying out against the 
meaninglessness of culture and thereby proving its own capa-
city to transcend culture by imaginatively projecting new 
visions of meaning. 324 Art affects the lived quality of our 
. 
325 d ff d d f l"f . d ex1stence, an we e ect new stan ar s o 1 e 1n or er to 
integrate these qualities into our lives. As art, these 
visions of meaning are separate from our lives. And, as 
integrated into life, these meanings are no longer,art~ This 
i 
"de-artization" of a symbol is comparable to its destruc-
tive analysis which, as we remember, has the benefit of 
breaking down the elements of an insight, a technique, etc., 
into "palatable" particles capable of reintegration in new 
forms. And so ethical metaphors may be broken down by de-
structive analysis (whereby they cease to be metaphors) to 
The 
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yield insights and standards which the community may employ 
for development. 
We have already seen in previous sections how in 
epistemology, ontology, and ethics insights are projected 
as universal standards to which all must submit. Polanyi 
claims the same universality for art. He claims art is 
both intensely personal and detached in that the finished 
product bears inseparably the personality of the author and 
yet has a life of its own. Thus, art constitutes a personal 
claim to a universal standard of truth and reality in the 
same sense in which science and other intellectual endeavors 
claim universal standards. 326 And that is why Polanyi says 
that art has no tests external to art. 327 Art may interact 
with tradition and the public's present inclinations as well 
as the author's judgments. But an artist submits these to 
being universal standards which may be contested by other 
artists--for they are not infallible for being art! 
The ethical metaphor,· as an imaginative work similar 
to the symbols of art, must be judged by the universal 
standards of meaning in the ethical domain which they give 
326Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 102. 
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to the culture. Only those who can be drawn, by an act of 
the imagination, into such a metaphor can judge whether it 
truly introduces one to a world of ethical possibility. 
Such a judgment must be distinguished from that concerning 
whether communal insights into value or the Good are fruit-
ful fo~ bringing the Good into concrete reality through 
standards of ethical action. The first judgment is more 
like an artistic judgment; the second judgment is more like 
a scientific discovery. Both judgments function in the 
ethical domain of knowledge and action. 
Returning to Prosch's claim that morality derives 
its power to carry us away through the same sort of trans-
natural symbolic integration that operates in art and reli-
gion, we clearly can agree with him to a certain extent. 
Further, he is correct in pointing out that a refusal to 
participate in the ethical symbol reduces it to merely an 
b . . h f . 328 o servat1on Wlt no power o commltment. But the mistake 
Prosch is making here is that he identifies Polanyi's en-
tire notion of value with the ethical symbol. And I have 
tried to show how the ethical domain, though it supports and 
is, to some extent, supported by ethical symbols, is not 
circumscribed by the borders of these symbols. The ethical 
328Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. lOS. 
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domain also includes commitment to values and standards 
that are easily comprehended with no real effort of the imagi-
nation but with a simple intent to submit to the standards 
one has learned within his culture. Prosch's identification 
of ethics with ethical symbolism is not only textually incor-
rect, but it implies ideas, inconsistent with Polanyi's ex~ 
plicit statements. 329 
One important implied inconsistency is Prosch's 
assertion that values are persuasive only because they "carry 
us away". 330 Here he uses the language of symbolism to 
describe the source of authority for ethical values. He im-
plies that commitments are possible only when we are carried 
away by an ethical symbol. But this assertion places too much 
emphasis upon art as the model for knowledge and action. It 
overlooks all Polanyi has said about the role of commitment 
in such non-symbolic endeavors as science, technology, history, 
politics, etc. If commitment is powerless without symbol, 
then it ought to be powerless in science. But Polanyi says 
it plays an important role in science. Therefore, commitment 
329
cf., Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 30; 4Si -Scientific 
Thought and Social Reality, ed. by Fred Schwarz (N.Y.·. N.Y.: 
International Universities Press, Inc., 1974), p. 65; Knowing 
and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited by Marjorie Grene, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 18, 31, ·44. 
330Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. lOS. 
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cannot be dependent upon symbol for its power, although its 
ideal can be manifested by committed application of the symbol. 
Another inconsistency lies in Polanyi's explicit 
denial that ·ethics is grounded in symbol. He says, "Moral 
rules are therefore an instrument of civic power in the hands 
of those who administer moral cultur~, and morality is allied 
to custom and law. Men form a society to the extent to which 
their lives are ordered by the same morality, custom and law, 
which jointly constitute the mores of their society". 
Clearly, if Polanyi's work in Meaning is consistent 
with his earlier thought (and I have argued that it is), 
~ 
then Prosch is wrong to narrow the power of ethics down to 
ethical symbols. They have an important role to play; but, 
as we can see from the quote above, the ethical domain in-
eludes much more than ethical symbol. 
We may conclude with some brief remarks about reli-
gion. Polanyi classifies religion as an imaginative endeavor 
which generates symbol. But the solemnities of religion 
differ from works of art in that they are deliberately un-
original. They employ conventional and traditional forms, 
and they intend to call our existence to a comprehensive and 
lasting framework. 332 Participation in worship is a way of 
332Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), P. 118 •. 
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thanking and trusting God, and ritual is a way of realizing a 
sense of eternity over temporal existence. For Polanyi, 
God is the focal point that fuses by imaginative effort all 
the incompatibles of the practice of religion. Only through 
participation in acts of worship can we see God. 333 
Now Prosch has evidently picked up Polanyi's asser-
tion that only by participation in religious symbol can we 
know God as a clue that the same pertains to ethics: only 
by participation in the ethical symbol can we know the Good. 
But we must observe that the analogy does not hold. In 
Polanyi's view of religion, God is the symbol which gives 
meaning to the subsidiaries of ritual and worship. Thus, 
Polanyi is consistent in saying that we know this symbol only 
by participation in it. He says of all symbols that they 
are known in this way. But ethical symbols, which are also 
known only by participation, are not the whole of ethics. 
This much is plain from the passages referred to above. Thus, 
we do not come to know ethical realities merely by participa-
tion in ethical symbols. 
Finally, we must note that the basic attitude of man, 
whether concerned as moral or religions, is one of holding 
together the incompatible elements of life (fears, pains, 
anguish, etc.) in a permanent tension with the hope that he 
333Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 155-6. 
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can do what he must by a power that is beyond him and yet 
which enables him to live within the limits of his capaci-
ties, his "calling". 334 This hope is an attitude that can 
be symbolized; but it is not a symbol itself. Attitudes 
such as hope, fear, hatred, love, etc., are not in themselves 
symbols as Polanyi understands them. But they are effective 
in defining the kind of response we take up toward the sym-
bols our culture provides us or that we discover. Thus, we 
must not understand attitudes like hope as ethical or reli-
gious symbols, even though they join incompatible elements 
together under a tension. For there is no imaginative 
effort involved in taking up hope, except in response to 
symbols that demand such effort. 
I ccnclude, then, that Polanyi's notion of metaphor 
is an instance of symbol that bears on ethical realities. 
This bearing has to do, however, with giving us visions of 
particular values or the Good which we cannot attain without 
surrendering and submitting to the symbol. It does not have 
to do with the whole of ethics, such as the development and 
learning of moral standards, moral commitment, submission 
to custom and law, and knowledge of moral values, that is 
possible apart from symbol. We may now turn to Polanyi's 
334Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 156. 
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explicit statements on the nature of ethical realities in 
society in an effort to understand how the whole of the 
ethical domain actually functions in society. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION AND TRANSITION 
We have established that all value knowledge bears 
the same structure as knowledge in any domain. We organize 
our vague notions of value into the explicit integrations 
that form our concepts of value. And these concepts are not 
mere mental constructions but are arrived at with the commit-
ment that they touch upon an aspect of reality. We are com-
mitted to our concepts as revealing aspects of reality; 
hence our conceptions of value, Good, and right represent 
commitments in these areas which we have already made at the 
moment we "discover" these conceptions. We indwell our 
value commitments, bringing them to explicit focus when the 
challenges of life require reflection and value-reorienta-
.. 
tion. And we discard those value commitments which prove 
themselves out of touch with the reality we face; i.e., we 
prove such values to be "false". 
We have shown that the body, as the prime medium of 
all knowledge, cannot be disregarded in value-knowledge. The 
body mediates between the subject-object dichotomy, allowing 
for the appearance of a world already shot through with 
values, preferences, and a sense of what is right and Good. 
The body is the prime medium of experience; and our concept-
ions in all domains of thought are explicitations of the tacit 
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knowledge mediated through experience, the contact of the 
body with the world. Hence, explicit value-concepts are 
grounded in a perception of a world in which values are 
always already operating; and the skills and habits of right 
action and of consistently responding appropriately to our 
chosen values indeed essentially involve the body. 
Value-knowledge, then, is an intuitive integration 
of particular value-preferences into a systematic whole 
which bears the marks of a grasp of reality, of the kinds 
of values which we ought to prefer to realize in the world. 
Mediated by the body, value-knowledge grows as we gain 
insight into the nature of the world in which we live and 
into the nature of the Good itself. Each insight integrates 
tacit elements of knowledge that heretofore were non-func-
tional, bringing a new mode of life to the person. And 
each insight acts as the tacit ground for new discoveries. 
Knowledge of values is neither inductive nor de-
ductive, though it may include such inferences. Rather, it 
is constituted by testable intuitions which can be critici-
zed by means of the results we obtain in following them. 
If t~e results lead to a sense of reality, we are justified 
in following their lead; if not, we are not so justified. 
We must see Polanyi as an intuitionist-cognitivist in value 
theory. Further, we must see his position as mediating 
between a rationalist and empiricist position; for we do 
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have an! priori sense of "betterness", but this sense is 
not concrete nor does it give us an insight into particular 
values. The sense of "betterness", of one thing or course 
of action being better than another, is rooted fundamentally 
in our biological existence; but the explicitation of con-
crete, particular values is a process of intellectual dis-
covery. And such discovery can be "right-headed" or mis-
directed, right or wrong. Standing out beyond our compre-
hensions is reality itself, luring us to ever more compre-
hensive integrations of truth in the domain of value-knowledge. 
Value-knowledge, then, can be said to be "true" or 
"false". Like all other forms of knowledge, a tacit know-
ledge of values is a kind of "foreknowledge", a desire to 
make explicit our vague sense of what is better. This move-
ment, lured and conditioned by the reality it seeks, is a 
passion for understanding, a passion for breaking through 
the paradoxes and irresolved difficulties of present con-
ceptualities into new vistas of truth. Thus even in value-
knowledge we folio~ our intimations of reality, seeking the 
marks of truth in our conceptions: fruitfulness, intrin-
sic interest, coherence, accuracy and close definition, and 
systematic relevance within the domain of value-knowledge. 
All of these marks of truth, of the knowledge that 
the values we hold are true in the sense that they reveal 
something of a world of value that remains tacit in our 
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understanding, a tacit world that calls us to the responsible 
explicitation of the concepts it promises us. 
Commitment and movement toward the realization of 
such promise within the domain of value-knowledge is the 
essence of a personal knowledge of values. We find ourselves 
already committed as persons to the explicit concept of a 
v~lue which we have been indwelling personally in the tacit 
dimension of knowledge. 
This does not mean that the values we hold and ex-
plicitly own as our commitments are subjectively chosen in 
the sense that they are arbitrary and unjustified. Personal 
knowledge of values is responsible knowledge. Like all 
other domains of knowledge, it both proposes and obeys the 
standards of corrictness that are suggested within the domain 
itself and which are properly relevant to it. Our assertions 
of value-knowledge are essentially the obedience of personal 
commitment to universal standards that grow out of prior, 
tacit commitments. Our explicit values are, thus, always 
concepts which integrate personal commitment with impersonal 
standards; and in this sense they are said to be responsible 
commitments. Explicit commitment to a value is at the same 
time submission to the universal value standards implied and 
proposed as part of the commitment. And this submission 
involves an expectation that others should also submit to the 
authority of such values; for we submit to what we believe 
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are universal value standards. A responsible judgment on 
what is a proper value is personal knowledge in that it in-
volves both the tacit and explicit poles of knowledge. 
We begin, then, by ordering our preferences in the 
attempt to satisfy our most fundamental biological needs; 
and this effort represents a tacit foreknowledge of values 
that we will come to acknowledge as such in the process of 
value-explicitation. Thus, the need to evaluate and order 
values is a need to know them, to achieve intellectual 
insight into them. And each attempt at re-evaluation and 
reordering is satisfied only when new levels of understanding 
are reached--levels which themselves, firmly indwelt, become 
the tacit ground for higher integrations of more profound 
values. The ultimate reality of which our process of value-
explicitation allows us an ever more comprehensive grasp, 
as judged by the marks of truth that attend any knowledge-
claim, is the Good. Thus, we attend to the Good and engage 
in the process of bringing it to clarity through our personal 
commitment to its explicitation in knowledge and its integra-
tion in action. 
We achieve our notions of the Good and of value, 
then, by arriving at comprehensive visions that are grounded 
in and bring integrated unity to our various tacit comprehen-
' 
sions of it. The Good finds continued and unexpected 
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confirmations as we proceed to explicate it rightly accord-
ing to the calling to responsible judgment by which the 
reality of the Good itself attracts us. 
Our explicitation of the Good proceeds both from a 
recognition of the Good as a whole toward an identification 
of the tacit particulars or values which compose it and 
from a knowledge of such particular values toward a compre-
hension of the whole they compose. We "interiorize" par-
ticulars in order to integrate them into a comprehensive 
whole; and we employ a "destructive analysis" of the whole 
which we comprehend and indwell in order to grasp new values 
which have integrated themselves within our grasp of the 
whole. 
The explicitation of the Good depends upon the alter-
nate use of both of these methods. However, the explicita-
tion of a particular value is generally the result of de-
structive analysis, while the explicitation of a comprehen-
sive whole that reflects the Good is achieved through the 
integrative interiorization of particular values. In either 
case, explicitation is not a matter of logical deduction 
or empirical "addition". It is fundamentally a matter of 
intellectual insight. 
Heplful in explicitating the Good is a formalization 
of this insight. Polanyi does not believe that any domain 
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of knowledge can be fully formalized. The key tenet of tacit 
knowledge is that we always know more than we can tell. Thus, 
knowledge as such, in any domain, cannot be identified with 
the system which formalizes it. And this must be true also 
of the ethical sphere of knowledge. If we attempted such a 
formalization in this domain, the same problems that attend 
such attempts in other fields would attend it: systematic 
errors, misapplication of facts and procedures, the inherent 
impossibility of fully formalized knowledge. Our perspective 
of the Good must, rather, be guided by our personal commit-
ments which are no less unjustified for being unformalizable. 
The dual procedure of explicating the Good and dis-
covering higher values is also a procedure of correcting 
false values. We can isolate them through destructive 
analysis, correct what is wrong in them, commit ourselves to 
the restructured values, and re-integrate them into a renewed, 
comprehensive grasp of the Good as a whole. Values themselves 
are an integration of both tacit and explicit components of 
the value commitment; this is what Polanyi means by a per-
sonal knowledge of values. Thus, no theoretical, explicit 
structure or system can be identified with the process of 
discovering and holding values. Such an identification mis-
takes a sociology of values with a comprehension of the dy-
namic of value-knowledge. 
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personal knowledge of values involves, then, what Polanyi 
calls "indwelling". Indwelling is that deep form of com-
mitment in which we spill ourselves into subsidiary elements 
and arrive at discoveries in the value realm completely 
committed to them. We indwell ethical realities, discover-
ing explicitly those to which we have already become com-
mitted. Such indwelling represents the truth of the exis-
tential dictum that "existence precedes essence." For the 
"spilling over" of indwelling, indeed the ,very act of in-
dwelling itself, is the "thrusting forward" of our existence 
in the sense.in which most existentialists understand it. 
Further, such indwelling is quite different from a distanced 
contemplation and rational control of a concept; that music, 
art, poetry, etc., emphasize such indwelling is adequate 
evidence of this. But this does not mean that we cannot 
indwell intellectual concepts so as to rely on them tacitly 
in order to focus on new discoveries; for the enterprise of 
science attests to this capacity. 
The point is that we do indeed indwell ethical 
realities; but we neither make our values subservient to 
explicit choices (as do the existentialists) nor do we first 
discover values and then commit ourselves to them. We in-
dwell them, discover explicitly what is tacit in our indwell 
ing, and find ourselves committed explicitly to what 
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previously was only tacitly valued. 
Value-knowledge is not discovered in isolation from 
others. Like all knowledge, value-knowledge is convivial. 
Polanyi is not a solipsist; tacit knowledge functions to give 
us an awareness of the person through our indwelling the 
meaning of his acts. All communication depends upon the 
communal sharing of social meanings that arise out of such 
indwelling; thus, all values arise out of such sharing and 
are essentially interpersonal. Our values and standards of 
the Good are not simply ours, but are discovered in the con-
text of tacitly indwelt social meanings that are an inherent 
part of our personal reality. And this involves specific 
acts of trust and obedience to authority, all of which con-
stitute particular social structures. We are all inter-
personally reliant upon such structures in that we indwell 
them as a community of persons and develop our values in the 
communal context of human 1 meaning. Our values transcend 
our own particular ability to integrate and comprehend them; 
we rely on communal meanings. This does not mean, however, 
that we cannot oppose particular social values; we have the 
power to isolate them by destructive analysis and to con-
sider them critically, restructuring and re-integrating them 
into social life through the common forms of social change. 
We are then both comrnitted·to the tradition of communal 
meaning and capable of opposing it without destroying it 
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through radical action. We must submit to the tradition in 
order to learn the social meanings essential to moral develop-
ment; but we oppose its falsehoods as we discover them. We 
learn through indwelling the tradition not only what it is 
but what it ought to be. Nonetheless, we are not justified 
in claiming that our notion of the Good is the only correct 
one; even in our conviction of being right in opposition to 
social concepts, we must acknowledge room for growth and 
correction. We must learn the tradition from persons who 
indwell it and are connisseurs of it; and we must intend to 
become connoisseurs ourselves, connoisseurs who can be opposed 
and corrected. 
Value-discovery, then, is a response to our convi-
vial obligations and draws us beyond ourselves into a reality 
of Good to which we find ourselves already committed and 
which we hold as universal truth. We "break out" of old 
thought and behavior patterns by transcending old knowledge-
structures in our movemen~ toward new vision of the Good. 
The questing power of the mind wedded to imagination taps 
into the potential of discovery inherent within the reality 
of the Good, releasing and controlling the path of discovery 
through heuristic visions. Knowledge of value and of the 
Good is not a mechanical process of discovery but is a 
uniquely human event. Discovery requires a human grasp of 
a problem, a paradox in value-theory, and involves effort 
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and free exploration. Only when we go beyond mechanical 
rules of procedure do we "break out", risking defeat and 
hoping for accomplishment. 
The marks of a true value-discovery are the same as 
for any truth; they show a sufficient degree of plausibility 
in resolving present difficulties, are accurate comprehen-
sions of the tradition in terms of our present conceptuali-
ties, are systematically important and intrinsically interest-
ing. Further, we follow "hunches" en route to their discov-
ery, we have "anticipatory intuitions" of them. We know in 
advance what would "count" as a proper ascription of value, 
and we find an intrinsic promise of a deeper access to ethi-
cal realities through an indwelling of our discovery as a 
"final" resolution. 
The process of value-discovery is a passage from 
more tangible realities to less tangible ones. But being 
less tangible does not mean that a higher insight into the 
nature of the Good is less real. For Polanyi, a concept is 
"real" to the extent that it gives us access to a deeper 
comprehension of reality. The less tangible a concept is, 
the more comprehensive it is and the wider a range of indefi-
nite future confirming manifestations it presents us. Thus, 
the less tangible a value-discovery is, the more "real" it 
is; such discoveries approach the reality of "wholes" or 
"universals". 
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Universal values are not simply aggregates of par-
ticular, elementary values. They are integrations of these 
into novel, complex, wide-ranging insights into the Good. We 
rely on knowledge of particular values in order to achieve 
such integrations and are subsidiarily aware of them in the 
more comprehensive insight. We acknowledge them as parts 
which ontologically sustain and contribute to the reality of 
the Good as the highest universal. It is the universal 
itself which attracts our focus in the search for meaning and 
knowledge of the Good, which releases and controls our pro-
cess of achieving higher insight. Thus, universals are not 
mere mental constructs but have in themselves a power to 
. 
draw our focus and crystallize our insight into higher value 
and the Good. Our highest vision of the Good is that stan-
dard to which we ourselves submit and which we choose to 
indwell as our highest access to the Good. 
The concept of values and of the Good does not con-
stitute the whole of the ethical domain. The ordering of 
goals constituted by our insight into values implies an 
ordering of the human activity which is committed to realiz-
ing them. For knowing a value is itself a commitment to it; 
a commitment to realize it. If our values are true, then 
the effort to realize them involves actions which are in 
accord with the nature of the Good in so far as we under-
stand it. Such actions are right actions; and those actions 
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which fail to be guided by such insights are wrong accions. 
Communal value standards imply communal norms of 
action to which we submit as we participate in developing 
these standards. Our behavior is always guided and disci-
plined by the authority of communal norms of action, which 
are ordered toward their own stable preservation. These 
norms of action are the origin of communal obligations, of 
our sense of "ought". We find ourselves obligated to act 
rightly, to act in accordance with communal norms. When we 
act rightly, we act justly; and we have a right to pursue 
the Good according to communal norms. 
A personal knowledge of the Good, then, implies a 
personal knowledge of right and wrong. For we have a per-
sonal knowledge of the communal standards of action that 
are implied in our system of values. 
Our development of ethical norms requires and is more 
than a change of behavior. Just as all knowledge is con-
stituted by a dynamic of tacit reliance and explicit focus, 
so all changes rely upon simple, particular states of being 
in order to develop more complex and highly integrated ones. 
Since all knowing is a form of change, discovery of values 
and new insights into the Good are changes of human modes 
of being. They are ontological developments which share 
the dynamic of tacit knowing in the structure of reliance 
and focus. 
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Ontological change is not mechanical and determined 
The movement from a lower system of values to a higher, more 
complex and integrated one which issues in new standards of 
action is a free movement. This does not mean that the 
movement from a lower level of moral functioning to a higher 
is not deliberate. But it does mean that such achievements 
are motivated by uniquely personal intimations of the Good 
and follow an indeterminant course. We are able to decide 
whether to fulfill self-set standards; we are not determined 
by theffi. Thus, in the process of free decision, we act out 
and continually resolve a tension between universal stan-
dards (the determinate pole of cHoice) and personal commit-
ment (the indeterminate pole of choice). We are onto-
logically free to choose our actions; and this indeterminacy 
and creativity are logical implications of tacit knowing 
(since the unspecifiability of tacit clues make determinism 
permanently unjustified). The moral life, then, is free, 
creative, and emergent. We are responsible for our decision 
and are called to take responsibility for our freedom within 
the context of communal life. Freedom and responsibility 
are given together, we must deal with an ordered society 
within which we order our own actions in pursuit of the 
Good. 
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The dynamic of moral growth follows the same pattern 
of integration and development as applied to all forms of 
ontological change from lower levels to higher ones. Higher 
insights into value are epistemologically dependent upon 
lower ones; and higher standards and norms in pursuing the 
Good are ontologically dependent upon lower ones. The higher 
levels impose on those below it the "boundaries" of their 
functioning, such that they serve the higher in sustaining 
its pote-ntials. Higher standards of action are not, however, 
reducible to the aggregate norms and values of lower stan-
dards. Rather, we indwell or "embody" these lower standards 
giving them whqt justification they have in view of a higher 
indwelling of these higher standards and forms of action 
which harness the dynamic of the lower. And we may seek con-
stantly to achieve higher levels of moral functioning, if we 
follow the ontological impetus toward the higher that is in-
herent within the structure defined by "reliance" toward 
"focus". We move ever upward in our ability to make respon-
sible, effective choices in pursuit of the Good. 
This development toward higher levels of moral func-
tioning is not merely a personal achievement. It is carried 
on within the communal context and is ultimately a co~~unal 
achievement. Indeed, we have an obligation to sustain and 
forward society's values. Moral acts are themselves forms 
of our total aorganismic participation in the moral life 
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of the community. They are guided by insights into right 
action, insights which allow submission to the communal moral 
Good. 
Right action, then, embodies both the moral and the 
non-moral forms of human action according to the ordering 
principle of the pursuit of the Good which is inherent within 
it. The esta:)lishment of a standard of right relies upon our 
commitment to right action and justice as ordering principles 
within the community. The Right embodies itself in such acts. 
Human action itself forms a hierarchy of levels of human 
reality, each level realizing a higher form of moral and com-
munal life. 
Since moral life develops through submission to stan-
dards which we learn within the community and project uni-
versally, we must view it as obeying and being guided by rules 
of action. Moral standards are the operational principles 
of moral life as it moves toward the potential of realizing 
the Good. These standards comprise the rules of action within 
the community and tend to establish a stable pattern of ethi-
cal life which we are obliged to respect. But respecting 
these standards does not mean obeying them unquestioningly. 
We are free not only to explore alternative ways of pursuing 
the Good which may enhance the moral life of the entire com 
munity, but we may also abrogate our responsibility and fol-
low our own self-oriented desires in a manner destructive of 
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communal-and-personal-development. 
We develop moral life by finding alternate ways to 
achieve this Good when our normal ways are closed off, by 
discovering novel rules of rightness, and by a normal matura-
tion of our present moral life. Also, we may be "carried 
away" by moral symbols into new dimensions of moral life far 
beyond our grasp without the aid of the symbol. 
For the most part, however, moral life develops in a 
natural way. A continually developing insight into right is 
the ordering principle of moral life. It releases and sus-
tains the potential for right action and establishes work-
able systems of morality. Our highest, most well integrated 
standards become the centralized principles of our ethical 
life, regulating our behavior in a general way. But they 
leave room for an exploration of "equipotential" methods of 
responding to specific situations, just as biological orga-
nisms are successful in life by adjusting to specific situ-
ations while meeting the life requirements of the organism 
as a whole. Our moral principles develop toward stability 
and permanence as long as they are effective in meeting the 
requirements of moral, human life as a whole; but, toward 
the end of adaptation for the better, they remain flexible, 
changeable, and open to new discoveries, new insights into 
right. 
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Noral life is the life of the person as a whole. 
And moral freedom involves the ability to either grow or de-
volve. Moral evolution occurs only under obedience to or 
proper restructuring of moral standards consistently pur-
sued; moral devolution occurs when one deliberately performs 
wrong actions. We learn rules of rightness from the tradi-
tion, from connoisseurs of the moral tradition. And we change 
it for the better by achieving connoisseur status ourselves 
and establishing new rules of rightness which benefit the com-
mon Good. We can commit errors or refuse to benefit the 
common Good. But our moral health depends upon positive 
development of the moral life. And this development esta-
blishes a hierarchy of values and standards of action in 
which each level supports and sustains the one above it and 
is controlled by the higher level. 
We, then, have the power to change communal life for 
the better. We can even achieve a status of greatness where-
by we can function with high effectiveness--perhaps even as 
a symbol--to effect social change. Thus: we can transcend 
our moral culture toward higher ideals, toward the "ultra-
biology" of moral change. 
Moral life, then, moves ultimately toward a communal 
realization of the Good through a self-regulating movement 
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toward the consolidation of a unified and unifying moral 
development of persons. Such change depends, however, upon 
human decision. And even entire societies may follow a com-
munal intimation of hidden moral realities. Borrowing from 
Teilhard de Chardin, Polanyi calls such communal realiza-
tions the development of the "noosphere", the sphere of life 
most uniquely human, moral, and spiritual. 
We may, then, summarize my contributions to Polanyi 
studies thus far by pointing to four specific contributions: 
1) I have drawn from a wide number of resources to present 
an integrated description of Polanyi's epistemology and 
ontology; 2) I have located the parallel between his epis-
temology and his ontology and have lifted out from them a 
basic structure to ethical experience and have shown that 
ethical theory is possible in terms of personal knowledg~; 
4) I have extended the ethical domain of knowledge (and 
action) beyond the purely symbolic knowledge with which 
Harry Prosch wishes to identify it and have shown that ethi-
cal knowledge is fundamentally personal knowledge,. sharing 
all of the elements and the dynamic of personal knowledge. 
We may now proceed to the confirmation and "fleshing out" 
of these contributions in Part II. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
AN OUTLINE OF WHAT WE MUST EXPECT TO FIND 
IN POLANYI'S SOCIAL THOUGHT, BASED UPON 
WHAT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED THUS FAR 
We have established that the structure of tacit know-
ing pertains to a knowledge of values and of the Good. And 
we have further established that the ontological parallel 
to tacit knowing, the ontological structure of evolution 
through a reliance upon particular elements to integrate novel 
wholes, pertains to the moral development of the person 
according to "rules of rightness". And the general structure 
of the process of valuation and right action should now be 
clear. 
But, despite the clarity of ethical import which 
Polanyi's epistemology and ontology evidences, we can still 
go much further in developing his notion of the ethical 
domain. Having explicitated the structure of an ethical 
domain from his epistemology and ontology, we can now search 
his social and political writings for confirmation of this 
structure. If we find this structure confirmed in these 
. 
writings, we can be much more certain that the ethical struc-
ture we have explicitated was indeed tacitly implied in 
Polanyi's epistemology and ontology and was not a mere 
isogesis of the texts. For, although it is possible to 
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slant the evidence in order to make these texts appear to 
be at least favorable to the development of ethical theory, 
such self-deception becomes virtually impossible when the 
ethical interpretation can be tested. 
Polanyi has not left us without an adequate test of 
such an interpretation. First, although he never attempts 
to develop ethical theory as such, he does often refer to 
concepts which are valid only under the supposition of an 
ethical domain of knowledge and action: eg., the common 
Good, freedom, moral culture, moral ideals, "right" and 
"wrong" types of societies .. Such references, though not 
comprising a systematic ethic~, are useful in testing the 
fundamental structure already explicitated. If what Polanyi 
says in such references either is a direct implication of 
our explicitation or at least is consistent with it in a 
confirming sense, then the explicitation is probably cor-
rect. Thus, a good test of the reliability of our explici-
tation is to draw the most reasonable expectations concern-
ing w·ha t Polanyi might explicitly say about moral life on 
the basis of his tacit understanding of the ethical domain. 
We can then compare our expectations with an account of 
what he actually does say, as clearly and systematically as 
this can be elucidated. If the two match, then Polanyi's 
explicit moral concepts are consistent with his tacit under-
standing as comprehended in our explicitation. And this 
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"consistency" will also bear the marks of deep rootedness in 
the more systematic tacit structure of the moral dynamic 
implied in his epistemology and ontology. 
We should be surprised if, after demonstrating tow 
knowing and doing are inextricably linked, we did not find 
the enterprise of science determined not only by the epis-
temological dynamic of tacit knowledge but also by rules of 
research and investigation which transcend mere epistemo-
logical requirements. Science is a social procedure for 
establishing facts about the natural world. It is in the 
unique position as a cultural institution of organizing the 
social responsibilities of scientists to pursue the truth for 
its own sake. 
We should expect, then, that science will function 
under rules which ensure the proper and effective pursuit of 
this goal. And these rules are actually a "mini-model" of 
an ethic, since they involve social rules aimed at achieving 
a specifically defined communal Good. Thus, the institution 
of science itself should evidence an "ethic of discovery" 
which organizes the enterprise as a whole. 
We should find truth itself as an ultimate value in 
this ethic of discovery, a value realized as a moral value. 
For inherent in the enterprise of science is the conviction 
thatwe ought to discover truth; and, since the failure to 
do so can come through deliberate (self)-deception, fraud, 
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and generally inappropriate methodology as well as by honest 
error, the ensurance of right procedure demands rules which 
structure behavior in many ways other than those which 
specifically govern research. The pursuance of truth, then, 
demands an ethic of discovery. And we should expect Polanyi 
to insist on all the social elements which ensure the dis-
covery of truth: free exploration, autonomy, conviction 
and conscience. 
We should, then, be able to find within the communal 
enterprise of science an ethic which cannot be denied essen-
tially as pertaining to communal concerns in general. That 
is, we should find it strange that the scientific enterprise 
would stress· free thought and exploration, the pursuit of 
truth, and responsible research while finding these denied 
in other communal concerns. Since we have established that 
the ethical dimension involves knowledge of ethical realities, 
then there are moral truths. And we should expect Polanyi 
to suggest at least the possibility of such knowledge in the 
moral domain. Indeed, the same dynamic of knowledge and 
action which establish intellectual standards of truth in 
general should be recognized as effective in the moral domain. 
If our argument that knowledge should be expanded to 
include moral knowledge leads us to expect to find evidences 
of such assertions in Polanyi's political anJ social writings, 
then the argument that the ontological dynamic of biological 
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development should be expanded to a higher development of 
man into moral and spiritual dimensions should lead us to 
expect that Polanyi would refer to moral rules within the 
social context. Just as intellectual visions in other do-
mains establish the "rules of rightness" for pursuing truth 
and accomplishing purposes within them, so we should expect 
to find moral ideas functioning in society as rules of right-
ness. And we should expect to find conscience playing a 
prominent role in the communal moral consciousness, given 
the intuitionism of Polanyi's ethical epistemology. 
The epistemological concept of "indwelling", and 
its ontological counterpart in the concept of "boundary 
conditions", should show up as playing an important role in 
the proper functioning of a communal ethic. We should find 
Polanyi referring to an indwelling of moral teachings and 
ideals; and, because of his insight into the nature o~ 
symbols, we should expect to find the assertion that "moral 
heroes" act as symbols that "carry us away" into new dimen-
sions of the personal knowledge of moral realities quite 
consistent with his theory of personal knowledge as a whole. 
We should discover that morality, like any domain of human 
knowledge and action, is motivated by passions similar to 
those for truth; and these passions drive us to an ever 
deeper indwelling of moral realities. 
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We should be very surprised to find any statements 
in Polanyi's social or political writings which support a 
deterministic position. For he specifically repudiates 
determinism in his philosophy of science. Freedom is at the 
root of his thought, as already evidenced in his epistemo-
logy and ontology. Hence, freedom should be the cornerstone 
of his social-political theories and, consequently, of his 
moral theory. For it would seem even more absurd to find 
arguments for political and social freedom while discovering 
assertions of determinism in the moral realm. We should ex-
pect Polanyi to emphasize both the power to choose and the 
liberty to choose. 
This freedom, evident in the discovery of truth and 
preserved within the enterprise of science, will be given 
maximum interplay in the ordering of society toward the 
particular goods of each theater of human endeavor. Yet it 
will be disciplined by that ordering in a way which permits 
that good (and the communal Good) to be maximally realized. 
We should find some suggestion of a theory concerning how 
the tension between freedom and control is resolved both in 
the pursuit of discovery in the sciences and in the common 
pursuits of society. Without such a theory, we would find 
only a very sketchy and incomplete notion of the moral dimen-
sion. 
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It is clear that Polanyi cannot allow our freedom of 
choice to develop into anarchical social freedom. And, in 
order to clarify why he cannot do this, we must discover 
both what he conceives to be a free society and what he con-
siders to be an "unfree" society. We can expect only "free" 
societies to be "moral" ones; and unfree societies cannot be 
moral. We should look for a thorough moral critique of 
non-free societies such as the Nazi regime and Marxism, as 
well as of societies which claim to be free but which do not 
obey the rules necessary to preserve both freedom and the pur-
suit of the Good. Without a critique of what does not count 
as a free (and moral) society paired with a description of 
what does count as one, we could confirm little of what we 
have argued concerning Polanyi's ethic. 
We find, then, that, in order t0 confirm much of what 
we have argued concerning the structure and dynamic of a 
Polanyian ethic, we must turn to his social and political 
writings in search of scattered statements regarding moral 
life. For these alone can demonstrate (in so far as this 
is possible) not only that Polanyi puts his tacit ethical 
dynamic to work in these writings but also reveal a good 
deal of how that dynamic effects the functioning of society. 
CHAPTER NINE 
THE SCIENTIFIC ENTERPRISE AS A MODEL 
FOR MORAL COiviMUNITY 
In this chapter I return to Polanyi's notion of the 
nature of the scientific enterprise in order to lift out 
the social dynamic of the search for truth (rather than the 
epistemological dynamic, which was dealt with earlier). My 
purpose in doing this is to demonstrate that science, con-
sidered as a human activity, involves essentially a moral 
strategy for achieving its purposes. Thus, science, replete 
with its commitment to truth, is a moral activity; and it 
binds scientists together as a moral community.. Commitment 
to truth, freedom of exploration, mutual control and poly-
centric interests, free competition for publication, etc., 
are all social and moral activities which make the achieve-
ment of truth possible. And, if truth is possible only under 
such conditions, then the development of moral truth itself 
can occur only under similar social structures. Hence, the 
republic of science is a model for the moral community. Its 
essential structure is the fundamental structure of all 
truth-finding, which is the root of all moral development 
(since without moral truth there can be no moral life). 
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I present evidence in this chapter that Polanyi 
intends to see his concept of personal knowledge extended to 
other domains of thought such as art and history. Thus, if 
the ethical domain is a legitimate field of thought, as I 
have argued that it is, then ethics itself must pursue ethi-
cal truths through the same truth-facilitating procedures 
which account for the success of science. And this means 
that a certain ethical structure must correspond to such an 
enterprise: the republic of science. The moral field of 
action requires a knowledge of moral truth which, in turn, 
depends upon a moral structure which permits truth to be 
discDvered. Thus, moral decisions will be made in the con-
text of a moral structure which allows its own self-revela-
tion. 
From this point, the "confirmation" slides into a 
description of how moral organization functions in society. 
And the description matches what we might have expected to 
be the case judging from the ethical theory I develop from 
Polanyi's epistemology and ontology. The chapter ends with 
a description of the communal movement toward the Good as 
a moral achievement. This chapter will demonstrate that the 
expectations outlined in the previous chapter are fulfilled 
by a close analysis of Polanyi's social and political thought; 
there is indeed an ethical substructure which functions 
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tacitly in Polanyi's thought. We shall, however, devote 
the last two chapters to Polanyi's concept of the free society 
(and the preversions of freedom). 
1. The·Moral Autonomy of Science 
Science, as a human enterprise, provides a "mini-
model" of an ethical soceity. Much of what we should expect 
concerning what Polanyi would say about the nature of morality 
may be found in his concept of the structure and functioning 
of the sciences. Thus, we may begin our investigation of 
Polanyi's explicit concepts of the moral domain by noting 
how they come to the fore in the scientific enterprise. 
Polanyi explicitly declares that morality plays a 
significant role in the very foundations of science: 
The third party in the scientist's mind which trans-
cends both his creative impulses and his critical 
caution, is his scientific conscience. We recognize 
the note struck by conscience in the tone of per-
sonal responsibility in which the scientists de-
clares his ultimate claims. This indicates the 
presence of a moral element in the foundations of 
science ... 335 
This statement indicates clearly two important 
features of a moral dynamic: conscience (responsibility) and 
the freedom which this implies. The scientist has the 
responsibility to make true ultimate claims, or at least 
claims that are true in so far as he understands them. This 
335M· h 1 P 1 . S . 
. ~c ae o any~, c~ence, Faith, and Society (Chicago: ·The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 41. 
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responsibility is prompted by coliscience and is explicitly 
moral. A scientist would be wrong not to meet the standards 
of procedure and concern for truth that is inherent within 
the scientific enterprise. In so far as he achieves the 
communal aim of scientific truth in accord with the proceed-
ings prompted by conscience, the scientist dwells within the 
moral framework of science. 
The scientific enterprise, then, is deeply formed by 
moral considerations that flow directly out of the concern 
to guarantee the discovery of truth. The scientific com-
munity is a moral association of persons acting on the basis 
of a common belief. 336 That is, the scientist has a respon-
sibility to speak to the common understanding of scientific 
truth, not only in the sense of the knowledge we have of par-
ticular truths but also in the sense of what generally counts 
as truth. 
Polanyi sums up the moral structure of science in 
Science, Faith, and Society (pp. 55-6) as an emotional and 
moral surrender to truth. This surrender unfolds according 
to the following phases: 
1) Love of science and faith in its significance. 
2) Inspiration by and acceptance of past scientific 
heroes . 
.) 36Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chciago Press~ 1975), p. 169. 
245 
3) Striving to satisfy a feeling for reality by lis-
tening to scientific conscience 
4) Fostering new original efforts and administering 
scientific culture. 
5) Fellowship in a community of conscience rooted in 
the same ideals recognized by all. 
The scientist is defined as such by his love of the adventure 
of discovery; and his commitment to the significance of 
science is essentially a moral one because it is a commit-
ment to discover and be guided by truth. Thus, he relies upon 
the body of truth and propriety of procedure already firmly 
established in the scientific community. He is inspired by 
them and indwells them on his own odyssey. This indwelling 
forms a tacit understanding of what counts as true and worth 
researching, thus forming his scientific conscience. It is 
the lens through which he views and attempts to discover the 
truths concerning the natural world. And the fruits of his 
research constitute a new body of truth which provides new 
guidelines for discovering further truths. Guided by scien-
tific culture, he assists in its administration. And, thus, 
he lives in, responds to, and participates in forming a fel-
lowship in a community of conscience which guides the scien-
tific enterprise. 
We must define the scientific enterprise as a search 
for truth in relation to the natural world. The moral com-
mitment to the discovery of scientific truth, as outlined 
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above, must be distinguished from the practical concerns of 
science. Science pursues knowledge simply for the sake 
of knowing and is not determined by practical, social 
needs. 337 Hence, Polanyi does not include the mas~ive mili-
tary-industrial concern to invent and produce a constantly 
renewed technology as essential to his definition of science: 
"We must reassert that the essence of science is the love of 
knowledge and that the utility of knowledge does not concern 
. "1 " 338 us pr1.mar1. y . Indeed, practical discoveries are more the 
result of pure, theoretical research than the aim of them. 339 
This does not mean, of course, that science cannot be 
responsive to social needs; it only means that it cannot be 
subservient to them and that it must be developed on its own 
f . 340 terms or 1.ts own purposes. The independence of the search 
.. 
for truth represents a higher principle than that of the 
market. 341 
The 
337Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty 
University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 4. 
338 Ib"d 6 1 • ' p. . 
(Chicago: 
339Michael Polanyi, History, Philosophy, and the 
Sociology of Science: the Contempt of Freedom (N.Y., N.Y.: 
Arno Press, 1975), p. 19. 
340Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its 
Political and Economic Theor-y~(~c=h-l.~.c~a--g_o_:--~R~o-o_s_e_v __ e~l-t~U~n~i~v-e--rsity, 
1962), p. 18 .. 
341Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its 
Political and Economic Theor~y~(~C~h-l.~.c~a--g_o_:--rR~o-o_s_e_v __ e~l~t~U~n~i~v-e--rsity, 
1962), 25. 
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Polanyi, then, distinguishes between pure, theoretical 
science and technological invention. The former constitutes 
the moral association of persons engaged in the process of 
discovery, aild the latter constitutes the application of dis-
covery. The moral value pursued in science, considered as a 
morally disciplined enterprise, is truth. Thus, truth is a 
moral value realized within the moral guidance of the com-
munity of persons committed to it. 
The commitment to truth in science functions as a 
moral absolute. It makes science morally aut8nomous in that 
no truth can be accepted or discarded on any grounds other 
than those which respect truth absolutely. Polanyi believes 
that the enterprise of science is grounded in our trust that 
society is in theory seeking truth and is willing to acknow-
ledge the significance of discoveries even when they count 
against cherished prejudices. Every claim of science relies 
upon this trust. 342 Thus, no scientific theory can be cri-
ticized, rejected, condemned, or suppressed on political or 
ethical grounds. 343 The moral obligation of science to truth 
is an autonomous obligation which must be fulfilled according 
to standards projected solely out of that pursuit. 
342Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Soci~ty 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 73. 
343
"Can a Scientific Theory be Legitimately Criticized, 
Rejected, Condemned, or Suppressed on Ethical or Political 
Grounds?", R. Hollinger, Journal of Value Inquiry, 9, 1975, pp. 
303-6. 
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2. The Ethical Dynamic of Science 
The communal obligation to pursue truth in the sci-
ences cannot proceed without order~ Polanyi characterizes the 
community of scientists as a miniature "body politic" on the 
whole, though specifically established to pursue truth. 344 
If we can establish the means by which scientists 
control or regulate the body politic of science, we will be 
able to say something about the moral structure of science. 
For if science is morally committed to truth, then those 
means by which the scientific community is regulated properly 
to achi~ve this goal are fundamentally moral regulations; for 
their effectiveness rests upon the essential moral commit-
ment to truth itself. 
Polanyi believes that the way in which science actu-
ally functions in a successful way is.the way in which it 
ought to be allowed to function. Science functions best when 
it functions as a republic consisting of a society of free 
explorers. 345 It functions successfully under a delicate 
balance of freedom and regulation. This balance is achieved 
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by self-regulation, which is generally effective in produc-
. f . f 1 f . . . t 346 1ng a ru1t u con orm1ty among sc1ent1s s. Most impor-
tant, there is no central authority which exercises power 
. . f. b 1. f 34 7 s . . f f 11 over sc1ent1 1c e 1e . c1ent1sts are ree to o ow 
their hunches; but their hunches are valuable and worth 
following only in so far as they are informed by the communal 
sense of what counts as true. 
Polanyi likens the self-regulation of the scientific 
enterprise to the way in which a group of people might accom-
plish the task of putting a puzzle together. Although there 
is no central plan governing the moves of each person, the 
puzzle is pieced together, and more quickly than it would be--
if only one person w~re working on it. The task is quickly 
accomplished because each person relies on the work of others 
while benefitting from each person's success in developing 
th . 348 s . h . f e p1cture. c1ence, t en, 1s a process o group coopera-
tion and is more successful by virtue of being a group effort 
than it would be if it were the product of isolated 
346"",{ · h . 1 P 1 . S . F . h d S . 1•11C ae o any1, c1ence, a1t , an oc1ety (Chicago : The Un i v e r s it y o f·~c,.o;;h;....;i...;;.c:...a--g...,.,o:.__..,P=<"'r-e--s-s .:...' --::-1"'9-;:6"""6"""")-,-p-. .....:....<;,-S 7 • 
347 Ibid., p. 51. 
348Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its 
Political and Economic Theor-y~(~C~h-l~.c~a-g~o~:...;;__~R~o-o_s_e:...v--e~l--t~Urn~i~v--e~rsity, 
19 6 2) ' pp. 6- 7 . 
. d. . d 1 349 1n 1v1 ua s. 
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The puzzle is put together in view of all. Each pe~-
son responds to the total, joint effort of all. Thus, inde-
pendent initiatives are organized to a joint achievement by 
mutual adjustment. There is a joint discovery of a hidden 
system of things. Attempts to organize the total effort under 
a single authority eliminates independent initiatives, reduc-
ing joint effectiveness and leading to paralysis of the opera-
t
. 350 
lOll. 
The ethic of the scientific enterprise, then, is con-
stituted by the attempt to maintain the delicate balance of 
freedom and control within the communal framework of a self-
regulation grounded in an eye for the truth. Mutual adjust-
ment alone can insure the success of the scientific enter-
prise. 
"Mutual control", then, is the means by which scien-
tists "keep watch" over each other. Each scientists is sub-
ject to criticism by all others--or is encouraged by their 
appreciation. Of course, the scientific world consists of 
an unorganized melange of highly specialized fields; and no 
349Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its 
Political and Economic Theory (Chicago: Roosevelt University, 
1962), p. 8.; Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, 
edited by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: The Univetsity of Chicago 
Press, 1969), p. 50. 
350K . nOWlng 
by Marjorie Grene, 
19 6 9) ' pp . 50- 1 . 
and Being: 
(Chicago: 
Essays by Michael Polanyi, ed. 
The University of Chicago Press, 
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scientist can claim to be competent to judge the work of 
those outside his field. 
But scientific specialties are not each wholly unique. 
They generally overlap one another in the form of a "chain", 
so that one field may be in the "neighborhood" of ancther. 
One field has enough similarity to another that a scientist. 
in one can comprehend and to some degree judge the validity 
of insights in another field. And the mutual judgment that 
arises out of this situation exercises the responsible con-
trol that maximizes freedom of exploration while minimizing 
stifling suppression. Out of such dynamic arises general 
standards of judgment which equalize standards of worth-
whileness and plausibility throughout the scientific world. 351 
Thus, even though no single scientist can judge the 
validity of all research in a certain domain, he can criti-
que the work of those who are themselves in a position to 
judge scientists whose work he cannot directly critique. 
This creates a continuous line of qualified critique and forms 
the ground of all mutual adjustments. 352 
' . ~ . 
. 351Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 72. 
352Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Fress, 1962), p 217. 
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Indeed, we trust specialists in knowledge only because we 
assumeas true the cultural ideal that the domains of science 
are so coherent that specialists can supervise one anJther 
and, thus, warrant the confidence of society and its support 
of intellectual pursuits. 
We must ask, then, by what standards this critique 
of mutual adjustment is carried out and how is it enforced. 
Polanyi says the main mechanism of control in mutual scien-
tific authority is a mutual recognition of merit and contri-
bution as well as a mutual censure of falsehood. 353 Such 
authority has the guardianship of the premisses of freedom 
in that it protects against lawlessness in the scientific 
community. 354 This means that a predominantly accepted 
scientific view of the nature of things must exercise a 
rather severe discipline over scientists. 355 • For without 
respect for the ideals of science, scientists could only re-
sort to charlantry, which would dissolve all scientific 
353Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its 
Political and Economic Theor-y~(°C~h-l~.c~a_g_o_:--~R~o--o_s_e_v_e~l't~~u~n~i~v-e--rsity, 
1962)' p. 21. 
354Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 63. 
355 . d B . Knowing an e1ng: 
by l\larj orie Grene, (Chicago·: 
19 6 9) ' pp . 9 2- 3 . 
Essays by Michael Polanyi, ed. 
The University o± Chicago Press, 
253 
opinion, leaving no standards at all to satisfy. 356 
The discipline of mutual adjustment ctilizes various 
means to assure a measure of control: 357 
1) publicatons in periodicals, books, papers, etc. 
2) selection for scientific posts, research grants, 
etc. 
But the most important method in an area where controversy 
arises is that of persuasion, of critical argument aimed at 
making the truth manifest. Critical argument is not intend-
ed merely as a destructive force. Its aim is to isolate 
and evaluate the nature of falsehoods in the scientific 
world. And such a task cannot be achieved without two impor-
tant elements of evaluation: consultation with other sci-
entists both within and without the field in question and 
competition of ideas in the interest of establishing. the 
truth. Thus, consultation and competition are also import-
ant aspects of mutual contro1. 358 
These methods of scientific discipline guide re-
search and judge results by allowing or disallo1~ing their 
publicity. But they also appeal to the scientific consci-
ence to strive for the truth out of a free response to it. 
357Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 47-9. 
358Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 165. 
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Indeed, the purpose of these means of discipline is to make 
possible a free and spontaneous order of individual initia-
tives. For this kind of order is possible only if each 
scientist takes into account what others have done previously 
in relation to similar problems. Of course the effectiveness 
of mutual adjustment may ~ to diminish somewhat as the 
group to which one must adjust one's efforts grows larger. 
For where large numbers are concerned, each can only adjust 
himself to a general state of affairs which the others have 
bequeathed to him. Nonetheless, the method works better than 
alternatives such as control by a central authority. In 
general, the method of mutual adjustment works quite well, 
no matter how large a group is involved. 
A centralized authority, apart from any private 
authorities, tends to destroy the motivation of the persons 
thus controlled so that they do not choose to adjust to one 
another but must be forced to follow a "party-line". 359 
359Michael Polanyi, The Lo§ic of Liberty (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1 69), pp. 185-6. 
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Polanyi likens the breakdown of individual adjustments to 
the situation that would result if individuals in a line of 
battle did not meet their responsibility to adjust their 
efforts to one another in attack and defense: the entire 
line of battle fails. 360 Or again, a centralized author-
ity might be able to plan a summary of goals and moves 
required to achieve them; but it cannot say exactly which 
moves at which times will be effective in accomplishing 
particular goals. 361 
Polanyi calls this system of mutual adjustment a 
"polycentric" system. Each center of research adjust itself 
in relation to the others to allow a maximum effect in the 
362 group task with a minimum of stress to each. In such a 
system, the line of authority remains between scientists 
rather than over them. 363 Polycentric controls yield an 
360Michael Polanyi, History, Philosopht and the 
Sociology of Science: The Contempt of Freedom~.Y., N.Y., 
Arno Press, 1975), p. 35. 
361Michael Polanyi, The Lo~ic of Liberty (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1 69), p. 134. 
edited 
Press, 
362Ibid., pp. 173-5. 
Michael Polan 
e Un1vers1ty o 
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. d. b . . . 364 d b f 1n 1rect conse~sus etween sc1ent1sts an cannot e orma-
lized into a complete system of inflexible rules. Polanyi 
considers insight into the general will governing scientists 
to be a tacit skill as are other human capacities that are 
governed by polycentric systems, such as physical skills, 
intellectual tasks, and, as we shall see, social life itself. 
Polycentric adjustment is evident in all phases of bio-
psychological development and adaptation, from the 
specialized functioning of organs in respect of the health 
of the entire organism to the polycentric task of harmoniz-
ing t~e purposes in life, the task we call the achievement 
of wisdom. 365 The more highly specialized and the greater 
the number of individual~ involved in mutual adjustment, the 
b h 1 . k 3 6 6 Th h etter t e po ycentr1c system wor s. · us, t e more com-
plex the world of science becomes, the greater becomes the 
effectiveness of each, individual pursuit of truth. 
Polycentricity has its strong points and its weak 
points. It avoids the risk of creating an inflexible body 
of rules generated by one authority which is incapable 
364K . now1ng 
by Marjorie Grene, 
1969), p 85. 
and Being: Essay£ by Michael Polanyi, ed. 
(ehicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
365MichaeL Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 177-8. 
366
rbid., p. 118. 
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of following the many leads to truth generated in a single 
problem. But, on the other hand, it cannot guarantee that 
any particular pursuit of truth will be successful or that 
the pursuit will be good for the enterprise as a whole. 367 
Nonetheless, no other system can avoid these risks or pro-
vide the benefits of polycentric control through mutual 
adjustment (ibid). 
The scientific world, then, is motivated in its pur-
suit of the truth by a fundamental moral concern for the 
truth. And this moral concern grounds the procedure of the 
pursuit. The scientific community forms a body politic 
governed generally by an ethical commitment to the truth and 
specificially by procedures which procure an effective bal-
ance between free exploration and communal discipline. This 
balance is maintained by polycentric controls of mutual self-
adjustment. Scientists judge the validity and worthwhile-
ness of one another's work, exercising discipline and con-
trol through persuasion, denying of forwarding publication, 
and criticizing one another's research in a free market place 
of ideas. The individual is free in science to speak and 
367Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 157. 
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seek the truth even if his convictions oppose current 
beliefs, 368 thus preserving the right of opposition. 
The ethical dynamic of science meets some of the ex-
pectations we have developed from an analysis of Polanyi's 
tacit ethical structure. But, if the world of science is 
a microcosm of ethical life, then we should expect the free-
dam, the pursuit of absolute values, and self-regulation to 
be a part of ethical life as a whole. Indeed, Polanyi ex-
pands the freedom to pursue truth as an ultimate value to 
academic institutions, asserting that they should be free 
to pursue the discovery of truth in all domains of know-
ledge. 369 They should be free to follow independently the 
inherent interest suggested in exciting problems suggested 
in research in any domain of knowledge. 370 The education 
of society should impart a commitment to truth and freedom 
368Knowin 
by Marjorie Grene, 
1969), p. 70. 
369Michael Polanyi, The Lo§ic of Liberty (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1 69), p. 41. 
370rbid., p. 43. 
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as the general authority of all knowledge. 371 
Polanyi refuses, then, to allow a commitment to pur-
sue scientific knowledge to produce a rationalism which denies 
truths not discovered by scientific method as understood by 
"scientific rationalism". He claims that such denials are 
evidence that scientific rationalism is out of hand, as when 
the neurologist is compelled to deny the unconscious or de-
1 h . . . ff 1 . h 3 7 2 c are t at 1t 1s an 1ne ectua , ep1p enomenon. Polanyi 
reminds us that even scientific rationalism is guided chiefly 
by the intellectual, moral, and social progress of the 20th 
century. The authority, custom, and tradition of this 
society constitute the very language in which rational thought 
is expressed. 373 Thus, we should not imagine that rational 
thought can successfully deny the categories of custom, in-
eluding morality, in which it is rooted. We must, then, ad-
mit that categories other than "true" or "false" are operative 
in our lives. Polanyi says, "Knowledge can be true or false, 
while action can only be successful or unsuccessful, right 
371Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Societ' 
(Chicago: The University of Chic~go Press, 1966), p.Z. 
372Knowin 
by Marjorie Grene, 
19 6 9) ' pp . 4 2 - 3 . 
373 rb·d 41 1 . ' p. . 
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or wrong". 374 And he claims that to assume an action can 
be explained without ahy evaluation is to assume acts can be 
performed without mordl motive at a11. 375 
The need to view human life from the perspective of 
categories other than those permitted by a strict scienti-
fie rationalism is, however, rooted even more deeply than in 
culture. Man needs a full understanding of his condition 
and, due to a biologically rooted inability to withstand 
protracted perplexity, he seeks understanding through cate-
gories other than scientific ones. Without the development 
of non-scientific categories for understanding, such full 
understanding cannot be achieved. And, with protracted 
1 . b . . h . 1 b kd 3 7 6 perp ex1ty, one eg1ns to exper1ence p ys1ca rea own. 
We see, then, that the positivist conception of 
morality, wh1ch turns moral statements into nonsense be-
cause they have no verifiable meaning, is clearly 
374Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A 
Pose-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), p. 175. 
375scientific Thought and Social Reality, ed. by Fred 
Schwarz, (N.Y., N.Y.: International Universities Press, Inc., 
1974), p. 143. 
376visual Presentation of Social Matters (n.d.), 
Econ file #6, box 25, folder 9, pp. 1-4. 
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. f 377 unsat1s actory. Positivistic science itself cannot sane-
tion moral claims and in fact denies their validity by its 
emphasis upon "physicalism"378 And as long as positivistic 
science remains the uncontested authority and perfect ideal 
of knowledge, ethics cannot be secured from a destruction 
b . 1 d b 379 y scept1ca ou t. 
The ethical dynamic of science must, then, be extend-
ed to the pursuit of truth in all domains of knowledge. If 
freedom, the value of truth, and self regulation constitutes 
the dynamic of science, then they must be extended as the 
ethical dynamic of all domains of knowledge. For Polanyi 
makes the same demand of all domains of knowledge: that they 
should pursue the truth. And if the pursuit of truth in 
science is effective only under the polycentric control of a 
free mutual self-adjustment of scientists, it is reasonable 
to conclude that every domain of knowledge would bendfit by 
a similar ethical dynamic. 
Indeed, this seems even more reasonable when we find 
377scientific Thought and Social Reality, ed. by Fred 
Schwarz (N.Y., N.Y.: International Universities Press, Inc., 
1974), p. 84. 
378K . now1n 
by Marjorie Grene, 
1969), p. 46. 
Essays by Michael Polan i, edited 
T e Un1versity o C icago Press, 
379Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p.27. 
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Polanyi saying " ... truth of literature and poetry, of 
history and political thought, of philosophy, morality, and 
legal principles, is more vital than the truth of science."380 
If such truth is more vital than science, then the effective-
ness in pursuing truth afforded by the ethical dynamic of 
science must be extended to other domains of knowledge. 
After all, non-scientific domains of knowledge are not there-
by ~scientific: "The study of man in humanistic terms is 
not unscientific, since all meaningful integrations (includ-
ing those achieved in science) exhibit a triadic structure 
consisting of the subsidiary, the focal and.the person, and 
all are thus inescapably personal" 381 Meanings in science 
are no more favored than meanings in art, religion, and moral 
. d 382 JU gments. The passionate valuations that make scientific 
truth possible are also to be justified in other domains of 
1 . 1 d. 1' 383 d h d . cu ture, 1nc u 1ng mora 1ty, an sue oma1ns possess 
their own kinds of formal excellence. 384 
~ 80Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 84. 
381Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 64. 
382 Ibid., p. 65. 
383Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), p. 134. 
384 Ibid., p. 133. 
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3. Truth and Morality 
Responsible human choices are analogous to acts of 
discovery. They submit to the demands of their own self-set 
ideals. Responsible choice has, then, the status of being 
385 grounded in personal knwoledge. Indeed, Polanyi has 
explicitly stated that his purpose in formulating the notion 
of personal knowledge was to provide grounds for conceiving 
f h f 1 . d 3 8 6 Th . h h o man as t e-seat o mora JU gment. 1s means tat e 
conceives of the moral life as involving a personal knowledge 
of values and of the ultimate p~rposes of life as well as 
sense of right action. He confirms in this statement the 
argument we have built out of the epistemological and~onto­
logical works that moral life is an independent domain of 
knowledge and action. Certainly, he intended to avoid the 
reductionistic tendency of naturalistic explanations df mora-
l . h. h d h . f h "b "1" 38 7 1ty w 1c eny t e ex1stence o uman respons1 1 1ty. 
If the responsible moral decisions of life, 
rationally guided by a personal knowledge of values and of 
the Good, are the essential aspects of ethical life, then 
385Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 46. 
386 Ibid., p. 28. 
387 Knowin 
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ethics is a force in its own right, a domain of knowledge 
in its own right. Polanyi again confirms our previous argu-
ments in saying, " ... freedom of thought is rendered pointless 
and must disappear, where reason and morality are deprived of 
their status as a force in their own right". 388 
This status comes as we see all knowledge as perso-
nal and all personal knowledge as a domain of discovery and 
of action. Only human actions, of course, are subjects of 
moral judgment, though even the sciences make value judg-
ments of some kind. There is a continuous evaluation of 
standards of excellence from the sciences all the way to 
moral evaluations. But the same dynamic of indwelling func-
tions throughout the continuum. By indwelling the mind of 
another through his actions we can understand the moral 
quality of his acts. Polanyi explicitly says that this 
moral knowledge, as often uncovered in history, is con-
. . h h . 389 t1nuous Wlt t e sc1ences. 
Indeed, we develop and obey moral standards even 
when we do not intend to do so. We use moral standards 
388Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago: 
University of Chicago ?ress, 1969), p. 107. The 
389Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 79-81. The 
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when we express condemnation or approval or seek guidance 
in a moral dilemma. This use is uncritical, a matter of 
faith. 390 But we also use moral standards in a more explicit 
way, as when we raise moral issues in themselves and question 
their validity or forward their tentative conclusions. Indeed, 
this explicit focus on moral issues safeguards moral princi-
ples from the self-destruction that comes of boundless self-
d . . 391 eterm1nat1on. Such safeguards are necessary, for Polanyi 
claims that moral judgments cut deeper than intellectual valu-
ations (as evidenced in the fact that a man consumed by intel-
1 1 . 1 b . . ) 392 ectua passJ.on may a so e va1n, envJ.ous, mean, etc .. 
Some human actions, then, can be explained only by 
reference to the exercise of mor?l judgment. And where we 
recognize moral judgment, we recognize the existence of human 
values as motivating persons. And, in recognizing this as 
true not only of others but also of ourselves, we refer to 
moral judgments which we hold to be valid and thus discover 
that we do in fact (and must!) make the distinction between 
moral truth and moral illusion. Moral truth is founded on 
3 9OS · . f. Th h d S . 1 R 1 . d ~C~J.~e~n~t~J.~~l~C~~O~U~g~t ___ an __ ~~O~C~J.~a~~~e~a~J._t~y, e . by 
Fred Schwarz, (N.Y., N.Y.: International University Press, 
Inc., 1974), p. 84. 
391Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 86. 
392Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), ~ 215. 
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the recognition of a valid, rational claim; moral illusion 
. 1 . 1" k "11 "11 . 393 1s compu s1ve, 1 e sensory 1 usory 1 us1on. 
The standards of truth, justice, and morality, then, 
b . d . d d . bl" ff . 394 must e recogn1ze as 1n epen ent powers 1n pu 1c a a1rs. 
Moral judgments arise out of the context of communal rela-
tions in which we indwell our religious, ethical, and intel-
lectual commitments. They arise and are verified in much 
h . "f" . 395 t e same way sc1ent1 1c comm1tments are. And morality, 
like all thought is valid by its own standards and its pro-
. h d b . . 396 gress 1s everyw ere prompte y 1ts own pass1ons. 
There is always, of course, a range of discretion 
in every moral choice. Choices are not determined by 
society. The "compulsion" of a choice comes from a valid 
b . . ' f . b. 1" 397 su m1ss1on to one s own sense o respons1 1 1ty. 
393K . now1n 
by Marjorie Grene, 
1969)' p. 33. 
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395
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396Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Ch~cago, The University of Chicago 
T>ress, 1962), p. 215. 
397Michael Polanyi, The Studi of Man (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 195 ), p. 22. 
267 
As with all knowledge, the craving for the universal searches 
out the only thing that can satisfy the intellectual passion: 
the uni~ersal itself. Thus, though we are free subjectively 
to co as we please, this freedom is overruled by the respon-
sibility to do as we must. 398 
In this vein, Polanyi says, "Moral judgments are 
approvals and as such are akin to intellectual valuation. 
The thirst for righteousness has the same capacity for satis-
fying itself by enriching the world that is proper to intel-
lectual passions ... moral man strives to satisfy his own 
d d h . h h "b . 1 l'd' 399 stan ar s, tow 1c e attr1 utes un1versa va 1 1ty. 
These universal standards measuremore than the right-
ness of an action. Men are valued as men according to their 
moral force. We do not judge the performance of the facul-
ties in valuing a person, but the effect of it on the whole 
person. Moral rules control the whole self rather than the 
exercise of our faculties. Living by codes of morality, 
custom, and law is to comply to standards in a far more com-
prehensive sense than is involved in scientific and artis-
tic standards. 400 
398Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Pres:, 1962), p. 309. 
399 Ibid., p. 214. 
400 rbid., p. 215. 
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Truth and morality, then, are intimately linked. Just 
as there are ethical commitments to truth which ground the 
procedures which discover it, so does truth itself become a 
moral value. And this leads us to acknowledge the truths 
we discover within the moral domain as moral truths. These 
truths are independent in that they do not depend upon any-
thing other than moral experience in the form of a sense of 
values and of right. Moral truths, then, form the grounds of 
moral decisions. And these decisions are stated as "oughts": 
they constitute moral "rules". 
4. Moral Rules in a Social Context 
Polanyi says that men form a society to the extent that 
their lives are ordered by the same morals, customs, and 
laws. 401 This means that a society is essentially a moral 
organization of persons. And the fundamental moral ground of 
the society as a whole develops over time into the customs 
(mores) and laws of the society. 
The moral ideals of a culture constitute its guiding 
precepts of right and wrong. Moral ideals are rules of right-
ness. 
401M~ h 1 P 1 . P 1 K 1 d T d A 1 1c ae o any:1, ersona~ now e ge: · owar s 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), p. 215. 
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Whatever rules of rightness a person tries to fulfill 
he commits himself to an ideal; and again, he can do 
so only within a medium that is blind to this ideal. 
The ideal determines the standards to which a person 
holds himself responsible; but the ideal-blind medium 
both grants the possibility for striving for this 
ideal and0zimits this possibility. It determines his calling.4 
Our society teaches us the moral rules, we indwell in order to 
project new ideals. And yet it also acts to "drag" us down 
from our commitment and effective action in realizing our 
highest ideals. Society is the medium of the ethical domain, 
not the self-identical scope of moral life. , Our communal life, 
bound by the codes which form society, inspires us to ideals 
which are not wholly impractical. But they are not fully 
1 . bl . h 403 rea 1za e e1t er. 
This "seeing" of ourselves is the function of con-
science. Conscience interprets and applies tradition. Tradi-
. 
tion imposes a general authority in laying down the general 
presuppositions concerning value, right, and good which we 
indwell from infancy. But conscience alone is the specific 
authority for the explicit moral decisions we make. Tradi-
tion cannot impose specific moral applications, as this would 
402Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowled e: Towards A 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Ch1cago, T e Un1vers1ty o C1icago 
Press, 1962), p. 215. 
403Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: The 
University ~f Chic~go Press, 1958), p. 63. 
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d . . d 4 04 estroy 1ts purpose as a gu1 e. Polanyi says, "A General 
Authority relies for the initiative in the gradual transfor-
mation of tradition on the intuitive impulses of the individ-
ual adherents of the community and it relies on their con-
. 1 h . . . " 405 sc1ences to contro t e 1ntu1t1on . Thus, the role of 
conscience is to interpret and develop the thrust of tradi-
tion toward a deeper insight into value and a more compre-
hensive movement toward the Good. For Polanyi, the words 
"conscience" and "moral" are never merely descriptive terms 
but carry with them the sense of "commendable" or "wrong". 406 
For Polanyi, different moral systems are not just "different"; 
some are more commendable than others. 407 
Thus, the criterion for deciding which value systems 
are commendable and which are not lies in conscience. The 
final grounds on which one bases the premisses and decisions 
of conscience are moral truths we indwell. The criterion 
of conscience is not a pragmatic one which depends upon which 
4 O 4M . h 1 P 1 . S . F . h d S . r 1c ae o any1, c1ence, a1 t , an oc1ety (Chicago: The University of~C~h~i-c_a_g~o~P~r-e_s_s~,-,1~97676')-,--p-.~57 . 
. 
405
rbid., p. 59. 
406 rntellect and HoEe, ed. by Thomas A. Langford and 
William H. Poteat (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1968), 
p. 369. 
4 O 7 Ibid. , p. 3 7 3. 
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belief "works" to aid us in pursuing some particular goal. 
All beliefs "work" for those 1vho believe in them. 408 But not 
all beliefs are true in that they do not all comprehend the 
proper values which, universally followed, lead toward the 
Good. Hence, we cannot rely upon what works pragmatically 
to lead us to particular goals. For we can be successful 
in accomplishing a goal even though we are mistaken in what 
we believe is true. For Polanyi moral truth is the ground of 
conscience; for we have a deeper inner impetus to seek truth 
than to succeed in a particular goal. And conscience itself 
attests to this when we avoid truth in favor of a self-justi-
fied pursuit of personal goals. 
Conscience, however, is powerless without the will 
to act rightly. Once conscience has discerned the right 
action according to universal standards of action, it must 
take precedence over both will and our perception of the 
facts. We must sometimes even proceed with an insight into 
right as informed by. conscience when the temporary facts count 
against it. The will must bow to the conscience, which may 
demand "conversion" even against our will. 409 
4 0 SM · h 1 P 1 . S . F . h d S . 1c ae o any1, c1ence, a1t , an oc1ety (Chicago: The University of.~C~h~i_c_a_g~o~P~r-e_s __ s~,~1~9~6~6~)-,--p-.--T61. 
409
rbid., p. 67. 
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Conscience, then, is the final adjudicator in all moral con-
flicts: both when one is faced with a choice between two 
value systems and in conflicts within the scope of an accepted 
authority. But as long as conflicts are generated from two 
fundamentally different views of the same region of experi-
ence, they must proceed more by an attempt at persuasion and 
conversion by reference to the intrinsic worth and superiority 
of a particular position. And this is especially a matter of 
intuition and conscience. 410 
Polanyi says conscience functions by the interioriza-
tion of moral teaching. To interiorize is to identify our-
selves with a moral teaching. This is what Polanyi means by 
"indwelling" a concept. Moral teachings form the proximal 
term of tacit moral knowledge, which in turn forms the frame-
work for moral acts and judgments. All indwelling is "interi-
. . " 411 0r1zat10n . 
A moral teaching appears meaningless until the stu-
dent hits on the same indwelling that the teacher is prac-
ticing. We must dwell in the particulars while attending 
toward a comprehensive entity that these particulars consti-
tute. This is acceptance of the teacher's authority. It 
4l 0M · h 1 P 1 . S . F . h d S . 1c ae o any1, c1ence, a1t , an oc1ety 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 66-7. 
411Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 17. 
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requires "believing" before "understanding". For we must com-
mit ourselves to communal life as a part of becoming human, 
of becoming a pers~. This commitment is an indwelling. And, 
more fundamentally, it is an acceptance and trust of communal 
modes of life: it is faith, a faith we adopt before we under-
stand it. 412 We must not turn to blind traditionalism, of 
course, but must nonetheless recognize our limits and the neces-
. f 1" 0 h . h . . lf d" . 413 s1ty o re 1ance. t.erw1se our pat 1s se - estruct1ve. 
We find, chen, that our expectations concerning the 
nature of moral authority are met in Polanyi's social writ-
ings. Just as scientific conscience ensures the pursuit of 
truth in that domain, so does conscience in general ensure 
the pursuit of moral rightness. We may now ask how the rules 
developed out of moral conscience work to effect moral change 
in society as a whole. 
5. Communal Change of Moral Consciousness 
The transmission of moral beliefs is accomplished not 
so much by precept as by example. The transmission of moral 
belief by example can occur via the symbols generated by 
412
scientific Thought and Social Reality, ed., by Fred 
Schwarz (N.Y., N.Y.: International Universities Press, Inc., 
1974)' p. 61. 
413Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 61-2.• 
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moral heores. We have already examined-the nature and dynamic 
of symbols; and we must vie\.; the ethical domain as generating 
its symbols in the form of "moral heroes". 
Our modern, highly articulate culture flows largely 
from a small set of men whose works and deeds are 
revered and consulted for guidance. The knowing of 
these great men is an indwelling ... our awareness of 
thelr works and deeds serves us ... as a framework for 
unfolding our understanding in accordance with the 414 indications and standards imposed by the framework. 
Indeed, ·the acts of "world historical personalities" 1 ike 
Alexander, Augustus, Charlemagne, Luther, etc., are the most 
striking examples of human decisions. Yet heroes of the moral 
world are even more influential in the long run, though pDli-
tical persons affect the framework of political power and 
create the drama of human history. 415 
Can unique moral heroes provide us with moral know-
led~e since they do not represent known patterns? Yes--the 
more unique the heroes are, the more interesting they are in 
themselves and the greater opportunity they offer for an 
intimate indwelling of their individuality. 416 We must 
414K. . 
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recall that a symbol is a unique power which draws us into 
itself and integrates us into its meaning. In the case of 
the moral hero, his uniqueness creates a symbol which draws 
us into his moral reality and integrates within us a new in-
sight into the Good. Thus, to contemplate a person as an 
jdeal, as a moral hero, is to submit to his authority for 
judging oneself417 and, ultimately, to be created by him in 
a new moral realm. 
Our very calling as human beings is shaped and deter-
mined by the moral symbols that reach out to us and to which 
we willingly submit ourselves. Thus, our commitment to our 
social and mental milieu can be shaped and determined by who 
we recognize as our heroes and masters. 418 
Of course, not all moral change is determined through 
moral heroes. There is also a natural evolution of moral 
life. If tacit thought is the indispensible, ultimate power 
by which all explicit thought is endowed with meaning, then 
no one generation or individual can or should critically test 
all the teachings on which it relies. We always know more 
417Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man ( Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 96. 
418 Ibid., p. 98. 
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than we can tell: the transmission of knowledge from one 
. h h . . ·1 . 419 Th · · generat1on to t e ot er 1s pr1mar1 y tac1t. us, 1t 1s 
logically impossible for the moral tradition to operate with-
out the addition of wholly original interpretive judgments, 
such as what "heroes" supply, at each state of transmission. 
This process of heroic reinterpretation introduces elements 
420 
which are wholly novel, a process which pertains to all 
fields of knowledge. But we must understand Polanyi when he 
says, "Further controlling principles of life may be repre-
sented as a hierarchy of boundary conditions extending, in the 
case of man, to consciousness and responsibility". 421 Polanyi 
refers here to the natur~l and continuous moral development of 
man. The heroic inbreaking of new moral ideas does indeed 
produce moral symbols which integrate us into the new discov-
eries that constitute the heroic insight. But there is a 
natural and continuous bio-psychic development that consti-
tutes moral life as well. Thus, we can understand also how 
each act of understanding may lead to a conversion to a truer 
419Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 60-1. 
420Mi~hael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 58. 
421 Knowin and Being: Essa s by Michael Polanyi, ed. 
by Marjorie Grene C 1cago: T e Univers1ty o C 1cago Press, 
1969)' p. 239. 
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. way of being a man and of understanding him better. 422 
Thus, apart from the inspiration and insight generated 
by moral heroes, the natural tendency of man's evolution is 
toward moral insight. And his pursuit of the Good tends 
naturally, when guided by moral insight, to an increased in-
terest in the welfare of the whole of society and to a les-· 
sened interest in his own welfare. Polanyi says, 
I have said that at the highest level of personhood 
we meet man's moral sense, guided by the firmament 
of his standards. Even when this appears absent, 
its mere possibility is sufficient to demand our 
respect. 
We have here a fact which sets a new major task to 
the process of evolution: a task which appears the 
more formidable as we realize that both this moral 
sense and our respect for it presuppose an obedience 
to commands accepted in defiance of the immemorial 
scheme of self-preservation which had dominated the 
evolutionary process up to this point.422 
Carl Friedrich has pointed out423 that Polanyi's in-
sistence upon the universal intent of moral and intellectual 
passions :eads to the suggestion that justice is grounded in 
a kind of natural law. 424 This natural law is the product 
of convivial discernment. The embodiment of justice, which 
422Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), pp. Sl-2. 
423
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424 Inte1lect and Hope, ed. by Thomas A. Langford and 
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is grounded in human nature, within law is the main concern of 
natural law theorists, 425 a concern which is justified by the 
fact that the personal coefficient of knowledge cannot be re-
d f 1 h . f . 426 move rom aw any more t an 1t can rom sc1ence. The 
basic law of human nature upon which natural law may be built 
is Polanyi's claims that man is moved by moral and intellect-
ual passions which have a universal intent and bear upon an 
. h "bl 1" 427 1nex aust1 e rea 1ty. 
Polanyi confirms in these passages the communal nature 
\ 
of moral experience. We would expect such a confirmation, 
of course, since we have already established the communal 
nature of knowledge and of science in particular. We discover 
in these passages that morality, as an independent force, is 
developed not only within the context of the community but that 
• the commu~ity itself has a moral nature which may evolve to-
ward higher moral insight or decay by neglecting its responsi-
bilities. We see, then, that the Good cannot be separated 
from the communal Good. 
425 Intellect and Hope, ed. by Thomas A. Langford and 
William H. Poteat (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1968), 
p. 92. 
426 Ibid., p. 101. 
427 Ibid., p. 109. 
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6. The Communal Good 
A faith or confidence in the potential of the human 
bond and of shared obligations implies, as we have seen, a 
moral bond. Polanyi says, 
.. the group has a claim to conformity of its members, 
and that the interests of group life may legitimately 
rival and sometimes overrule those of the individual. 
This acknmvledges a common good for the sake of which 
deviation may be suppressed and individuals be required 
to make sacrifices for defending the group against sub-
version and destruction from outside.428 
Thus, Polanyi explicitly outlines ~he origin of a notion of a 
common Good which places all persons under an obligation to 
cooperat~ as a community in its establishment. 
The common Good is not merely a subjective idea about 
goodness or rightness, as we have seen in our discussion of 
the implications of Polanyi's epistemology. The Good, as we 
have also seen, is as much a reality as are those discovered 
in scientific pursuits. 429 
We aim, as a community, at the Good. But Polanyi 
declares that the communal aim lS not the sole impetus toward 
the Good. Indeed, the community itself is not a single entity 
428Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962)' p. 212. 
429
"Politics and Science: A Critique of Buchanan's 
Assessment of Polanyi", P.C. Roberts, Ethics, 79, April 1969, 
p. 239. 
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but is a collection of different people who share some beliefs, 
ideals, and motives in life. Individuals can differ from one 
another in the community to the extent that the society they 
compose contains a mixture of both highly developed persons in 
the moral domain and those of lower development. We have 
already noted the role of heroes of discovery and attainment 
in the community. Thus, it should not surprise us that society 
fosters both individual and communal ("civic") thought. 430 
The community must foster the individual thoughtwhich 
forwards the life of the community as a whole while maintain-
ing itself as a community against forces which would rend it 
asunder. This demands a delicate balance between freedom and 
control similar to that maintained in science. 
The community must maintain this control in a·manner 
similar to the way in which it is maintained in science: by 
moral inspiration combined with some procedures for-enforcing 
the basic order which allows society to function most effec-
tively in its pursuit of the Good. The fundamental method of 
control, as in science, remains a moral control. Civic sense 
and moral convictions are embodied in society and form the 
"civic home" in which we live. We cannot force individuals to 
indwell the moral life of the community; for moral standards 
430Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Britical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 215. 
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are rightly rendered suspect when they are upheld by force, 
are based upon property and wealth, or are imbued with a 
431 local loyalty. 
Polanyi acknowledges four "coefficients" of societal 
organization, each of which plays a role in a communal cohe-
sion and realization of the Good: 432 
1. shared convictions 
2. shared fellowship 
3. co-operation 
4. authority or coercion 
The joint functioning of these elements of communal life is 
responsible for social cohesion and are the grounds upon which 
all social institutions (family, religion, education, etc.) 
are built. The first three are essentially moral since they 
involve a free response to the beliefs, friendship, and goals 
of others. We must acknowledge our natal embodiment of these 
and choose them in the process of attaining social maturity. 
But the last element mentioned represents the public power 
which shelters and provides effective control of societal in-
stitutions.433 
431Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philoso~hy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), pp. 215-1 . 
432 rbid., p. 212. 
433 rbid., pp. 212-13. 
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Inherent within this difference between the first 
three coefficients of societal organization and the fourth one 
in a polarity of communal life. On the one hand, social pro-
gress in achieving the Good proceeds by shared passions and 
standards. On the other hand, some external control is neces-
sary because individuals can rise above or fall below general 
societal standards. Thus, individuals are not dependent upon 
the societal moral life they indwell. They can form a moral 
pole which, for the better or worse, are at variance with the 
civic pole of communal moral life. 434 Yet both the "moral" 
and the "civic" poles are necessary to communal life: " 
the restraint which power incurs as the price of employing 
morality for its own coercive purposes proves only that mora-
lity for its own coercive purposes proves only that morality 
is an indispensable, though self-willed, ally to power. 435 
All elements are necessary for achieving the social Good. 
The Good, then, is not just a personal achievement, 
though it is uniquely personal. The Good is a communal 
achievement, so far as it is achievable at all. Only by 
434Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962)' p. 215. 
435
rbid., p. 226. 
283 
indwelling communal norms can we be informed concerning any 
notion of the Good and work to transcend it--or fail it and 
experience guilt. Communal life is a delicate balance between 
external control and a moral commitment to obey the standards 
of society. Freedom, commitment, and external control are 
blended within the community to make the Good both an indi-
vidual and communal achievement. 
Finally, we can now observe that our conception of a 
moral reality, developed from, an analysis of Polanyi's epis-
temological and ontological works, is explicitly confirmed 
as an extension of conscience as we find it in the scientific 
. 436 p 1 . enterpr1se. o any1 says, 
A personal knowledge of man may consist in putting 
ourselves in the place of the persons we are study-
ing and in trying to solve their problems as they 
see them or as we see them. That opens the door for 
our entry into human personality in its whole moral, 
religious, and artistic outlook, as the bearer of a 
historical consciousness, a political and legal re-
sponsibility. Thus, it introduces us through an 
extension of scientific enquiry straight into the 
whole sentient, c~eative, and responsible life of 
human concerns.4j7 
The ethic of discovery, then, which extends itself 
to moral truths, must, by implication, extend itself to the 
4 36M . h 1 P 1 . S . F . h d S . 1c ae o any1, c1ence, a1t , an oc1ety 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 55. 
437
scientific Thought and Social Reality, ed., by Fred 
Schwarz (N.Y., N.Y.: International Universities Press, Inc., 
1974), p. 96. 
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moral governance of society as a whole. The same ethic which 
undergirds the free pursuit of truth also undergirds the moral 
conscience of a free society. What works in the process of 
scientific discovery438 also works to establish the political 
and moral truths which undergirds a free society. 439 
Polanyi claims, however, that the norms for judging 
concrete truths within particular domains may differ; but he 
does .not admit that what is essential for truth in any domain 
(i.e., the intent to discover truth within a context of free 
inquiry) may be sacrificed in any domain of knowledge. And 
this is precisely what determines his affirmation of the 
necessity of the free society as a social truth: freedom in 
society is an implication of the need to freely pursue the 
438Michael Polanvi, The Republic Df Science: Its 
Political and Economic Theory~(~c=h~i~c~a-g_o __ :--~R~o-o_s_e_v_e~l-t~U~n~i~v--ersity, 
1962), p. 5. 
439To be more specific, the extension of the dynamic 
of social organization is based on exactly the same kind of 
truth which science discovers. Frank Knight ("Virtueand 
Knowledge", Ethics, 59, July, 1949, pp.271-284) early raised 
the issue whether the norms applicable to science are applica-
ble to other domains of knowledge or to society as a whole. 
His aim was to question whether social-political, communal 
norms are true or false in the same sense in which scientific 
ones are. Certainly, the kinds of truths involved are dif-
ferent. Communal moral truths and norms of pursuing the Good 
ar~ not true or right in the sense of passing muster before 
present concepts of scientific truth. But the ethical dynamic 
of truth-seeking and norm-setting is not dependent upon truth 
being specifically scientific; scientific truth is, rather, a 
species of tacit knowledge. And the dynamic of tacit knowing, 
applicable in all domains of knowledge, is the real root of 
the ethical dynamic of knowledge and action. 
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truth in any domain. He emphasized science because he was a 
scientist and because science is supposed to be the major 
f h . . t 440 source o trut 1n soc1e y. 
440Polanyi has been further criticized, however, for 
claiming his notion of truth-judgment is not subjective but 
personal. We will remember that a personal judgement abides 
by standards set by the judgment itself and, thus, is not sub-
jective since it aims at universal coverage. The judgment 
then becomes the standard of the com~unity of knowers within 
the domain of knowledge at issue. This notion has been mis-
understood to mean that the standard is merely what the com-
munity tends to believe rather than what they are supposed to 
believe according to the standards they obey. Thus, some 
have argued that Polanyi is a subjectivist in so far as poli-
tical truths are concerned since in this field there is often 
no agreement as to the best idea or course of action to follow. 
Such critics claim that POlanyi would leave such truths up to 
pure choice as to how to view things, a choice that may not 
represent the truth at all (''Politics and Science: Reflections 
on Knight's Critique of Polanyi", James M. Buchanan, Ethics, 
77, '66-'67, pp.305-6). They often turn to a more "pragmatic" 
standard of truth: the "best" social order is that which 
works the best, that gives us what we want. And such con-
. siderations makes "truth" an irrelevant consideration (ibid., 
308). But clearly Polanyi does not claim that political 
truth--~r any other truth--is constituted by social agreement. 
The agreement of society is formed by a social acknowledgment 
of truth and a commitment to obey the standards of truth in 
so far as they are known. Thus, the agreement is based on 
truth; it does not itself constitute the truth. Such a no-
tion would make truth subjective, and all political truths 
would be relative to choice in such a view. But foremost in 
Polanyi's mind is that we discover political truths in them-
selves and then forward them by agreement and obedience to 
the standards of knowledge that the truth implies. Political 
truths are, then, agreed upon only because they are acknow-
ledged as such; and the prime social and political truth 
which this procedure necessitates is the truth that persons 
must be-Iree to discover the truth in all areas of knowledge 
supported in society. 
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We have, then, established both the fact and nature 
of the do~ain of societal, ethical truths. We may now examine 
the ethical structure of society as a whole, as evidenced in 
its social institutions and political dynamic. We can best 
begin this investigation by examining how society goes wrong. 
For we can most easily discern a correct functioning of 
society by comparing such structures with the fundamental 
immoral structures of society. 
CHAPTER TEN 
THE MORAL INVERSION OF THE FREE SOCIETY 
This chapter is a propadeutic to the final chapter 
on Polanyi's notion of a free society. In it I analyze what 
Polanyi considers to be various moral inversions of freedom 
and the common Good as exemplified in certain social-poli-
tical structures such as Marxism, democratic libaraJism, 
Nazism, etc. An understanding of what is wrong with these 
attempts to give a moral organizati6n to society (attempts 
which are moral even when they focus on giving an amoral 
structure to society) will help us grasp the nature of the 
free society. We shall see that Polanyi's dissatisfactions 
with social structures that differ widely from the ethical 
structure which makes science successful is that they fail 
to provide the means to discover in a free manner the very 
truths (moral and otherwise) which they require in order to 
maintain themselves. 
1. Moral Inversion in Society 
Communal moral truths are, then, important aspects 
of truth and are very much linked to the method of establish-
ing scientific ideas. Indeed, Polanyi claims that the modern 
mind, with its penchant for science, is a fusion of scientific 
287 
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skepticism and a passion for moral progress. But this 
fusion has not been a healthy one, for the most part. In-
stead of producing a commitment to moral and scientific 
truths, it has made science itself a standard for moral truth. 
Indeed, modern society has paradoxically believed that it is 
morally necessary to judge all truths by the standards that 
pertain to science. So our culture seems pervaded by a dis-
sonance of extreme critical lucidity and intense moral con-
science.442 The problem with modern society is not moral 
laxity. We have never seen so much moral intensity, much of 
which has been aimed at humanitarian reform. Polanyi affirms 
that there has been moral excess and that ethics must catch 
up to the pathological forms of morals created in this era 
of excess. 443 The root of this pathology lies in the pecu-
liar cooperation which skepticism gave the passion for social 
betterment in the philosophy of the enlightenment. 444 This 
skepticism criticized all pronouncements on moral truths, 
thus releasing persons from falsehoods and prejudice. But 
such skepticism did not distinguish true moral ideas from 
441M. h 1 P 1 . Tl... .,. . t D. . (G d C. 
. 1c ae o any1, ~e-~ac1 1mens1on ar en 1ty, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 57. 
442 Ibid., p. 4. 
443K . now1n 
by Marjorie Grene 
1969)' p. 3. 
444Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 57. 
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false ones; moral ideas in general came under attack. Thus, 
men were also freed to follow a-moral courses of action. In 
this sense, a concern for true morality leads to a protest 
against falsehoods which inevitably include all moral 
values. 445 
Polanyi insists that the development of moral pas~ , 
sions and scientific skepticism into moral skepticism is not 
just an accidental, historical development. This development 
was a logical development of these attitudes. 446 And he 
claims that we now face' the same outcome today as we grope 
447 our way back to the sceptical ideals of the 18th century. 
Polanyi says that the passions generating moral seep-
ticism were not religious but moral, though their morali-
ties were perverted and immanent only in brute force. 448 
Elevati~ns of nationhood as a law unto itself above moral 
standards are, according to Polanyi, the ultimate logical end 
of the enlightenment. 449 Clearly, he sees our present danger 
44SK , 
nOWlnO' 
by M&rjorie rene 
19 6 9) ' pp. 8- 9. 
446 Ibid., p. 10. 
447 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
448 Ibid., p. 17. 
449 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
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of moral skepticism as leading logically to the ends which 
threatened enlightenment society in the rise of nations and 
in moral libertinism and to the end that development implied: 
the collectivisms of communism and nazism. These threats are 
not political or economic in Polanyi's view, but are most 
intimately connected to the moral values we hold and the way 
these values open us to truth in all domains of knowledge, in-
cluding the political domain. 
Polanyi refers to the improper development of moral 
ideas in society as "moral inversion", claiming that it is 
rooted in the skepticism that destroys the belief in truth, 
justice, law, etc., which are supposed to embody the social 
passions. Without these, social passions are perverted into 
brute force. 450 The national sense of "moral responsibility" 
then becom~s the capricious shaper of all personal knowledge 
making all knowledge dependent upon social compulsions. 451 
Such a move makes knowledge dependent upon the collective 
social needs, no longer allowing free pursuit of the truth. 
450Michael Polanyi, The Lo~ic of Liberty (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1 69), p. 5. 
451Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man ( Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 43. 
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This essentially denies the reality of science as well as 
the realities of other domains of knowledge such as law, 
art, religion, etc. And, by denying them, it takes the 
first step in destroying them and confirming its own per-
verted doctrine as "truth"452 
. 1 h" . . " "h"l" If 453 Polany1 also cal s t 1s 1nvers1on n1 1 1sm . 
Nihilism and moral inversion are identified in Polanyi's 
writings, and the ends of each are the same. But one small 
difference between them lies in the fact that moral inversion 
may be hidden somewhat from the view of society, whereas 
nihilism is an explicit attitude. As Polanyi says, the 
nihilis~±c revolutionary gives effect to his immanent mora-
l . b h" . f . 1" 454 1ty y 1s man1 est 1mmora 1ty. 
Nihilists, then, function under the principles of 
absolute skepticism. They are attracted to those types of 
political positions which share their skepticism, finding 
identity in a violent narrow political creed. This gives 
the nihilist a sense of moral superiority. But since he 
cannot demand justice in the name of justice or humanity in 
4 S 2M . h 1 P 1 . S . F . h d S . 1c ae 0 ar.y1, c1ence, a1t , an oc1ety 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 81. 
453K . now1n 
by Marjorie Grene 
19 6 9) ' pp. 4 3- 4. 
and Being: Essays b Michael Polanyi, ed. 
icago: T e University o C icago Press, 
454 Ibid., p. 44. 
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the name of humanity, he mus~ turn to devleoping a perfect, 
"scientific" society. He develops a sense of righteousness 
about calculated brutality. Nihilists become impenetrably 
skeptical fanatics, and the pursuit of naked power becomes a 
blind moral passion. 455 Thus, the nihilist accredits in-
. . . h 1 . 456 tr1ns1c r1g ~ousness to revo ut1onary power. 
Polanyi affirms, then, that modern nihilism is not a 
moral laxity but is a part of the comprehensive moral pro-
test of our time. The intensification of moral demands has 
led to a sense of moral degradation in relation to our fail-
ure to live up to self-professed principles. And it leads 
to a rebellion which aims at establi~hing another center of 
power, free from traditional .compromise. This center must 
proclaim itself groundlessly as the absolute good--and amoral 
reign begins.457 Such societal essentials as justice and 
charity, in so far as they are truths held by society, are 
t f d . 458 rans erre to party 1nterests. 
455Meaning, Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 16-17. 
456Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge· To~ards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 237. 
457Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, ed. 
by Marjorie Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1969), pp. 4-5. 
Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 78. 
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This process of inversion is deeply intensified by 
positivism. Under the influence of positivism, which elevates 
the standards of science to a position of judging validity 
in all domains of knowledge, truth became identified with 
science. Science, in turn, became, under positivism, a mere 
ordering of experience. Thus, justice, morality, custom, and 
law became mere conventions charged by emotional approva1. 459 
Undergirded by positivism, then, science produced a 
skepticism in domains of knowledge in which it had no right 
to judge. The moral passions are then displaced to a fevered 
attempt to apply scientific categories of understanding to 
moral~ty, politics, and law, thus destroying the inherent 
standards by which such fields judge their concepts valid. 
In summary, Dr. Jim Wiser has said " ... nihilism sooner or 
later generates a political creed which functions in the 
place of the discredited moral ideals of the tradition."460 
Polanyi is not willing to admit, however, that all 
·modern achievements are simply products of moral inversion 
459Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 8. 
460 Human Reason and the Quest fnr MPRning, Jim WisAr; 
Pap~r given at the Canadian Political Science Association, 
Fredericton, New Brunswick, June 9-11, 1977, p. 3. 
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(nihilism) or are themselves nihilistic. Some movements need 
to be distinguished from nihilistic ones. Freud, eg., assert-
ed that all value judgments are guided absolutely by the 
desire for happiness and are all illusions bolstered by argu-
ment. Therefore, he admires people who spurn false standards. 
But this is only a spurious moral inversion since Freud holds 
the ideal of a society in which all work for the happiness of 
all. 461 Again, utilitarianism may seem to be morally inverted 
when it decries moral sentiments as hypocritical while assert-
ing itself as scientific. But this, too, is only a spurious 
nihilism, since utilitarianism achieves to ethical stan-
dards.462· Thus not all modern movements are nihilistic. 
The danger is more specific (eg., Naxism and Communism) and 
its results are more concrete than vague moral disease. 
Despite the danger Polanyi says we face of moving 
back to nihilism, he claims that our present health is well 
grounded and is a natural power of all societies. Societies 
have a natural power for recovery from moral inversion and 
moral pathologies. Fanatical hatreds, lies, and cruelties 
can become pointless with an upsurge of national feeling for 
dignity and the hope of freedom and need for truth. 463 · 
462Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962)' p. 233. 
463K . nowl.n 
by Marjorie Grene 
1969)' p. 18. 
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Polanyi points to the Hungarian revolution as an example of 
how the demand for truth can receive the explicit support 
even of those involved in denying this, such as the secret 
police. 464 There is, then, a natural recoil from the nihilis-
tic effects of scientific rationalism. And in our times, it 
has hardened our moral tone and cleared the ground for re-
laying the foundations of morality. 465 Polanyi calls this 
II •111 • • • 466 reco~ rev~s~on~sm. 
Thus, although all of the logical antecedents of ir.-
version are present today just as they were in the enlight-
enment, we are still beyond nihilism. We can suspend the 
logic that leads to inversion by establishtng a civic partner-
ship united in its resolve on continuous reforms and in its 
refusal to be led by radicalism into the logic of moral in-
version.467 We can recognize that it is logically false to 
deny truth since such a denial affirms truth. And this 
truth has an operative power, a spiritual reality, which is 
_merely transferred to temporal political exigencies when 
464K . now~n 
by Marjorie Grene 
19 6 9) ' pp. 2 0- 21. 
465 Ibid., i?· 44. 
466
rbid., p. 21. 
467 Ibid., pp. 22-3. 
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this truth is denied. 468 We break out of such denials and 
move out of the path to nihilism not by a mere intellectual 
achievement (e.g., the discovery of truths), since all truths 
can be shadowed by a commitment to nihilism; but rather we 
accomplish this by dissolving nihilism as an existential 
commitment 469 through a renewed commitment to truth over 
party or social interest. 
In sum, we see that for Polanyi there is a general 
passion for social justice, freedom of thought, and the 
desire for increased prosperity. The original impulses toward 
these were, however, perverted through moral inversion, an 
inversion which is deeply grounded in intellectual error 
because of its denial of moral, political, and social 
468Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Societ~ 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 7 . 
469Knowin 
by Marjorie Grene 
1969), p. 31. 
i, ed. 
Press, 
471Polanyi's affirmation of political truth as linked 
to commitment in an important sense should be adequate evi-
dence that Najder's complaint that Polanyi is "merely intel-
lectual" in his view of historical change and does not pay 
attention to social and economic causes is a mistaken judg-
ment; Intellect and HoBe, ed. by Thomas A. Langford, and 
William H. Poteat (Cur am, N.C.: Duke University Press, 
1968), p. 379. 
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truth471 Nihilism, however, cannot-satisfy this passion be-
cause of its denial of truth, which is essential for any 
social order, even a nihilistic one. But this logic of 
nihilism can be suspended by a commitment to truth. For only 
such a commitment can dissolve the view of all truths as 
being dependent upon party interest. 
The issue of freedom for truth is the basic deter-
minant of the government and form of society in which we 
live. If we cherish truth and promote its free pursuit, we 
move toward the free society in which moral values have a 
voice of truth in their own right. But if we seek only the 
interest of the party we choose, truth cannot survive. And, 
without truth, we cannot establish a society which is re-
sponsive truly to the needs of its people. 
Polanyi does not leave us with abstract statements 
concerning social-ethical dynamics and the way in which they 
go wrong. He gives concerete illustrations of the essential 
forms of ·moral inversion which afflict humanity. We can firm 
up our confirmation of the moral structure of society by more 
deeply investigating moral inversion in its concrete forms. 
471Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man ( Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 2-3. 
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2. Marxism as an Example of Moral Inversion 
Polanyi defines society as a form of human existence 
which attempts to make sense of the relations between per-
sons.472 And he says that adherence to truth implies adher-
ence to a society which respects truth; thus, love of truth 
reappears as love of a society which fosters truth. Submis-
sion to intellectual standards implies participation in a 
society which accepts the cultural obligation to serve these 
473 standards. The search for truth, then, is itself a move 
to establish a society which respects truth and all of the 
forms of organization that commitment implies. We have 
already outlined the societal structure of the "republic of 
science''. We shall now see how, according to Polanyi, the 
refusal to make truth primary and an end in itself has quite 
different ramifications for the society which pursues this 
path. 
The organization of society is a necessity, even when 
there is an agreement of convictions: "Though men be har-
moniously guided by their agreed convictions, they must yet 
form a government to enforce their purpose". 474 Polanyi 
472
rntellect and Hope, ed. by Thomas A. Langford and 
William H. Poteat (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1968), 
p. 3. 
473Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962)' p. 203. 
474 Ibid., p. 224. 
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refers to this government as a "moral culture" and emphasizes 
the essential difference between two types of moral cultures: 
the free society and Marxism, which interpret the same data 
differently and do not accept the same facts as real and signi-
ficant.475· The former is free in so far as it acknowledges 
thought as an independent force in society; and the latter is 
1 . . . f . . . . 1 d . h" 476 tota Itarian In so ar as It In prinCIP e enies t IS. 
We cannot, of course, choose to live in a state of 
total anarchy, for Polanyi, such a state is inconceivable. 
Human conviviality is a brute fact which we cannot escape. 
"We embody our own temporal, inchoate experiences stretching 
over a long period of time, in the unification of one moment--
which also embodies our unification with one another in the 
same moment". 477 We do not need to deal at length with con-
viviality here, since we have already dealt with it. But 
we do need to recall that conviviality is at the root of 
society and of the government that reflects its organization 
toward common purposes. 
. . . 
4 75~ichael Polal_lyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of 
1962), p. 240. 
476 Ibid., p. 376. 
Towards a Post-
Chicago Press, 
477Meaning, Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962), p.l53. The 
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Marxist totalitarianism is Polanyi's prime example of 
a "moral culture" that places the interest of the party over 
the independent pursuit of truth. Marxism is a form of 
totalitarianism which sublates thought in the service of the 
proposed welfare of the state and denies independence and 
free activity to thought. 478 In Polanyi's opinion, Marxist 
totalitarinism shapes the facts at will and gets these ac-
cepted not only by coercion but also by persuasiveness, in-
cluding a wholesale corruption of the principles of factual 
"d 479 evJ. ence. 
Because of this, the Marxist state functions without 
regard for voluntary support: Persons in such a state can 
become convinced that it is right to obey no matter what is 
commanded; and one can be silenced out of any disaffection 
by the weight480 of social di"sapprova1. 481 But most of all, 
the impact of Marxism is the denial of any intrinsic creative 
power of thought, a denial which makes independence in thought 
478Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 214. 
479Ibid., p. 241. 
480 Ibid., p. 225. 
481 Ibid., p. 224; Polanyi affirms that Stalin's regime 
is an example of such a state's ability to exercise power 
without voluntary support. 
301 
unthinkable for Marxists. 482 
Marxism unites moral passion and skepticism into a 
political doctrine. Political power is scientifically sanc-
tioned, so there is no room for moral truth. 483 For this 
reason Marxis~ can act unscrupulously in a deliberate man-
ner because it can claim that its righteousness is embodied 
in its power. And this makes Marxism "morally" attractive 
to those seeking a perfect justification of the use of 
power. 484 It allows Marxists to argue for their position 
on "moral" grounds, even though Polanyi claims their argu-
1 . . 485 ments represent a mora 1nvers1on. 
Marxism is, according to Polanyi, the most interest-
. f h II 1 f II f .. 1. 4 8 6 . A d. 1ng case o t e mora orce o 1mmora 1ty. s 1a-
lectical materialism, Marxism makes stern scientific objecti-
vity the proper moral response to our challenge of high moral 
dynamism, thus coll~psing the proper antinomy between them. 
4 8 3M. h 1 P 1 . Th T . D. . (G d C. r1c ae o any1, e ac1t 1mens1on ar en 1ty, 
·N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 59-60. 
484Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962)' p. 231. 
485 Ibid., pp. 231-233. 
486 Ibid., p. 227. 
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Moral force is transformed into a commitment to amoral objec-
tivism. Morality, as a concern for a scientific objectivity 
which controls the "facts" of life, becomes imminent within 
the material concerns of the proletariat. Thus, the science 
of Marxist society provides objective view that gives the 
moral force to create the Marxist "utopia". Morality--what 
. d 1 h . . . h487 1s one- -no ,onger as 1ntr1ns1c wort It becomes a func-
tion of decisions to structure society "scientifically". 
Thus, moral objections to Marxism are answered by reference 
to its scientific correctness; and it does so by asserting the 
"morality" of using power to shape society by "scientific 
principles" without being committed to these principles as a 
1 . h 1 488 va ue 1n t emse ves. 
Such a philosophy leads to a "logic of revolution". 
If society is not divine, it is made by man, who then is free 
to do with it as he likes. There is then no excuse for a 
bad society, so a good one can be made without delay by seiz-
ing power through revolution. All resistance must be put down 
as treason. 489 Eventually messianic violence is transformed 
487Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), pp. 228-30. 
488 Ibid., p. 231. 
489K . now1n 
by Marjorie Grene 
1969)' p. 13. 
and Being: Essays by Michael Polan i, ed. 
C icago: T e University o 
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from being a means to an end to being an end in itself, 490 
and this constitutes the worst aspect of moral inversion. 
Combined with such force, truth becomes identified with the 
value of party expediency, and the critical faculties are 
paralyzed to the point that one can no longer apprehend truth 
at all. The distinction between objective truth and party 
truth collapses into the latter. 491 No human judgment in any 
field--politics, law, art, etc.--can be valid except in 
h h . . 1 d d 492. t e sense t at 1t serves a part1cu ar power an en . 
Polanyi attributes the immorality of Marxist action 
to the logic upon which it is founded; but he does not deny 
that Marxists, like anyone else, may act contrary to the logic 
of revolution. Indeed, he says that, as a matter of fact, 
despite Russia's explicit totalitarian planning of science, 
490K . d ~ . . now1ng an_ Being: ~ssays by Michael Polanyi, ed. 
b1y9 daq or1e Grene (Ch1cago: Tl1e University of Chicaao Pr<>s s 69), p. 14. 0 .... ' 
491 Ib1·d., p. 29. 
492s . .f. h 
c1ent1 1c T ought and Social Reality ed b F d Schwarz (N y N y . I t · ' · ' Y re 
1 • :' 
1
: • • n ern~t~oi_lal Universities Press. Inc. ~974~, p. 64, NaJd~r has cr1t1c1zed Polanyi's claim that a ' 
co~nmltJTient. to Marx1sm necessarily fosters the love of state 
~ower, den1es moral motives in public life and openl·r d 1 1nhumani ty· H h \f . ' , ec ares 
. . e agrees t at . arx1sm may be auil ty of .. lo · . 1 
d1screpancy between scientific and moral cl~ims but do gic~ ~allow Polanyi in claiming th&t Marxists must n~cessari~; ~~ 1~mo~al; Intellect and Hope, ed. by Thomas A Langfo d d W1ll1am H p t t (D h N · r an p. 376 : · 0 ea ur am, .C.: Duke University Press, 1968), 
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for the most part science proceeds in the same way as it does 
493 
ever)'1vhere else. Thus, the logic of revolution can be 
"suspended" at any point; but the suspension is always con-
trary to the movement of the logic and, hence, to the depth 
meaning of a culture. As long as the logic is merely suspend-
ed, the immediate danger exists that revolution morality will 
recapture the movement of a culture. 
The fact that the logic of revolution is sometimes 
suspended, however, is significant evidence of its falsehood 
in Polanyi's view. Scientific truth, eg., in so far as it 
aims at discovering the truth, is not and cannot be dependent 
upon the interests of a party. Newton's work on gravitation, 
eg., was a d{rect result of a pursuit of truth: the work of 
Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler. It was not a response to 
h . . . f N I . 494 t e maritime Interests o 1 ewton s time. 
Marxist philosophy of science cannot integrate party 
interest with the bald fact that no one can tell what the 
results of a discovery will be. And this necessary ignorance 
makes it impossible to claim that discoveries are motivated 
by historical interests. 495 The Marxist attempt to do so is 
an example of "writing history backwards", i.e., infusing 
493Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p.84. 
494 Ibid., p. 78. 
495
rbid., p. 80. 
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into historical characters foreknowledge of their own 
future. 496 Nonetheless, in so far as the logic of revolu-
tion functions tacitly even in the committed Marxist society, 
. . 'bl 497 pure science rema~ns ~mposs~ e. 
3. The Logic of Liberalism 
In view of Polanyi's distaste for Marxism, one might 
think that he would support the liberal, democratic insti-
tutions of England and America in opposition to Soviet Marx-
ism. But, although he has much respect for the positive 
aspects of their political and social institutions, he does 
496Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 81. 
497Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 3; Polanyi says that 
a similar point is intended in the Hungarian revolutio~. The 
failure of Marxist Hungarian society to allow truth--and moral 
truth--to have its own say in the domain of politics and his-
tory brought forth a rebellion against oppression. The rebel-
lion itself was a message concerning the nature and role of 
truth. The message of the Hungarian revolution is that 
truth must be recognized as an independent power in public 
life. The press must be free to tell the truth; Knowing and 
Being: Essary by Michael Polanyi, edited by Marjorie Grene, 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 24; 
The Hungarian revolution recognized the metaphysical reality 
of truth, justice, morality, and art; and that such an acknow-
ledgment should serve as an axiom of further political thought; 
Meaning, Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch (Chicago: The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 24; For freedom is possible 
only if truth, justice, humaneness, etc., stand above society 
as ideals which it serves. Only then can society be free to 
judge itself; Michael Polanyi, History, Philosophy and the 
Sociology of Science: the Contempt ofFreedom (N.Y'.; N.Y.: 
Arno Press, 1975), p. 11. 
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not consider them an ideal paradigm of what he calls the ''free 
society". Their institutions are based on liberalism and 
utilitarian philosophy. Liberalism in England and America 
implies that only beliefs which are demonstrable should be 
imposed on others (otherwise the conflicting beliefs must be 
tolerated). This in turn implies only demonstrable ethical 
beliefs should be imposed. But liberalism, in Polanyi's view, 
also holds that ethical principles cannot be demonstrated. 
Thus, absolute doubt is applied to traditional ideals, weaken-
ing their force in culture and threatening to destroy the basis 
of freedom of thought. 498 . Indeed, where the logic of liberal-
ism was not suspended but given free reign in Europe, the re-
sult was its self-destruction through pacifism in the face of 
h N . d h f . 499 t e • azls an t e asclsts. 
In practice, however, the logic of liberalism was 
suspended in the U.S. and England. Skepticism was not applied 
to religious beliefs and, thus, moral beliefs. And democra-
tic institutions were allowed to grow while religious belief 
was strong, giving effect to moral principles in a free 
society. 500 The free society, then, relies upon a suspension 
The 
498Meaning, Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 10. 
499 Ibid., p. 13. 
500 Ibid., p. 11. 
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of the liberalism-logic which would, given free reign, destroy 
the foundations of freedom. Utilitarianism, eg., a product 
of liberal thought, cannot condone commitment to ideals which 
demand serious sacrifices. For the principle of utilitari-
anism is to pursue happiness as the highest Good. Neverthe-
less sincerity is often measured by a lack of such prudence 
in pursuing committed ideals which do not lead to happiness 
but to loss. 501 Utilitarians attempt to camouflage selfish-
ness as a lack of self-interest. 502 
Even if the liberal and utilitarian aspects of demo-
cratic institutions are dangerous potentials toward the in-
cursion of a logic of revolution, they still have elements 
to recommend them that are foundational in a free society. 
For they allow everyone to state his beliefs and allow 
others to listen and form their own opinions, which result 
in a free exchange of mind. Such exchanges come as close as 
possible to the truth and are the anti-authoritarian formula 
of liberty. 503 In a free society, the art of free discussion, 
The 
501Meaning, Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 10. 
The 
502Michael Polanyi, The Lo~ic of Liberty (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1 69), p. 98. 
503Meaning, Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 7. 
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as the ground of democratic institutions, is the tradition 
which guides conscience in its decisions. Free discussions 
proceed by the principles mentioned: fairness and tolerance. 
Fairness is putting one's case objectively by sorting out 
facts, opinions, and emotions. Hence our position is clearly 
laid out for opponents. Tolerance is the capacity to listen 
to our opponents and sort out the sound from the unsound 
points. Fairness and tolerance must be exercised in the face 
of a listening and judging public, which is an essential 
partner in free controversy. 504 Interference with the pursuit 
of truth in a free society comes only in the interest of truth 
itself and not of some particular social interest. 505 
. 
Marxism and democratic institutions grounded in liberal 
utilitarianism, then, both represent moral inversions of 
society. Marxism denies the social freedom necessary to pur-
sue truth as an end in itself, particularly in the domains of 
historical and political truth. Hence, moral truth has no 
independent force, and the society is ordered by a "moral" 
concern for dispassionate objectivity in the form of an unjus-
tified use of power and oppression. Liberal-utilitarian 
5 04 · h P 1 . S . F . h d M1c ael o any1, c1ence, a1t , an Society 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 67-8. 
505
rbid., P· 69. 
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institutions allow for tolerance of conflicting points of 
view, unlike Marxist societies. But this only means that 
demonstrability has become the sole criterion of truth, a 
criterion that becomes more and more harsh as demonstration 
becomes more difficult. And the criterion of happiness as 
the ultimate moral guide of action becomes necessary when 
the indemonstrability of moral truth becomes evident. And 
the "happiness principle" is obviously inadequate when we 
are called upon to make ultimate sacrifices for a principle 
we cannot deny as essential for attaining or moving toward 
the Good! 506 
506we might take exception to Polanyi's conception of 
Marxism and a liberal, utilitarian society. We might point 
out concerning Marxism that a commitment to truth might be 
extended from the sciences to all other doma1ns of human 
thought without changing the fundamental principle of Marx-
ist socialism. Polanyi might argue that only the economic 
freedom of capitalism can allow an economy to truly prosper. 
But this only means that Polanyi presupposes that the actual 
discovery of truth, economic growth and stability, etc., are 
marks of the moral truth of his ethical dynamic. If we sup-
pose with him that such achievements are movements toward the 
·Good, then we shall be inclined to his view. But we cannot 
exclude the possibility that, even if Marxism is saddled 
with developmental problems which prevent its proper func-
tioning in Polanyi's own time, its principles of centralized 
control and solidified, co-ordinated societal structure and 
power cannot "work". Polanyi argues that the logic of Marx-
ism leads to a necessity to acknowledge its self-defeat. 
But we must admit that the word "logic" is ill-chosen, since 
an historical outcome can hardly be seen as a logical impli-
cation of the statement of an historical principle. We may 
not, then, be able to agree that Polanyi's critique of Marx-
ism is necessarily correct. But this does not mean that 
Polanyi is wrong about the possibility of achieving the Good 
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These examples of "moral inversion" have the useful 
purpose of throwing into relief Polanyi's notion of a free 
society. We earlier pointed out that the free exploration 
of truth was, in Polanyi's opinion, essential for scientific 
discovery. And we have outlined the ethical dynamic implied 
in the structure of such scientific investigation. Now we 
can precede to outline the ethical structure of the free 
society as informed by the ethic of the republic of science. 
in a free society. It only means that Marxism and a free 
society are not necessarily mutually exclusive in respect to 
thepossibility of achieving the Good. 
Concerning a lib0ral and utilitarian society, we must 
note that again Polanyi has not met the arguments of these 
positions head on, except for the issue of the absolute demon-
strability of knowledge. His argument that an absolute sacri-
fice can be made only on principles inimical to the happiness 
principle of utilitarianism is easily answered by the reply 
of an altruistic utilitarianism which values such sacrifice 
as a part of the meanin~ of utilitarianism. Polanyi has fur-
thermore never clearlyistinguished between his concept of 
the Good and the Good as understood by utilitarians. Quite 
possibly, they are not mutually exclusive. But again, de-
spite Polanyi's ineffective critique of utilitarianism, he 
cannot be judged thereby to be wrong about the ethical dy-
namic of the free society. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
THE FREE SOCIETY 
This chapter on the free society integrates many of 
the arguments developed in my discussion of the republic 
of science as a model of the ethical community and the in-
sights gained through an analysis of moral inversions with 
explicit statements Polanyi makes about a free society. The 
result is an overview of the free, moral community; and this 
overview makes it plain that the expectations concerning 
the nature of ethical society which developed as a result of 
explicitating the tacit ethical structure of Polanyi's epis-
temology and ontology have been met. This discussion of the 
free society concludes the argument of the work as a whole 
and demonstrates the importance of a commitment to continued 
explicitation of ethical knowledge in the communal context. 
Inherent within the ethical structure of the republic 
of science is the freedom to explore domains of scientific 
knowledge and to pursue truth as a value in itself. Marxism 
and utilitarianism represent perversions of •OUT freedom to 
explore, adopt, and reject ideas in the pursuit of our 
"hunches" or insights into truth. Hence, freedom must be 
the fundamental reality of the ethical society: the ethical 
society is a free society. 
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The term "free society" refers to the freedom indi-
viduals have to make significant choices in respect to their 
own lives and for structuring their society. Such a concept 
of freedom would be nonsense unless man's choices made real 
differences. Polanyi is a proponent of political and social 
freedom in so far as he believes in a more fundamental moral 
freedom: man bears responsibility for what he becomes and 
blame or praise may be attached to his deeds. Polanyi is not 
a determinist, as we have already noted. 
Political and moral freedom are grounded in man's 
capacity to perform acts that serve no material need merely 
because they are deemed excellent in th~mselves. 507 Polanyi 
calls this the "spiritual" foundation of freedom and mutual 
respect. Polanyi does not meet head on the epistemological 
and ontological problems that have perennially beset anyone 
who asserts either a doctrine of determinism or of human 
moral freedom. He seems simply to assume naively that an 
observed capacity in man to act in contradiction to his 
apparent benefit is the manifestation of his freedom. His 
approach here remains phenomenological in respect to 
507Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man ( Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 86. 
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a description of freedom, while he improperly assumes this 
description is itself sufficient to establish the case that 
inan ·is free.. This assun:iption is.; no doubt, grounded in his· 
belief that any explicitation of tacit knowledge manifests 
an as'pect of reality. While this assumption may be proper 
in the sense that something of reality i~ revealed even in 
mistaken ideas and that we arejtistified in_commiting our-
selves to what we believe is the best interpretat~on of 
experience, we cannot assert with Polanyi's uncritical 
' 
attitude the reality of human freedom. We must say simply 
that Polanyi may be right and even ~hat we prefer along with 
.. 
him to assume the reality of human freedom and to per~eive 
social structures as amenable to change through man's own 
free capacities. 
Whether the free society is grounded in human moral 
I 
I freedom is not, however, an essential poi~t to_decide for 
the case I am presen~ly establishing. ~ ' We 'need only acknow-
ledge that Polanyi himself believes in human fre~dom and that 
this belief plays a key role in his concept of the scientific 
enterprise and of the nature of social change and develop-
ment. Polanyi deems science as the prime example of man's 
capacity to act beyond his needs in accordance with what is 
"excellent in itself": truth. Dedicatio·n to science is at 
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. 508 
the same time the acceptance o{ an obligation to be free. 
There is no demand for absolute conformity .in free science, 
since the professional standards of science themselves impose 
a discipline that recognizes and_ encourages the right of rebel-
lion against these standards for the sake of preserving 
originality. 509 We should, then., expect Polanyi to champion 
not only the moral freedom which grounds human responsibility 
but also the exercise of that freedom within the social and 
political structure of society. 
' For Polanyi, moral freedom shades into political 
freedom as the moral power of self-determination becomes 
enmeshed with a cultural tradition. A self-determ-4:-Rative 
society thus achieves thi power to achieve knowledge and trans-
form itself while preserving individual initiative. The 
freedom of social self-determination is grounded not only in 
moral freedom but, perhaps just as importantly, in the free-
dom to pursue truth for truth's sake. But freedom of thought 
cannot be restricted to the scientific enterprise. Polanyi 
extends the need for pure, theoretical knowledge of truth 
t 11 d · f k 1 d · 1 d. 1· 510 o a oma1ns o · now e ge, 1nc u 1ng mora 1ty. 
509Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, ed. 
by Marjorie Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1969), pp. 54-5. . 
510Michael Polanyi, History, Philosophy, and the 
Socioloay of Science: the Contem t of Freedom (N.Y., N.Y.: 
rno Press, 1975 , p. 10. 
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Moral knowledge, knowledge of what is right and of 
what is good, is, then, an important part of the self-deter-
mination of the free society. The free society must be free 
for the sciences as well as for truth in every domain includ-
ing the truth of what it ought to do and to value. 
Polanyi does not believe that either utilitarian or 
totalitarian societies include the general respect for truth 
that is essential for social freedom. 511 His misunderstand-
ing that utilitariansim is fundamentally egocentric is, as 
we have seen, responsible for his belief that it overlooks 
the need for general rules of conduct and tends to nihilism~12 
And his perception of totalitarianism as requiring blind sub-
mission to impersonal standards of knowledge and action is 
resp~nsible for his assertion that this also denies a respect 
for truth. Concerning such respect for truth, Polanyi says, 
The recongition granted in a free society to the 
independent growth of science, art and morality, 
involves a dedication of society to the fostering 
of a specific tradition of thought, transmitted and 
cultivated by a particular group of authoritative 
specialists,· perpetuating themselves by co-option. 
To uphold the independence of thought implemented 
by such a society is to subscribe to a kind of 
orthodoxy which though it specifies no fixed arti-
cles of faith, is virtually unassailable within 
51 ~chael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 19. 
51 ~ichael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago: The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 32-3. 
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the limits imposed on the process of innovation by 
the cultural leadership of a free society.Sl3 
Truth in all domains of human thought, including 
morality, is the fundamental drive of a society that dwells 
in the freedom to pursue the Good on its own flexible terms. 
This general drive to truth includes a search for moral 
truth; and this search is successful in its continued con-
firmation of truth as the sine qua non of achieving the Good 
and in its discovery of universal principles of conduct which 
guide society to ever more profound realizations of the Good. 
We can understand, then, why Polanyi considers freedom of 
thought in general as the essence of moral thought and free-
dom. And we can appreciate his acknowledgment that such 
freedom is a priviledge to be gained through political strug-
gle, a struggle which demands our total commitment which can-
not be met by proposing an ideal of superior detachment. 
Rising above the struggle with an attitude of detachment 
withdraws us from the struggle and j~opardizes freedom 
"t If 514 ~ se . 
S 13M . h 1 P 1 . P 1c ae o any1, ersonal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophr (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
19 6 2) ' pp. 2 4 4- 5 . 
514Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Sdciet~ 
(Chicago: The University of Ch1cago Press, 1966), p .. 
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The necessity of freedom to pursue truth in every 
domain for the sake of discovering and preserving the moral 
truth that enables society to freely pursue the Good demands 
a reasoned effort to shape society toward maximum freedom 
and to discover truth. In the social context, Polanyi means 
by "reason" a commitment to fairness and tolerance. 515 
Fairness and tolerance must be exercised in the face 
of a listening and judging public, which is an essential 
partner in free controversy. 516 Any interference with the 
pursuit of truth in a free society must come only in the 
interest of truth itself and not in the interest qf some par~ 
. 1 . 1 . t 517 t1cu ar soc1a · comm1tmen . 
Free thought, then, demands the fairness of putting 
one's case objectively, of sorting out facts, opinions, and 
emotions. And it demands the capacity to listen to opposing 
points of view, to sort out the sound points from the unsound 
points. It demands that society give independent status and 
a theoretically unrestricted range to thought,even if in 
SlSMichael Polanyi, The Lo§ic of Liberty (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1 69), p. 29. 
516Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 67-8. 
517 Ibid., p. 69. 
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practice it must impose a particular code of laws and a pub-
lic education on society. 518 Only then, under such circum-
stances, can truth open onto the moral realities by which 
we pursue an ever more profound realization of the communal 
Good. 
The free society is defined, as is science (a soci~ty 
of free explorers), mainly by its attitude toward the dis-
covery of truth. Four elements constitute the relation be-
tween society and truth in general: 
1) a belief that there is such a thing as truth 
2) a belief that all members of society love truth 
3) a belief that all members of society feel 
obliged to follow the truth 
4) a belief that all members are in fact pursuing 
truth 
These elements are quickly lost in a society which fails to 
preserve them or profoundly doubts any one of them. Polanyi 
says that we must have confidence in them in order to cre-
h . . 519 w h d. ate t em 1n soc1ety. e cannot expect trut to 1scover 
itself, nor can we precede alone without the support of the 
community. All four of these elements are necessary. We 
518Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 214. 
519Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Societ; 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p.l. 
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must call forth the respect latent in every man for the truth 
by placing as much confidence as possible in his actual pur-
suit of it. In this area, doubt itself can destroy the honest 
effort on the part of others to cooperate in the discovery of 
truth. 
The social dimension of truth, then, is very impor~ 
tant in Polanyi's view. In an ideal free society, everyone 
would have perfect access to the truth in all domains. But 
this is not practicable in concrete society; each person 
must rely on others for truth since he is capable of knowing 
very little directly himself. 520 Society, then, functions to 
foster mutual reliance of persons in pursuit of truth, as 
exemplified through the services of social institutions. 
These institutions aid the discovery of truth, even though 
they limit each man's freedom. 521 
The coherence of a free society is spontaneously 
established by self-coordination (polycentric or mutual con-
_trol). Thus, authority is exercised by equals over each 
other, and all tasks are set by each to himself. In Polanyi's 
view, such a social dynamic opens man radically to an emerg-
ing sense of meaning that is cosmic in proportion and gives 
520 We have already noted the importance of this in 
the previous discussion of the nature of social relations. 
521Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man ( Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 68. 
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man a purpose bearing on eternity because of its fruitful-
ness for truth. The actions of individuals in a society 
ordered by spontaneous interaction are said to be free in 
so far as they are not determined by a specific command. 
Th . 1 . 1 . 1 1 5 2 2 e1r compu s1ons are on y 1mpersona or genera . 
Polanyi says, 
Public liberty can be fully upheld as an aim in 
itself, in so far as it is the method for the social 
management of purposes that are aims in themselves. 
Freedom of science, freedom of worship, freedom of 
thought in general, are public institutions by which 
society-opens to its members the opportunity for 
serving aims that are purposes in themselves. By 
establishing these freedoms, society constitutes 
itself as a community of people believing in the 
validity and power of things of the mind and in our 
obligation to these things.523 
This belief acknowledges that in a free society, society as 
a whole cannot know the public interest. Rather, this is 
-known only fragmentarily and is left to be achieved as the 
outcome of individual initiatives aiming at fragmentary 
problems. 524 
This does not mean, of course, that there is no 
supervision of group efforts. Group efforts are sometimes 
The 
522Michael Polanyi, The Lo~ic of Liberty 
University of Chicago Press, 1 69), p. 159. 
523
rbid., p. 193. 
(Chicago: 
524Micahel Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its 
Political and Economic Theor-y~(nC~h~i~c~a __ g_o_:~~R~o-o-s~e~v~e7l~t~U~n~i~v~e~r~sity, 
1962)' pp. 26-7. 
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supervised by some form of centralized planning. But such 
instances are designed to serve the goal of maximizing all 
possible individual initiative. Polanyi says, 
As long as c·ertain guiding principles- -of truth, of 
justice, of religious faith, of decency and equity--
are being cultivated, and as long as commerce is 
protected, the sphere of supervision will predomi-
nate and planning will be limited to isolated patches 
and streaks.S25 
Thus, only if civic thought is shaped by the same principles 
that sustain the freedom of individual thought can civic 
h h b f d f 1 h "d 1 f . 526 t oug t e ree an power u to s ape 1 ea ree soc1ety. 
A dynamic orthodoxy, then, claims to be a guide in 
the search for truth and, thus, grants the right to opposi-
tion in the name of truth. Truth, considered broadly here, 
is any mode of excellence in which we recognize the ideal of 
self improvement. Freedom is safeguarded in that, although 
there are restrictions on what people can do (one cannot 
simply do as he pleases), there is an assured right to speak 
the truth as one kn·ows it. The cultivation of public free-
dom in this sense--and not as a private freedom to do as one 
525Michael Polanyi, History, Philosopht, and the 
Sociolo of Science: the Contem t of FreedomN.Y., N.Y.: 
rno Press, 19 , p. 
526Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962)' p. 222. 
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pleases--is the distinguishing mark of a free society. 527 
This freedom takes on the form of polycentricism 
within the societal context. But, although Polanyi explicitly 
extends the preferability of a polycentric system of mutual 
adjustment beyond science to literary and artistic circles, 
he is ambivalent about whether such a system applies to the 
appreciation of moral ideas. In the Tacit Dimension, a later 
work, he denies the validity of polycentric mutual control to 
moral ideas and asserts indirectly that such controls do not 
apply to politics since politics is a deliberate organization 
of moral .ideas. 528 But in Science, Faith and Society, he says. 
that the way in which each person is an equal partner in the 
development of the "general will" in the Republic of Science 
may be generalized to other modes of discovery in literature, 
h d . 1" . 529 t e arts, an 1n po 1t1cs. Thus, he implies that moral 
ideas also fall under such a system. 
This contradiction does not receive clarification in 
Polanyi's works. But I do not think it represents a fatal 
slip. Obviously Polanyi believes that moral ideas are truths 
527Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its 
Political and Economic Theory (Chicago, Roosevelt Universiyt, 
1962), p. 26. 
528Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 83-4. 
529Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 16-17. 
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which are discovered in their own right. My previous argu-
ments have shown that Polanyi clearly implies this. Further, 
we have already noted that moral change comes about by allow-
ing our behavior to be guided by higher principles than they 
were before. So moral ideas are truths about principles of 
human conduct which lead toward the realization of our highest 
values: The Good. These ideas are parallel to scientific 
truths in that both they and scientific truths should be 
distinguished from the societal procedures which make possible 
their discovery. These procedures, as, eg., a system of mu-
tual adjustment, may be more applicable to some domains of 
knowledge than others. Since_·§ome domains, such as science, 
require and generally operate through the efforts of large 
numbers of scholars, they are most amenable to systems of 
mutual control. But this does not mean that the ideas dis-
covered are true or false by virtue of public opinion. It 
only means that certain lines of research are supported by 
the community according to the public opinion of the scien-
tific community. In the case of moral ideas, there is no 
large number of scholars which must adjust their findings 
in the light of one another's research. Indeed, the content 
of ethical discoveries are not the result of empirical 
researches as in science but are more personal appropri-
ations of meaning within the community. Activities, such as 
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political, economic, and legal activities, may be adjusted 
mutually; but the values and principles of the ethical domain 
require communal support as absolute goals and rules of be-
havior. 
What appears to be a contradiction in Polanyi, then, 
is really his indirect way of affirming the autonomy of the 
moral domain of knowledge and action. He denies the princi-
ple of mutual control to moral truths because they represent 
absolute intentions of the community. But he affirms mutual 
control to those institutions which are formed in the context 
of realizing these moral goals: the functioning of society 
which undergirds its realization of moral truth and the Good. 
Thus, Polanyi can say that it is the orthodoxy of free 
thought that forms the coercive power of the state and its 
institutions. For the institutional framework of a society 
that forwards free thought is the free society, which gives the 
maximum opportunity for the realization of moral truth. 530 
And so also he can affirm that even the laws of the free 
society are developed by a form of mutual control in that each 
judgment relies on that of previous judgments. 531 
530Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962)' p. 245. < 
531Michae1 Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 162-3. 
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This mutual control, however, cannot be accomplished 
via a central authority. No committee of scientists, eg., 
could forecast the further progress of science, except for 
routine extensions of the existing system. No scientific 
advance can be foretold by a committee. Such a committee 
could consider only problems of no real scientific value, 
totally devoid of originality. Only individuals can, by 
life-time concentration, discover really worthwhile prob-
lems.532 Individuals, then, mus~ be free to follow the in-
sinuations of truth in any direction which can be supported 
by the scientific community as a whole. Where specific 
authority, claiming alone to have contact with the center 
of general authority, demands obedience through an abdica-
tion of ultimate judgment to their center, the result is 
the loss of this precious freedom. 533 
Polanyi, then, argues that polycentric adjustment is 
essential not only in science, which flourishes only under 
such a system, but also for the development of culture. The 
freedom inherent in such polycentricity is, by implication, 
also necessary. Indeed, he says that a collectivist revolu-
tion must, for the sake of itself, suppress the liberties of 
533Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 59. 
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534 
universities, law courts, churches, the press, etc. Again, 
Again, "General planning is wholesale destruction of freedom; 
cultural planning would be the end of all inspired enquiry, 
of every creative effort, and planned economy would make life 
into something between a universal monastery and forced labor 
camp".535 
These criticisms do not mean that Polanyi beJfej)ves 
polycentric systems of government do not have inherent risks. 
He acknowledges that without a centralized specific authority, 
it is impossible to safeguard entirely against arbitrariness 
and decisional mistakes. But this risk does safeguard the 
freedom necessary for any field of human endeavor to survive 
as such. Competent opinion as normative must be given free-
dom of expression, though no degree of infallibility should 
be attached to these. 536 
The free society, then, is essentially a community of 
persons bound by ethical values of truth, right action, and 
the ideal of maximal freedom within a society ordered toward 
the realization of the Good and the preservation of justice. 
534Michael Polanyi, History, Philosophy, and the 
Sociology of Science: the Contempt of Freedom (N.Y., N.Y.: 
Arne Press, 1975), p. 40. 
535 Ibid., p. 60. 
536Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 60-1. 
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The same human ordering that makes the discovery of truth 
possible in science and other intellectual endeavors is 
essential to the political truths which make order possible 
at all. 537 And the preservation of human order toward reali-
zation of the Good is essential to human success in any broad 
ranging social venture. Identifying free self-determination 
with democratic institutions, Polanyi says that the "demo-
cratic spirit" which guides the life of a free nation is para-
llBl to the scientific spirit that underlies the activity of 
the scientific community, particularly in its sharing of fun-
damental beliefs on a communal leve1. 538 Thus, Polanyi, 
seems committed to the establishment of a free soci~ty that 
is free by virtue of its commitment to freedom, to truth, and 
to a moral order that preserves these ideals. 
The principle of the embodiment of higher levels in 
lower ones is, thus, extended to the moral and social rela-
. f .bl h . 539 M 1· . 1 t 1ons o respons 1 e c o1ces. r ora 1 ty 1s on a leve 
higher than society's organization for power and profit. The 
537 Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, ed. 
by Marjorie Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1969)' p. 68. 
538Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 70. 
539Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man ( Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 67-8. 
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higher principle is rooted in the lower one, so that moral 
progress is rooted in an exercise of power and in aiming at 
material advantage. Absolute morality cannot be applied to 
society, since power and wealth are always limiting mech-
. d d. 540 an1sms an act as me 1ums. Nonetheless, such mediums 
cannot sustain themselves; they require an ultimate aim at 
the social and intellectual skills and tasks, including 
morality. 
And because our participation is most deeply tacit, 
even new values within society are bred tacitly, by implica-
tion. Within the social context, we do not explicitly 
choose a new set of values as though they pre-existed and 
had only to be chosen. Rather, we submit to them in the very 
act of creating them. 541 Thus, our tacit indwelling within 
the social context of the search for the Good is in context, 
not only of the moral life in which we presently participate, 
but also of the originating forces of new values. 
540Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 87. 
541Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City 
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. xi. 
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Polanyi views society as having both an intellectual 
and moral task in preserving and forwarding the Good, a task 
he says rests in the last resort on the free conscience of 
every generation. 54 2 And the call of conscience involves the 
aspiration to preserve the ideal of the free society: a 
good society; i.e., one which respects the truth, desires 
justice, and loves its fellows.543 And only a nation which 
is sensitive to the claims of conscience and can follow them 
is free. 544 Society, then, is an instrument of our conscience. 
It protects us from our own greed and ambition as well as 
from corruption from others. Thus, man is morally dependent 
on his civic contacts through which his moral life is organ-
ized. Social responsibilities provide the occasion for moral 
542Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Societ~ 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 8 . 
543Michael Polanyi, The Lo~ic of Liberty (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1 69), p. 30. Scientific 
Thought and Social Reality, ed., by Fred Schwarz (N.Y., N.Y.: 
International Universities Press, Inc., 1974), p. 65. 
54 4Michael Polanyi, The Lo~ic of Liberty (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1 69), p. 45. 
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life. In this sense, then, the free society is an end in 
. lf 545 1tse . 
Polanyi says, 
But the restraint which power incurs as the price of 
employing morality for its own coercive purposes 
proves only that morality is an indispensable, though 
self-willed ally to power. It does not demonstrate 
that morality can ever control power according to its 
own principles; civic culture still remains dependent 
on force and material ends, and remains therefore sus-
pect. Nor does the history of free societies dispel 
this suspicion. We see, on the contrary, how every 
new moral issue has evoked a clash of interests, how 
often moral progress had to be forced upon the pri-
vileged by the pressure of the oppressed ... 546 
The reality of the moral domain provides the ground for the 
possibility of a conflict between forces which·restrict free-
dom and those which forward it. But Polanyi explicitly sums 
up the relations between the moral power of a free society 
and the political, social, and legal changes within it: 
To describe the institutional framework within which 
moral, legal and political opinions are thus con-
tinuously re-moulded in a free society would lead 
us too far. Suffice it to give some of the results 
of this process, which has radically changed life 
in the free countries since the principles of social 
reform gained wider acceptance some 130 years ago. 
There has taken place a far reaching humanization 
of the criminal law and of the prison system, and 
similarly of discipline in the army and the navy, 
while the same changes have gone on in the schools, 
545Scientific Thought and Social Reality, ed. by 
Fred Schwarz (N.Y., N.Y.: International Universities Press, 
Inc., 1974), p. 65. 
546Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962)' p. 226. 
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assylums, hospitals and within the family itself; 
the Factory Laws have enforced more humane condi-
tions of employemnt in an immense variety of ways; 
new welfare institutions have been set up to provide 
for the sick and the aged, for the disabled, the un-
employed and the slum dwellers; free education has 
greatly widened the prospects of poorer people's 
children; the legal disabilities of women, of Catho-
lics, Jews and of the colonial peoples have been 
removed or at least greatly reduced; the extension 
of the franchise and the recognition of Trade Unions 
have shifted the balance of power in favour of 
hitherto subordinate classes. All these were moral 
improvements of society which in England's history, 
for example, can be traced back to a series of 
specific movements appealing to the public con-
science; movements which had usually been evoked in 
the first place by persuasive individuals devoted to 
the advocacy of one particular reform. Such is the 
dynamism of the modern free society. It consists in 
the moral progress of civic thought, which transmits 
its conclusions, through the machinery of self-govern-
ment, into acts of social reform. It is the prac-
tical outcome of an intellectual process, moved by 
its own passions and guided by its own standards.547 
This quote shrn~ the distinctly positive role of the 
moral domain in the free society. It sums up the unique 
interrelations between the moral, political, and generally 
social forces of the community, showing how moral directions 
undergird other social developments. And each social change 
is a change for the better, a "better" informed by the in-
sight into the Good within the moral domain. 
But to what extent can we take the power of the moral 
domain in society? I do not intend within the scope of this 
547Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962)' pp. 222-3. 
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work to delineate in detail the functions of moral life in 
the total development of society, though such an investiga-
tion would be highly valuable. We can, however, observe 
some very general statements in Personal Knowledge which con-
firm our argued expectation that a powerful, independent 
moral domain actually directs through a pursuit of moral know-
ledge our movement toward the Good--and carries us beyond 
society to the heart of the Good! 
We have spoken of Polanyi's ontology as an "ultra-
biology", according to his own notion of the import of his 
work. In this respect, he says, 
The whole ontology of commitment and of a free society 
dedicated to-the cultivation of thought by responsi-
ble commitments of its members can in fact be built 
up, in this manner, as a generalization of biology 
followed by reflection on this generalized biology. 
Thus, at the confluence of biology and philosophical 
self-accrediting, man stands rooted in his calling 
i under a firmament of truth and greatness. Its teach-
ings are the idiom of his thought: the voice by 
which he commands himself to satisfy his intellectual 
standards. Its commands harness his powers to the 
exercise of his responsibilities. It binds him to 
abiding purposes~ and grants him power and freedom 
to defend them.s~s 
548Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962)' p. 380. 
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The purpose to which we are bound and for which we 
are empowered ultimately is the evolution of our personhood, 
which Polanyi says produces novel centers of being. 549 The 
capacity of the free society to sustain such evolution is 
grounded in its nurturance of a free exploration of new 
responses to moral dilemmas. Such explorations are "random 
impacts" which release the functioning of a novel ordering 
principle. Polanyi perceives such random impacts as produc-
. b. . h. t 550 1ng 10t1c ac 1evemen s. 
But the direction of evolution transcends mere intel-
lectual and social development: 
The appraisal of living beings merges into an acknow-
ledgment of the ideals transmitted by our intellec-
tual heritage. This is the point at which the theory 
of evolution finally bursts through the bounds of 
natural science and bec0mes entirely an affirmation 
of man's ultimate aims. For the emergent noospehre 
is wholly determined as that which we believe to be 
true and right; it is the external pole of our com-
mitments, the service of which is our freedom. It 
defines a free society as a fellowship fostering 
truth and respecting the right.551 
Finally, what is the point of arguing for the reality 
of the moral domain and its power to shape society? The 
549Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 401. 
550
rbid., pp. 402-3. 
551
rbid., p. 404. 
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point is that man bears a moral responsibility for what he 
becomes; and that he bears the potential of becoming some-
thing so much greater than what he is at present that his 
future is inconceivable. 
So far as we know, the tiny fragments of the universe 
embodied in man are the only centres of thought and 
responsibility in the visible world. If that be so, 
the appearance of the human mind has been so far the 
·ultimate stage in the awakening of the world ... We 
may then envisage a cosmic field which called forbh 
all these centers by offering them a short-lived, 
limited hazardous opportunity for making some pro-
gress of their own towards an unthinkable consuma-
tion.SS2 
We end this long and complex argument for knowledge 
of values and of the right within a Polanyian context of 
personal knoWledge with this quotation from Personal Knowledge. 
I have argued that, since the dynamic of tacit knowledge is 
the same throughout all domains of knowledge such as science, 
history, art, political science, etc., then one ought to 
extend the form of personal knowledge to which it commits us 
to the moral domain as well. The evidence, both tacit and 
explicit, for such an extension was shown to be abundant. 
Furthermore, Polanyi's ontology provided grounds for an argu-
ment for a notion of the ethically right, of a standard of 
552Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 405. 
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behavior which is comprehended in terms both of Polanyi's 
biotically oriented ontology and his epistemology. 
Finally, the argument for knowledge of the Good (and 
values) and of the right was confirmed in its correctness 
through an analysis of Polanyi's social and political thought. 
We were able to discern the structure of moral knowledge with-
in Polanyi's social thought, though such discernment would be 
impossible without a clear knowledge of what to look for, a 
knowledge gained in the analysis of his epistemology and 
ontology. Let us review briefly what these expectations were 
and how they were met. Based upon the tacit ethical struc-
ture which we explicitated, we should have expected to find: 
1) that science itself would be viewed as an enter-
prise amenable to an "ethics" of procedure which 
guarantees the discovery of truth. 
2) that science would reveal most if not all of the 
elements of a moral community: it would be a 
mini-model of the ethical community. 
3) that a moral community would include (following 
the lead of the republic of science) freedom (and 
free exploration), committed conviction, autonomy, 
and a role for conscience. 
4) that Polanyi would show a belief in the reality 
and importance of moral rules in a social context. 
He should believe in some kind of Good and in the 
possibility of right actioD. 
5) moral rules should be principles we can learn, in-
dwell, and develop to higher principles. 
6) that there should be a role for symbols inithe 
moral community, particularly in the form of moral 
heroes. 
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7) that Polanyi would present a theory which would 
attempt to resolve the tension between societal 
control and freedom, since he believes in both 
of these. 
8) that there should be evident some vision of a free 
society that functions according to moral principles. 
Now it is evident in these last three chapters that these ex-
pectations have been met. Expectations 1-3 were met in the 
discussion of the republic of science when I showed that sci-
ence does have a commitment to truth that demands certain 
behavioral recommendations and restrictions: in short, science 
procedes on the basis of an ethical dynamic which holds truth 
as its highest ideal. ·Truth is the moral ideal of science and, 
as such, it directs the activities of those who would pursue 
it. Hence free exploration (including the sort of freedom 
which grants us moral responsibility), personal conviction, 
autonomy, and social conscience all form a part of the repub-
lic of science. 
In Polanyi's discussion of rules of rightness as ap-
plied to communal life and as informed by social conscience 
and a concern for both moral truth and truth in general we 
find expectation 4 met. Further, in this discussion, Polanyi 
refers to the interiorization of moral teaching. And this is 
essentially a concept of moral knowledge as indwelt (meeting 
part of the fifth expectation). In my discussion of the corn-
rnunal change of moral consciousness, I show that Polanyi not 
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only believes in moral development but allows for the role of 
moral heroes in this development, satisfying the rest of the 
fifth and all of the sixth expectation. Thus, there is 
development toward the communal Good as a change of moral con-
sciousness toward a greater and more profound grasp of moral 
principles. 
The seventh expectation is satisfied in Polanyi's 
application of polycentric adjustment and mutual control. The 
inversions of morality which come from restricting the free-
dom to pursue truth through the dynamic of these maximally 
free controls throw into releive the vision of the free society 
which Polanyi gives us in satisfaction of our last expectation. 
I hope that this delineation of the-ethical dimension 
of personal knowledge will provide a fresh and interesting 
approach to the questions: What should I value? and What 
should I do? 
THE END 
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